THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR

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—man being frail
does on himself prevail,
and with a single thought
can bring the world to naught. . . .
—HUMBERT WOLFE

THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR

is edited by persons who have a deep faith in those lines, and edited for readers who believe with them that a "single thought can bring the world to naught." Particularly at a time when so much of the *action* in the world seems wrongheaded and unwise is it essential to make clear thinking prevail.

THEREFORE we believe you want to continue reading THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR: because you want to go on aligning yourself with those who are striving to see things clearly; because you want to share in some of this country's important thinking.

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Forth—to War?

A. J. MUSTE

AMONG those groups who are trying to abolish war, who for the most part still believe another major war would be an indescribable calamity, to be prevented at all costs, there are sharp and passionately-held differences as to how to achieve the desired result. It will be helpful if all concerned steadfastly resist the temptation to impugn motives. The advocate of "collective security" or "concerted action" may believe the policy of "neutrality"—of refusing for example to sell arms to both "aggressor" and "non-aggressor" nations—simply encourages the "aggressor" nations to war upon smaller powers today and strengthens them for a general war tomorrow in which "neutral" nations are certain to be involved. Pacifists, on the other hand, may be equally certain that "collective security" is in practice simply "collective insecurity" or "collective suicide" and is leading straight to just such another war between two sets of imperialist powers as every one agrees the War of 1914-18 was. So long as each honestly believes the course of the other is in effect, "objectively considered," a war-course, he can but hold to his conviction, advocate it and act upon it. Even so that process of discussion and clarification which is our one hope (and which we still have an opportunity to carry on in the United States) will be aided if each group recognizes the honesty of the other's motives; and if in so serious a matter each refrains from puerile efforts merely to win debating points over the other.

I want to deal first with the contention, advanced by many "sanctionists," that a prompt and serious application of economic sanctions against "aggressor" nations will stop their aggression and prevent war. That contention of course proceeds on the assumption that the international situation today can be correctly described as one of "gangster" nations arrayed against

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other nations that are qualified and willing to act as "policemen." The general validity of that point of view I wish to discuss later, though I must touch on certain aspects of it in dealing with the problem now before us.

The idea that economic sanctions need not and will not lead to war—i.e. to military sanctions—and that the application of economic sanctions is therefore the available and effective way to stop aggression and war is thoroughly fallacious. Let us take a concrete case frequently brought forward in these discussions. If Great Britain and France had made clear to Mussolini before he embarked on his Ethiopian venture—or even during its course—that they were really determined to deprive him of the means to wage war (of oil for example) Mussolini would have been stopped, we are told. The "if" in this case is a very big one. Despite the undoubted demand of multitudes in such a country as England and the gigantic labors of the statesmen, effective sanctions were not applied. Why not? Because for one thing before Mussolini decided to take Ethiopia France, through Laval, had given him a definite commitment not to interfere with his plan. France, which had presumably based her post-War policy upon "collective security" and the League of Nations, was therefore in no position to engage in the application of sanctions that would cripple Italy's war plans. And if, because of pressure from British popular opinion or for whatever reason, the British government had pursued any further than it did the sanctions policy which Anthony Eden symbolized, her course would obviously have proved very embarrassing to her ally France. Immediately there would have arisen exceedingly grave and delicate questions as to how far the entente with France could be endangered. Furthermore the British government did not come into the situation with perfectly clean hands and entire freedom of action. In view of the British imperialist adventures in Africa in the pre-War period, and of the gains for Britain in Africa provided in the peace treaties, it was difficult when dealing with a realist like Mussolini for Great Britain to pose as the defender of the independence of

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African peoples. Moreover there were British-Italian treaties and memoranda dealing specifically with Ethiopia. One of them had specified that no matter whether England or Italy moved first for the conquest of the country, the other would be let in on the spoils on a 50-50 basis.

Every important situation has developed the same difficulty in getting important powers to act in concert in applying drastic economic sanctions. The reason is always basically the same. Each power is concerned first of all in protecting and advancing its own interests. It is involved in a network of commitments made in the course of playing the game of power-politics. Obviously this casts doubt upon the validity of the "gangster versus policemen" interpretation of the international scene.

This leads us directly to another aspect of the problem of economic sanctions in the Italo-Ethiopian episode. Mussolini regarded the proposal to apply sanctions against Italy as an act of war. In this was he not realistic and honest? And do not those persons who regard the application of economic sanctions as an act of peace that will not normally lead to war fall into romantic and unwittingly dishonest thinking? Had England placed battleships in the way of Italian troopships and thus sided with Ethiopia no one would have labelled this anything but an act of war—justifiable or not, but in any case war. If instead England had organized a movement to prevent Italy from getting fuel for these troopships and at the same time had kept supply lines for the other belligerent open, surely the effect would have been the same. What is this but an "act of war"—unless we are interested in quibbles over technicalities? Certainly it causes wonderment to hear liberals and radicals contend that a hard and fast line can be drawn between economic and military policy and that the application of economic sanctions is a way to "wage peace" rather than another variant of an attempt to prevent or end war by means of war. And these are the very same radicals who have always contended that war in the military sense is merely a continuation of the economic struggle between imperialist nations; the very same

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liberals who have eloquently denounced the blockade of Germany as a peculiarly cruel kind of warfare.

Frequently these people seem to me guilty of another inconsistency. They contend, on the one hand, that the instability of the fascist economy drives the dictators toward war; and on the other hand they regard the dictators (and many would cover in their subjects) as psychopathic: these dictators must be stopped because they are mad, they are bent on war, they are running amok. Then these liberals turn around and argue that if we apply economic sanctions (i.e. still further increase the insecurity of the fascist countries' economy) and threaten these nations with disgrace from the failure of an "aggressive" adventure and their dictators with defeat, they will fold up. This seems to me an utter *non sequitur*. I am confident we must obviously anticipate that in desperation the dictator and his allies (who certainly cannot be expected to sit quietly and smilingly by while he is being politely ushered off the stage) will risk war.

Realistic sanctionists—including for example Anthony Eden—frankly admit the truth of this contention. Eden told his constituents there were effective sanctions and ineffective; he said the latter were not worth fooling with, but if a nation intended to apply the former it must be prepared to follow them up with armed force if the "aggressor" took the gamble of war. Here again the Italo-Ethiopian episode furnishes a telling illustration. When Mussolini was threatened with oil sanctions he in effect informed the British government that if the threat were carried out he would bomb British battleships in the Mediterranean. Thereupon the British naval experts and government declared Britain insufficiently armed to keep an adequate fleet in the Mediterranean—and the huge armament-building program was launched, with virtually no opposition from the Labor Party and other sanctionists in England. Now either the naval experts and the government were right, i.e. realistic, in their conclusions about what a people who enter upon a drastic program of economic sanctions must be prepared to do; or else

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they were only bluffing and simply took advantage of the episode and its effect on British opinion to launch a huge armament program which they wanted for other, presumably more sinister, purposes. If the former were true, economic sanctions cannot be relied upon not to lead to war; if the latter, it becomes impossible to think of Britain as a noble and highly moral policeman desiring to bring the Italian gangster down in the name of the peace of the world, or qualified to do so.

On the part of persons in power every proposal looking toward "quarantining" so-called aggressors is associated with proposals for increasing armaments—*vide* President Roosevelt's Chicago speech and the billion-dollar super-navy program. And in each case we are faced with the alternatives already indicated. These statesmen may be honestly realistic in believing that if "concerted action" is contemplated those committed to it must be prepared for all contingencies, including war; and no matter how much advocates of "concerted action" may deprecate an armament race and believe economic measures will suffice, they will certainly be forced, unawares perhaps, somewhat to moderate their opposition to the armament program of the statesman whose international policy they support. The alternative (that the statesman in question really desires the increased armament for some other than the announced purpose) places the "sanctionist" in an awkward position: that his excitement over the "aggression" of a foreign power has provided a smoke-screen behind which his own government pursues imperialist and militaristic designs.

The real situation may be put in still another way. "Sanctionists" have often argued that economic measures alone, unaccompanied by any military force or threat of force, can stop a specific "aggressor" in his tracks. But precisely how do we remove armies and navies and air forces, and the threat to use them, from the "picture"? Does the fact that for the moment no guns are fired, remove from the picture the British navy which rides at anchor in the North Sea or the American which lies off Los Angeles and Norfolk? It is the height of naïveté to

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think so. So long as independent nations, each claiming the right to wage war on its own initiative, are powerfully armed these armaments necessarily constitute a decisive element in the situation. At a given moment the game of power politics is played not only with the cards of economic pressures which are on the table, but with those cards representing armies, battleships and bombers which the players hold in their hands. Economic sanctions applied by such powers are camouflaged military sanctions.

Viewed as a purely technical problem, it is a far from simple matter to set up an effective scheme of economic sanctions—to "isolate" an "aggressor." The flow of trade as it affects many different countries is likely to be disrupted in various ways. After the War the world tried to cripple Germany's economy as well as her military machine, in the hope that the rebirth of German military power and German militarism might be prevented. Surely our experience there should have taught us some lessons we ought not to ignore. For that attempt so seriously affected the British and French economy that the greatest difficulties were encountered in arranging for the payment of reparations even in the days when the victors still believed they wanted to collect and when German governments were disposed to make a genuine effort to attempt some payment. Those who advocate economic sanctions as applied by the concerted action of several countries are the first to point out the admittedly real difficulties involved should a country with even such great and varied resources as the United States try to "isolate" itself to the degree involved in carrying out a policy of not trading in war materials with any belligerents. But surely this problem is much simpler than that of getting a number of nations to work out and carry through an effort to "isolate" a powerful "aggressor"—with which the isolating nations must, by definition, have fairly important trade relations since otherwise the interruption of trade would have no effect.

Largely out of fear that economic sanctions will be imposed, leading nations have tried to achieve economic self-sufficiency.

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But this effort is precisely one of the most unsettling factors in the present world-scene and it ought to be resisted in all possible ways. The same fear tends to create solidarity between a dictator and his people (as has been demonstrated by many boycott campaigns in all parts of the world) whereas it would be sound policy to drive a wedge between them.

Only one further observation seems necessary before we leave the relationship between economic and military sanctions. It has to do with so-called "people's boycotts," "workers' sanctions" etc. In theory there are differences between these and the sanctions applied by governments against each other. If, for example, labor organizations should prevent the transport to a belligerent country of munitions which manufacturers desire to sell (and which it is legal to sell) these organizations would to that extent be interfering with the smooth operation of the economic (profit) system. Furthermore they would be intervening in political affairs by direct action, determining for themselves the "foreign policy" of the nation. Swift steps would be taken against such unions if they obstructed the transport of supplies to a "friendly" power. Any direct action by workers' organizations in this field is basically revolutionary, directed against the capitalist state, and in the abstract therefore not subject to the criticism that it simply strengthens imperialism at home. But is it logical or efficacious for those who oppose the capitalist and imperialist status quo to draw a line among the great powers and regard some as "friendly" and others as "unfriendly" from a labor or revolutionary standpoint? Those who advocate "people's boycotts" (against Japanese silk, for example) often contend that such boycotts distinguish between the people of a nation and its militaristic dictators and that in an actual war, in which it is precisely the plain people who suffer most, such a distinction cannot be drawn. Unquestionably many men act in this spirit. But there is grave doubt that a boycott complete enough to produce an appreciable effect upon the trade of a country will not also generate hatred and contempt for "Nazi swine" and "Japanese devils" and "Fascist

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dogs." It is also hard to see how it is possible to exert enough economic pressure to alter the course of military cliques in "aggressor" nations without bringing terrific suffering upon the plain people who are assumed to be innocent.

Theoretical aspects of the question aside, "workers' sanctions" and popular boycotts today are not clearly separated from a policy of governmental sanctions. For the overwhelming majority of the men and women seriously committed to non-government boycotts are ardent advocates of the policy of "collective security" for the governments of the "democratic and non-aggressive" nations. We do not really, therefore, have a distinct problem to analyze here, inasmuch as the same groups that now engage in "peoples' boycotts" want to convert them into instruments of government policy rather than maintain them as instruments of private pressure only. Thus we are again brought squarely up against the basic question: is it correct and helpful to regard some nations as in a special sense "aggressors" and is it a primary task of progressive and peace-loving peoples to curb the aggressions of such powers, whether by economic or military measures or both?

All those whose opinion counts among the peace forces of the world agree that it is inaccurate, indeed childishly superficial, to interpret 1914 on the theory that Germany, Austria-Hungary and their allies were playing the role of "gangsters" "guilty of causing the War," and that Great Britain, France, Czarist Russia (and later on the United States were virtuous policemen risking their lives on behalf of world peace etc. Incidentally in that war Japan was a "policeman," at least until the war was over. This particular "policeman" was then made to give up most of what he had taken in the process of maintaining the sacredness of treaties and of keeping law and order in the world—a circumstance which may give us pause. As may also the fact that Russia under the Czar was a noble "policeman" whereas the moment the Bolshevik revolution was successful Russia was also adjudged a "gangster" who had therefore to be blockaded and fought by such agents of the

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international "police" as Denikin, Yudenitch and Kolchak. It is likewise agreed that it was a tragic mistake to build the peace settlement, and in effect though not in theory the League of Nations, upon the same myth of "war-guilt," of the good vs. the bad nations; that the attempt to impose impossible reparations, to fasten permanent political and economic servitude on the peoples of Central Europe was another; and that to a large extent "Versailles" is responsible for the rise of Hitlerism. It is agreed also that once the "aggressors" are stopped and disarmed, if necessary by another war, a very different peace settlement and world-organization must be achieved: an inclusive world-organization and a peace that does not perpetuate or intensify the economic inequities which led to war. But in the present crisis men are talking in the same old terms of guilty and innocent, of gangsters and policeman powers. Professor Harry F. Ward in a pamphlet circulated by the Methodist Federation for Social Service says, in a typical utterance:

> The beginning of international cooperation for peace is non-cooperation with the aggressors. After that comes the question of common agreement and mutual aid in working out the general economic problem. That step cannot be taken until the first is successfully accomplished. To put measures for removing the causes of crime before action to prevent the criminal from being successful, is to put the cart before the horse.

On the other hand in a recent issue of the *New York Post* so experienced an observer as Ludwig Lore—a man with a Marxian training and background—waxes lyrical about "democracies, guiltless of war thoughts," now paying "for their faith in human progress and their unpreparedness."

Space permits only a bare mention of points other than those already made in refutation of this point of view. If the "gangster" is the nation that has the loot it is well known that the bulk of the earth's resources, the choice colonies and fields for economic expansion etc. are in the hands of the democracies. If the "gangster" is the one seeking to advance or protect private interests far from his own bailiwick, who is the "aggres-

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sor" and who the "gangster" in Asia—Japan, or Great Britain, France and the United States? If Japan is an international gangster when she seeks control over certain parts of Asia because she believes this control necessary for strategic safety against such accomplished conquerors as those just named, what was the United States when on the same grounds she seized Panama? The fact that Panama was too small to offer resistance hardly puts our action on a higher moral plane. Or again, if the "gangsters" are the heavily armed nations, the democratic powers have led the way and maintained a preponderance throughout modern times.

Naturally when the so-called democracies say to Germany today "If you drop your gun we shall gladly talk about a sound peace settlement, the question of common agreement and of mutual aid in working out the world's vexing economic problems" Germany replies:

> Not so long ago we had our guns taken away and we were really glad of it because we believed it was part of a new deal for the world. We got rid of our Kaiser. We adopted the most democratic constitution in the world. In foreign affairs we pursued a policy of conciliation. But the rest of you kept your arms. You did not turn control of them over to the League of Nations. You broke your promise to disarm. For six years you did not admit us to the League though we were eager to join. For twelve years you kept troops on our soil. You built such high tariff walls that we could not trade and develop a normal economy. Now you tell us that if we will drop our guns you will gladly discuss a new deal. But, brothers, we tried that. We know what kind of peace you make, what kind of world-community you build, what kind of police you are, after we have lost our guns. We have learned "the facts of life" and we propose to talk your language now, the only language you understand—force.

At this very moment France and Great Britain are no longer talking to Germany and Italy in terms of the "gangster versus policeman" theory. They are trying instead to come to an understanding with them—a shift in policy which has already affected the struggle for democracy in Spain adversely and which probably bodes no good for Czecho-Slovakia and the

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Soviet Union. Nor do the advocates of collective security meet the problem when they argue (as Dr. Ward does in the pamphlet already referred to) that "concerted action" with governments such as Chamberlain's is not what is wanted, and that they plan "to put in office [in place of the Chamberlains] those who really believe in democracy and peace." We pay a price for reading the history of imperialist powers in terms of villains and saints and for being "against war" yet believing that for this once the villains must first be disarmed. And the price is precisely this: a war-crisis develops and as it approaches, Tory governments come into office; or if by accident a liberal or even a labor government happens to be in office it begins to adopt Tory, or reactionary, measures, since it is on such a basis alone that modern war can be waged.

Some elements in the peace movement reject such a reading of history on the ground that the world today is actually divided into two groups of powers: one advantaged by the imperialist status quo, a status quo which they achieved by war, in which they have refused to make a single basic change, and which they have armed and are arming to defend (even if that means plunging the world into another war); the other a group of powers—no better and no worse—disadvantaged by the status quo and equally determined, if no other way opens, to take the gamble of war in order to change it. These particular members of the peace movement think it essential, therefore, to forget the in-any-event too simplistic analogy of the gangster and the police. They want to begin by offering the "have-not" nations an extinction of "Versailles"; a new peace settlement dealing with the vexed economic issues of raw materials, colonies, markets, tariffs and currencies; and a real, not sham, world-organization.

It might help us, in grappling with such an approach, to note the factors that entered into the successful establishment of a large-scale political federation, the United States, out of the Thirteen Colonies. We shall have to be careful not to press the analogy too far but it seems worthy of more consideration

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than to my knowledge has been given it. I note the following points. First, none of the colonies were excluded, and great pains were expended in working out a plan under which they would all have substantial equality of status in the new set-up. Second, each colony relinquished a large measure of its "independence." Specifically it abandoned the right to wage war on its own initiative, and implemented that action by giving up the right to maintain an independent army. Third, the customs and tariff walls between the colonies were levelled—that is, a secure foundation for economic development was laid by the creation of a great free-trading area. A set-up was thus created which was beneficial to all concerned and kept them all attached to the new alignment without imposition of armed force. Fourth, some of the larger states, which had long-standing claims upon western lands, surrendered their claims and placed control of the Northwest Territory in the hands of the Federal government. This was a gesture that saved the larger states from the risk of "colonial" wars and at the same time generated a feeling of confidence in the larger on the part of the smaller states.

Space does not allow a discussion of what seems sufficiently obvious anyway for the immediate purpose, viz. the contrast between the essential elements in the federation of the Thirteen Colonies on the one hand, and on the other the fundamental elements of the Peace of Versailles and, in practice, of the League of Nations. The same contrast holds true of the "understanding" which is being discussed among the four Western European powers today. Neville Chamberlain does not aim at an approximation to world organization—which would involve a basic alteration in the position of British imperialism (for example in India), a reduction both absolute and relative in British naval and military power, and access for all nations to raw materials on equitable terms. His program is a deal among the four Western European powers at the expense of others, such as the Soviet Union and the colonial peoples. The reader will readily think of steps, in line with those taken in the es-

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tablishment of this nation, that should be basic to a new peace settlement and to an attempt to create an organized world. An extensive literature on the subject exists. But to complete the outline of a realistic approach to the problem of war I must touch on two more questions.

In the first place we are asked whether it isn't foolish to expect the dictators to accept an offer such as I have suggested. The answer to this question may be formulated along the following lines. We are in a poor position to argue that Germany, for example, would reject such an offer when it has never been made or even seriously considered by the democratic nations—when indeed the whole of post-War policy has run in the opposite direction. The first big job the forces of peace confront is that of getting their own countries to make an offer of a decent peace and a genuine world-organization. (Some may believe that the United States, in the reciprocal trade treaties, has taken a very small and tentative step in this direction. But the Van Zeeland report with its very cautious suggestions about tariffs, currency policy etc. remains filed away in the foreign offices of the great powers.) If we assume that among the German or Japanese people there are no elements that would respond eagerly to such an offer we attempt that indictment of a whole people against which Burke long ago warned. From its experiences with the output of the propaganda machines in the last war our own generation, moreover, should have learned the invalidity of such an indictment. It is as likely, furthermore, that a German government which accepted such an offer would not be Hitler's as it is that a British government which made such an offer would not be that of Chamberlain (and the financial and industrial interests, including munitions makers, which are supporting him). In any event it is the task of the peace forces of the world to change such rulers or to change their policies. The chances of doing that are, I submit, much better on the basis of the program outlined here than on the basis of the policy which has brought us to the present dire crisis. For the suggested program makes it mandatory to tackle economic

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difficulties first and foremost—to ease the economic pressures on all peoples and not least those on the "have-not" nations. And if the post-War years have done nothing else they have repeatedly demonstrated that fascism and fascist trends wax and wane as economic conditions worsen or improve. During the relatively "good times" of 1924-29 Hitlerism was a joke in Germany and not even Mussolini engaged in militaristic adventures.

When nations have followed a certain course (Versailles, etc., for example) for 20 years they naturally reap consequences in line with the policy that has guided them. We are asked to believe that the law of cause and effect has been abrogated when we are told that, despite a change in their course, they will continue to reap the old results. True, if a new course is adopted it may take time to undo the consequences of the old. No serious-minded person will promise that he has a remedy which will automatically, instantly and painlessly effect a cure. But in the main our trouble is not that in international relations we do not reap what we sow but that we have only too surely and abundantly reaped what we have sown. Sow another kind of seed and there will be another kind of harvest. Certainly there is no other way to get a different harvest.

Finally: What provision for sanctions, and for an "international police" to enforce sanctions, should be written into the "new peace"?[1] The answer should include the following points. We have abundant proof that when a political federation is built upon economic arrangements genuinely beneficial to the parties involved it is held together by the mutual benefits derived. Armies are not needed. Only those arrangements which benefit one group at the expense of another require force for their maintenance. The federation of American colonies, the

[1] The matter of "sanctions" properly comes at this stage in the discussion and not at the beginning, where Dr. Ward for example puts it. For when we have made provision for a world-organization based on some approximation to economic justice and mutual benefit —and in which individual nations or combinations of nations do not arrogate to themselves the functions of accuser, judge, jury, police and army in their own cause—we can begin to talk with some justification about law and justice and police power.

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North German Customs Union which held together states as different as Prussia and Bavaria, the great progress toward a solution of the nationalities problem in the Soviet Union, are illustrations that readily suggest themselves.

In my opinion the analogy of police-power is almost completely worthless and usually extremely dangerous. Suppose that national armies have been abolished and that such military forces as survive have been placed under the control of a League of Nations which recruits them from various nations, as the United States recruits them from its various states. Then suppose that an economic issue develops and that some powerful nation (or, as is more likely to be the case, combination of nations) feels itself sufficiently aggrieved to be willing to fight, as the Southern states did in the 1860's. Will not the struggle that ensues be war? And will it make any difference that each side argues in effect that it is simply using police-power against gangsters? Civil wars are notoriously bitter and destructive. As H. M. Swanwick in her book *Collective Insecurity* suggests, "A League War, however lofty its motive," would probably in no important respect "differ from any other modern war." And might not an international army, actually capable in a military sense of "enforcing" peace, become the most terrible instrument of tyranny the world has yet known?

Despite all this most pacifists would I suppose talk to their brethren of the "collective security" school in some such terms as these:

> If the imperialist nations in the present set-up will stop thinking of themselves in Pharisaic fashion as policemen over against other imperialist powers cast in the role of gangsters; if they will renounce and undo "Versailles"; if they will abandon the armament race; if they will take steps toward solving the economic issues which bedevil the world and toward setting up a genuine world-organization—if they thus get off the road on which they have been traveling to perdition and get onto an entirely new road, the benefits accruing under such a "New Deal" will be a cement strong enough to hold the peoples of the earth together without resort to the horrible persuasion of war. It will be much better if, having entered on this new road, the nations of the world

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burn the bridge of force behind them. If some of you still think you must have something you call an "international police force" we shall argue against this mistaken policy in all democratic ways that may be open—just as we oppose the war-policies of the nations of which we are now citizens. But we shall gladly admit that the role of violence in international life has shrunk enormously; and in all the constructive activities of a world-organization built on essentially sound lines we shall gladly and loyally participate.

Occasions arise when a drastic operation is required—when small measures are of no use at all. Who shall say such an occasion does not exist in international relations today? Furthermore, it is not expected nor is it necessary that these proposals be enacted complete on some fine morning. What we need are steps—possibly small to begin with, but in the right direction. And peace lovers continue to regard it as a sensible thing to move—if need be slowly—in the right direction rather than go fast in the wrong one.

AUTHOR'S NOTE:—Since this article was written the Czechoslovakian situation has passed through a highly critical phase. Out of the Munich Conference came an agreement for the cession of Sudeten areas to Germany. Thus the results supposedly gained by the last war vanish into thin air. Only those who can convince themselves that "crushing Germany more completely" in 1918 would have given Europe prosperity and peace have any ground left for believing that another war would accomplish any good. Everybody else ought to toss the method of war out of the window. This bitter hour is a good one for remembering that the Peace of Versailles which Hitler is tearing to shreds was signed at the point of a gun located in Czechoslovakia: when the German Commissioners objected to affixing their signatures to a document that ascribed sole war-guilt to their nation, offered to admit guilt in the invasion of Belgium, and asked that the rest of the question be submitted to the arbitration of neutrals, Lloyd George told them there were bombing planes waiting in the airdromes of Bohemia to descend on German cities unless the German Commissioners signed without delay. This is a good time to remember that the great Thomas G. Masaryk doubted the wisdom of including the Sudeten Germans in the new republic; to remember that Bohemia was as a matter of fact included by the Allies not out of concern either for Czechs or for Germans but for military reasons, in order to keep Germany hemmed in. The partition of Central Europe created political monstrosities and impossible economic set-ups which could be maintained only by artificial respiration. When French money and arms were no longer forthcoming the house of cards collapsed.

Those people are probably right who think the four-power deal at the expense of Czechoslovakia and other lands is unlikely to accomplish any good. They lapse into sentimentalism, however, if they think war would accomplish more. There is only one course that will not lead to practically certain disaster: it is a renunciation of the game of power politics and the creation of a new peace settlement (before war since no chance for a decent peace is likely to come after it) to include all nations and to deal with the vexed economic issues of raw materials, colonies, markets, tariffs and currencies in a comprehensive and intelligent fashion.

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The Arts Without Artists

STEPHEN C. PEPPER

IF THE aim of a liberal arts college is to offer opportunities for a rounded education it would seem that provision should be made for the cultivation of good taste as well as of historical background and scientific knowledge. Departments of literature, art, music and drama are, so their names suggest, the provisions made in our universities for this end. How adequately do these departments serve this purpose? A rapid glance over an average university catalog gives the impression that the arts are very well represented. There are, besides English, several language departments—not only French, German, Italian and Spanish but also Latin and Greek and possibly Sanskrit, Hebrew, Arabic, Russian and even Japanese and Chinese. There are departments of music, art and perhaps drama. In statistical terms the number of men apparently devoted to the teaching of literature, music, art and drama is quite high enough in proportion to the number teaching history and science.

A more careful scrutiny, however, soon shows that a large part of the effort of the English department goes into the teaching of elementary composition, which has principally to do with the simple mechanics of writing on paper the ordinary thoughts of an ordinary person and doing it correctly. This is a preliminary technical training in the use of a tool demanded for work in all subjects and has very little to do with literary values. It will be found similarly that most of the effort expended in the foreign language departments goes out also in teaching the mere mechanics of those languages. If the men and the time devoted to this mechanical work in these departments is subtracted from the total number of men and the total amount of time at the disposal of these departments the remainder that might be devoted to the cultivation of literary values is relatively small. Of this remainder, however, a still

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smaller remainder turns out to be available for genuine literary study. Many men in the language departments are not really interested in literature at all. They are professional philologists, grammarians and historians. Some of them are even professional economists, sociologists, anthropologists or political scientists. There finally remains a mere handful of men who are genuine literary critics. Practically never is a professional writer in an English or a foreign language department.

Just to emphasize the anomaly of this situation let us conceive of a department of physics in which there is not a single productive experimental physicist but instead a large staff of teachers of elementary laboratory and text-book physics, a corps of historians of physics, a mathematical physicist or two and a number of engineers. Let us suppose that the mathematical physicists, who in this department would be analogous to the critics in a literary department, are continually subject to suspicion not only by the majority of their own department but by the rest of the university, on the grounds that they are not dealing with obvious facts like the historians or with matters of obvious utility like the engineers. Let us suppose, too, that such a department of physics should become the rule and the tradition over a whole country and almost throughout a whole culture. A doctor's degree in physics, which would open a teaching career in that subject, would be based on a searching examination in the history of physics and a scholarly dissertation on some such thesis as The Influence of Boyle upon Hooke. If someone raised the question of accepting as a thesis the experimental results of some young productive physicist the answer would be that the value of such results is almost impossible to estimate until time has shown their worth and that, besides, experimental work is not of a scholarly nature and not of a sort to fall within a university's sphere of recognition. There would, of course, be no implied disparagement of the social values of physical experiments. Such matters simply do not come within the scope of a university.

Suppose, further, that some young man had started studying

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physics because of an absorbing interest in the subject and that, being strong of will, he had passed the requirements for the doctor's degree, retained in spite of this his enthusiasm for physics and found himself at last an instructor in the subject. Suppose that he then began devoting himself to physical experiments which he had long been eager to perform and that he even induced the students in his classes to do some tentative work along the same lines. Suppose that after ten or twelve years of such teaching the question of his promotion to an associate professorship arose. The chairman of his department would not know exactly what to recommend. The president would be in a quandary. The advice of several professors justly recognized for their scholarship would be sought and the fate of the young man would be discussed in a committee. Let us say that the committee consists of the chairman of the physics department (a man of world-wide reputation for his researches in the field of Italian physics in the second half of the 15th century), a man of equal reputation in the history of mathematics, a well-known member of the history department proper, an anthropologist and a philologist. These are all men of undoubted scholarly reputation, more than average intelligence, eager for the promotion of knowledge and of unquestionable integrity. The difficulty is that the young man's record shows no evidence of research in his subject since the certainly very capable doctoral dissertation on the basis of which he was offered an instructorship in the department. It appears that he has been rather wasting the last ten years on experiments which he performs in the basement of his house. One or two of these experiments have, it is true, received some popular notice. One of them even occasioned considerable publicity in the newspapers—a matter of perhaps questionable taste. The young man, however, certainly has a good mind and capacity for scholarly work, if he but had the strength of character to subject himself to the necessary discipline. It appears, furthermore, that his teaching is rather thin and that, though the students are uniformly enthusiastic about the illustrations he uses and

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the activities he permits them to indulge in, their acquisition of factual knowledge is slight. With considerable regret the committee recommends that the question of his promotion be deferred without prejudice—in conformity with the desire of the Administration that promotions to the associate professorship be given only in cases of undoubted merit. Meantime a bright young historian of physics who is specializing in Hellenistic mechanics and has seven scholarly articles to his name and a book in preparation is passed over the troublesome experimentalist's head as smoothly as a wheel turns on oiled bearings.

Now this analogy is so close to the actual situation in our English departments that I almost blush to present it. In the other language departments we do not sense the anomaly so greatly, chiefly because they are concerned with foreign languages and their principal duty is barely to get the students to understand what is being read. In the case of these departments their opportunity to enlarge the critical appreciation of most students ends where that for the English department begins.

In the departments of music and art the situation is not yet quite so desperate. Fortunately scholars in the history of music and painting have been rather scarce in America, so that universities have been forced to enlist the services of musicians and painters. These departments have, consequently, been developing from the core outwards, and if the core is not allowed to rot away completely or actually to be gouged out by well-intentioned scholars in other departments of the university the departments of music and art may continue to serve their primary purpose of cultivating taste. In fact the immediate hope of increasing the esthetic cultivation of students lies rather in these departments than in that of English. Nevertheless these departments are in great peril. Artists are of a type different from most other faculty members and are looked upon as objects strange and suspicious. They rarely have higher degrees, and finding these degrees of no value for their own pursuits they do not always exhibit the respect for them which their colleagues do. And their colleagues are frequently quite incapable

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of recognizing esthetic values and exhibiting the respect for them which the artists do. In consequence we presently find it rumored that departments of music and painting composed mainly of artists do not gain the respect of the faculty. It is proposed that these departments be reorganized and that men who will gain that respect be put in them. It is then discovered that history of music and musicology and that history of painting and archeology are "respectable" studies—in which, incidentally, doctor's degrees can be offered. Moreover, it is found that music and art departments designated as "adequate" or "distinguished" in certain authorized lists are confined to those which offer higher degrees and are consequently those which stress history of music and musicology, history of art and archeology, and that the more these subjects are stressed the more distinguished the departments are, whereas artists do not add distinction at all. Unless some effort is made systematically to resist these well-intentioned pressures and to emphasize the esthetic functions of music and art departments and their importance for the cultivation of taste and esthetic background it will not be long before there will be no music or art departments, properly speaking, but only departments of the history of music and of musicology, of the history of art and of archeology. There will then be even less effort to cultivate taste and critical judgment in these fields than in that of English. And one whole side of human cultivation will be successfully cut out of our educational system.

If it is pedantry to exaggerate some intellectual value at the expense of human balance and a sense of proportion then it is pedantry that is exerting this pressure upon literature, music and art. The form this pressure takes is so pervasive and plausible in a university atmosphere that it is almost irresistible. Yet scarcely an explicit argument is presented which would not apply just as truly to the work of an experimental scientist as to that of a practicing artist.

It must not be thought that I intend any disparagement of the study of the history of the arts or of such studies as philology,

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musicology or archeology. I simply want to point out that these studies are in no sense a substitute for the study of literature, music or the visual arts. They are helpful in enriching taste once the germs of taste have been sown. But one needs only to meet a few typical philologists, musicologists, archeologists and art historians to see that the work of these specialists is far from the spring of esthetic values. Artists themselves are the only safe guardians of these values, and next to artists critics. Obviously artists teaching in a university should have a wider general education than many of them now have, though the same could almost equally truly be said of many experimental scientists in our universities. But the ideal man and teacher is always hard to find.

My own feeling is that a department of art should be about evenly divided between artists and critics and that graduate degrees should not be offered or demanded in it. Then there should be a separate department of the history of the arts in which specialists in the history of literature, music, painting, sculpture, architecture, ceramics, textiles etc. could be brought together, probably to the great advantage of them all. Students in any department of art would be encouraged or required to take a large amount of work in the relevant historical field in the department of the history of the arts. As for specialists like philologists and archeologists, these men could well have special departments for their studies, as in some universities some of them now have. By means of this segregation of the definitely esthetic values from the definitely historical and scientific the art departments proper would have an opportunity to solve their own problems (which are many) in their own most effective way. They would have the freedom required for gaining morale and self-respect. And the cultivation of taste would attain the dignity it deserves in an American university.

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Higher Criticism Survives Archeology

WILLIAM CREIGHTON GRAHAM

IN VIEW of the temper of the present age the drift away from Liberalism toward Authoritarianism in the realm of organized religion is not at all surprising. The debates of theologians often seem to the layman to be so many battles between the mice and the frogs. Nevertheless living social issues underlie them as a rule, because organized religion functions as a factor in conditioning the whole pattern of living.

Unless the matter is so approached it might easily seem that nothing could be of less moment to the present generation than contemporary work in the field of Old Testament criticism. Many authorities in this field increasingly believe that recent discoveries of the archeologist demand a revision of certain conclusions, long held by the followers of Higher Criticism, about the origin and history of this literature. How can this matter at all to the present age? Yet if organized religion is a cultural instrument, and if the Old Testament scriptures are in any way vitally related to religion, the bearing of these questions of interpretation on present-day life may not be so negligible.

Consideration of this matter must begin with the origin and nature of higher criticism itself. Higher criticism is the application to the study of the Old Testament of the same principles and methods of literary and historical criticism that have long been applied to other ancient documents. In the beginning it was largely an attack upon the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, the Jewish Torah. Later on attention was gradually extended to the remaining books of the Old Testament canon.

The application of an inductive method of criticism to the historical books, Genesis through Kings, began in 1753 with a work by Jean Astruc who, though accepting Mosaic author-

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ship, detected in Genesis what he regarded as two distinct sources used by Moses. These he distinguished by their respective preference for the divine names Jehovah and Elohim. His two sources soon came to be designated, by the initials of these words, as J and E. On this humble foundation, an increasingly complex structure was erected during the next century.

In 1805 DeWette established the date of Deuteronomy as approximately 621 B.C. Its distinctive views on worship thus became a "meridian of Greenwich" in relation to which other writings might be fixed in time. Deuteronomy was thereafter designated by the symbol D. In 1853 Hupfeld distinguished two separate strands in the Elohistic writings. This added a fourth source which because of certain characteristics was described as "priestly" and given the symbol P. There followed the important work of Graf who showed that P was later than D and therefore post-exilic. The chronological order of the sources was thus established as J, E, D, P.

Up to this point the work of the critics might be described as source criticism, a technique with which every historian is familiar. To keep pace with these developments in the analysis of sources two general theories of the history of the pentateuchal literature had also been developed. The earliest, The Fragmentary Hypothesis, concentrated attention on the large number of seemingly independent fragments of literature which may be detected in the Pentateuch. It was abandoned because it did not do justice to the superficial unity of these writings. In 1830 Stähelin had presented the Supplementary Hypothesis—that P was the oldest source and J, E and D later supplementations thereof. Graf's demonstration of the late origin of P had led to a new hypothesis with whose formulation the names of Graf, Kuenen, Reuss and Wellhausen are connected. But it was the latter who, in 1878, presented the theory of the history of the literature which has since dominated the field. Wellhausen reconstructed the history of the traditions and institutions of Israel and related the history of the literature to the evolution of these institutions. In so doing

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he deviated in one very important respect from the source criticism which had preceded him. He posited the writing, at about 850 B.C. and 750 B.C. respectively, of two independently composed histories of the Hebrew people, a southern version (J) and a northern (E). These were later combined, according to Wellhausen, by a redactor (RJE). Wellhausen's hypothesis let down the bars to scissors and paste criticism by which there were retrojected, into the methods of the men who wrote Israel's history, procedures somewhat foreign to all that is known of the work of ancient historiographers.[1]

It is important at this point to stress the interdependence between Wellhausen's history of the traditions and institutions of Israel and his history of its literature, for each constitutes the chief prop of the other. Therefore if his history of traditions and institutions is in any way erroneous or inadequate his view of the history of Israel's literature might need revision.

The work of the higher critics, and the study of the problems they raised, is related to a larger question: the present conflict between authoritarian and liberal schools of theological thought. Liberalism lays the emphasis it does upon freedom precisely because its genius is to hold a critical, though by no means an insubordinate, attitude to authority. Therefore, in the matter of the Old Testament, the modern liberal movement in religion rests upon the positions of higher criticism, for these destroy the doctrines of plenary inspiration and verbal infallibility which various authoritarian religious systems had, in complete sincerity, built up or adopted in order that Holy Writ might be accepted as the sanction of their social functioning. In doing this higher criticism provided for religious liberalism an intellectual basis for an emphasis on the principle of freedom. It is this emphasis that some believe to be endangered by archeology.

What element in the work of the critics is vital to the liberal

[1] In the following pages it will be suggested that new evidence seems to point toward the early abandonment of the Documentary Hypothesis with its unproved assumption of the joining together by a redactor of two independent histories. In its place will arise a revised form of the Supplementary Hypothesis, which posits the expansion of an original history (J) by several successive accretions.

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position? It is certainly not the details of the Graf-Kuenen-Wellhausen reconstruction of the evolution of Israel's life and literature. It is rather the broad proposition that there was an evolution to reconstruct—that those writings which describe Israel's experience with the supernatural emerged from a social process and were not projected into it by any such mechanism as verbal inspiration. Whoever accepts, under no matter what theory of the details, the proposition that this literature in the historical books does not possess literary unity concedes all that is fundamentally vital to the liberal position. Not only so, but such a person accepts a certain implication tacitly arising from this diversity of authorship in the record—an implication which binds him to a very definite procedure in studying this diversity. If the books Genesis-Kings arose gradually, by whatever process of accretion, they constitute not merely a history but, even more than any writing by a single author, a product of history. One must therefore consider them in relation both to the life of the periods with which they deal and in relation also to those stages of the ongoing Hebrew social process from which their various strands severally emerged.

Archeology has without doubt greatly increased the historical values of the Old Testament as an account of the life with which it deals. The Hebrew story is much more closely related to the actual events in the history of the Hebrew people than has generally been believed in liberal circles. Archeology has authenticated many details of the record and is daily showing that there is not nearly so much retrojection of later ages into the accounts of the earlier periods as some have thought. Scientific historians may no longer ignore, as evidence for history, the patriarchal narratives or even the traditions of a still earlier age found in the first eleven chapters of Genesis.

This, however, does not suffice to establish that full historicity claimed for the record in the dogmas propagated by some authoritarian systems. There remains the still greater question of the religious significance of the meaningful pattern into which these details have been woven. This history of Israel has a his-

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tory itself. In the form in which it was left by those who last worked on it, it is preeminently the story of a chosen and peculiar people. By the election of the Creator of the universe they spring from the loins of a single ancestor. His descendants, in a selected line, fall in their entirety into foreign bondage and becoming there a great people are, as such, delivered through the divine interest. They are then launched toward high destiny through a unique culture whose patterns are prescribed in a law delivered by Moses. As a united people they so successfully invade and conquer a promised land as to become at once its dominant possessors. Only after this heritage is gained do they become susceptible to their cultural environment and, being corrupted thereby, keep falling back from their high destiny in spite of all efforts by the faithful to hold them steadfast. For their incorrigibility they are punished by the God who had led them from bondage (and who through Moses had set before them the true pattern of life) by being plunged once more into captivity. In the end—as is recounted in the books Ezra-Nehemiah—only a select and racially pure remnant, which accepts the Mosaic program, is by that acceptance finally reconstituted as the holy and chosen people of God.

Such is the formal record of Israel's origins and development as it unfolds itself to the uncritical reader. But archeology, though it has supported many individual details of this story, has nevertheless reinforced that very challenge of its salient features that had been raised by the results of historical criticism. Archeology undercuts the claim of simple racial origins, for it shows the formation of the historical Hebrew people as only gradually achieved, through the coalescing of smaller groups with different cultural backgrounds. Only a small fraction of the ancestors of this people were ever in bondage in Egypt. Hebrew law, as a whole, did not come into existence in the age of Moses or by his instrumentality. There was never any single Hebrew conquest of Canaan sufficiently sudden and complete to permit the establishment there, as a dominant pattern of life, of what the Biblical narrative presents as the distinctive and

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peculiar culture of Israel. Though archeology supports many details of the picture, it furnishes evidence that the pattern of the composition itself is not entirely credible.

If this is so archeology has not seriously undermined the basic positions of higher criticism. If one may judge its future results by its past findings this is likely to continue to be true. For these discoveries have emphasized the formal Old Testament record of the Hebrew past as only secondarily a history. Primarily it is something much more precious—a record of the psychological forces which lie behind and make history. When the formal record is so read, all the remaining literature—the Psalms, the Wisdom Writings and the oracles of the Prophets—are vitalized as expressions of the travail of minds and souls which wrought to create an authentic culture, an examined and purposeful way of life.

The key to this approach to the Old Testament lies in a study of the social origins of the historical writings, in particular the corpus Genesis-Kings. The original nucleus around which the books Genesis-Kings developed was a history of the people of Israel. The author, after the manner of many ancient historians, was more compiler than author. Available for his use in the task to which he had set himself (the interpretation of the past in terms of Hebrew nationhood) was a mass of local and tribal traditions and individual memoirs, most of them in written form and some of them very early in origin. Some Elohistic traditions, which the Documentary Hypothesis ascribes to the E history, were among the earliest of the materials he gathered. The writer brought together these Elohistic documents, along with others which used Jehovah (Yahweh) as the divine name, and set himself to fuse this conglomeration into a history of a united and triumphant Hebrew nation.

Certain broad features of the resulting narrative (the J document) suggest his social situation and the philosophy of life he sought to propagate. To begin with this history is highly particularistic and nationalistic in spirit. It gives the Hebrew people a simple racial origin in Abraham and traces them,

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through many crises, to the establishment of full nationhood under the dynasty founded by David. Israel's long history is interpreted from an aristocratic and theocratic point of view.

Her great past, according to this document, has been wrought by a long line of outstanding and heroic men of action, endowed by Jehovah with a mysterious capacity for leadership. Whenever the original source failed to make clear that their power comes specifically from Jehovah the compiler himself provides this feature. The full destiny of this theocratic aristocracy, however, is attained only after the kingship is established. The kingship is of a very definite type. Judah's royal house, the line of David, is the true dynasty. Saul, though a heroic individual, has limitations which disqualify him from becoming Jehovah's royal messiah. His surviving descendants turn out to be futile persons. David is this historian's great hero. Yet David is not his ideal ruler. The compiler takes no trouble at all to excise from his very early and authentic sources the record of certain characteristics which unfit David to be the ideal executive. The culmination of the long line of aristocratic leaders is reached in Solomon who is made king by a priest, a prophet and a soldier. Solomon is Jehovah's ideal messiah. He builds magnificent public buildings. He devotes himself to wisdom. He is keen in judgment and successful not merely in war but in the arts of peace and the accumulation of wealth. He is the symbol of civilized order and progress. His success is directly due to Jehovah's favor. Throughout the long series of crises which lead up to his triumphant reign the author constantly drives home the idea that no situation is too difficult for a divinely ordained ruler who enjoys the favor of Jehovah.

This history was produced by a man who believed the proper social system to be a royal theocracy, with the ruler supported and limited by an aristocracy in which priest and prophet are represented. But the compiler's zeal for Jehovah and his pronounced Judean bias, when considered together, are most illuminating. They suggest that this document does not reflect a period of Judean success (i.e. the date 850 B.C. usually assigned

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to it) but the period 842-835 B.C. when the worship of Jehovah was in eclipse in Judah and the regicide king of Israel, Jehu, was its great, self-avowed champion. During those years a foreign-born queen ruled Judah and the dynasty of David hung by the frail thread of the life of the young Joash, hidden in Jehovah's neglected temple. Such a situation would account for all the outstanding characteristics of this history, especially if its compiler might possibly have been that priest Jehoiada who in due course overthrew Athaliah and raised the young Joash to his murdered father's throne. For about two centuries this document, in substantially its original form, remained *the* history of the Hebrew people. It was then revised and supplemented from quite a different point of view. In the material designated by the Documentary Hypothesis as E there are elements that differ greatly from the portions of the E tradition incorporated in the J document (which had been dominated by a belief in a royal theocracy). These divergent elements are characterized by "an interest in the theocratic succession." The description is hardly precise enough. These materials reflect, rather, an interest in a succession of theocratic *prophets* or *prophetic* theocrats. They display a highly critical attitude toward the kingship and tend to magnify the role played in the past by a single line of prophetic leaders, who had received revelations and support for their authority as leaders directly from God. They emphasize, moreover, reliance upon miraculous, divine intervention rather than upon military power and are marked by a notable passion for social justice, a very plain animus against an exploitive aristocracy, and a transcendent conception of God. Obviously this prophetic-theocratic revision was made by a man who wanted to establish the authority of the critical prophet as enjoying a divine sanction senior to that of the civil executive. The social attitudes expressed in this revised version of Genesis-Kings seem to reflect the preaching of the critical prophets of the 8th century and onward. On the other hand they also approximate quite closely the social attitudes expressed in Deuteronomy. Indeed the relationship is so

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close that this revision may have grown out of the same social movement which led to the Deuteronomic reform. It is reasonable therefore to assign its author to the middle of the 7th century B.C.

Deuteronomy itself, which was probably incorporated in this prophetically revised history by the end of the same century, constitutes the nucleus of the second important revisional supplement to the original compilation. Within approximately half a century after the appearance of Deuteronomy a revision of the narrative, from the days of Joshua to those of Solomon, was carried out and to the original story was added, in the present books of Kings, an account of the history of Israel from the death of Solomon to the exile. These supplementary materials were imbued with the spirit of the book of Deuteronomy and seem to reflect the activity of forces similar to those which had produced that book.

The ideas and aims which animated this movement are somewhat hard to distinguish from those of the group behind the struggle for a prophetic theocracy. Like the latter group, the Deuteronomists blamed the decline of Hebrew political power on contamination from neighboring cultures. Like them, too, the Deuteronomists were imbued with strong humanitarian interests. The chief difference between the two movements seems to have centered on method rather than on fundamental social attitudes. The writer of the strand that propagandizes prophetic theocracy seems to have wanted to limit the king by making him subject, to some extent, to the directly revealed word of the prophet. Deuteronomy, however, betrays no such complete confidence in the prophetic order as such. Instead it exalts the lawgiver and would limit the ruler through the instrumentality of written law. As regards relations with other nations it too is highly nationalistic and isolationist. It clings to the institution of the divinely chosen king but requires him to subject himself, in the conduct of his realm, to the principles and precedents laid down in the written law. It especially departs from all previous writings by declaring the temple at

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Jerusalem the only lawful place of worship and by demanding the abolition of all local sanctuaries.

Deuteronomy marks a very important point in the social evolution of the Hebrew people and in the long struggle between authoritarian and liberal forces over the basic question of social control. The word of the royal messiah (the king) had become, through acceptance of this legal principle, no longer *ipso facto* the word of God. Liberalism had discovered a technique through which liberalism itself might become authoritarian. Four centuries after The Crown first became the recognized fount of social authority there came The Book, to be placed on a par with it and, eventually, above it. Moses had begun to overshadow David, the founder of the true royal messianic line.

The final revision of the original history of the Hebrew people grew out of a movement which was not slow to make use of the legal principle inaugurated by the Deuteronomists. The story of the emergence of this "legalistic" trend is told in the books Ezra-Nehemiah. But the literature (identified as the "priestly" strain) which reflects the movement itself was embodied in the corpus Genesis-Kings, although it is almost completely concentrated in the first four books. Leviticus, in its entirety, issues from this development. When this revision of the Pentateuch was complete the principle of legal control, inaugurated by the Deuteronomists, had been extended to the first five books of the Old Testament. Ultimately they became *The* Book, The Torah. The Pentateuch was thus transformed into a divine warrant and a Constitution for a priestly theocracy. But though The Book superseded The Crown it did not eliminate it. The Book merely enveloped it, for The Book retained the ancient recognition accorded the place of the king. This latest system was not merely a priestly theocracy. It was an aristocratic and royal priestly theocracy in which the High Priest ultimately came to play, within the limitations of political circumstance, the role of the king. It was an authoritarian re-

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ligious system which envisaged its potential function as that of conditioning the entire social process.

Such is the general picture of social evolution in Israel derived when the various strands constituting the record are examined, one by one, in their proper sequence and in relation to the life out of which they grew. The outstanding impression is of an underlying, genetic, social process in which the forces making for order were constantly challenged by those critical and dynamic forces which demanded change. There is nothing final or static in the history as revealed in the records. They reflect, rather, the very essence of religion—the search for the highest satisfactions which inhere in the most perfect order.

But suppose that these same documents be read, just as they stand, without reference to the social motivations which underlie them. The impression they create is then very different —as, indeed, it was meant to be by the original compiler as well as by those who carried out each successive revision. Read outside its frame of reference, the final product creates the impression that a true and unalterable authoritarian pattern for Israel's life had been revealed at an early stage in its history; that departure therefrom could not be constructive but only destructive; that change is apostasy and freedom rebellion. This impression is heightened by the fact that the story stops short at a certain tragic point in history. The Biblical account should be read in the light of such later literature as the apocrypha, the pseudepigrapha, the writings of rabbinical Judaism and the New Testament; for these show that the struggle between authoritarian and liberal went on and on and that it was this struggle itself, and not its absence, which made the evolution of Israel's life orthogenetic. The cultures which sprang from the Hebrew matrix were distinctive precisely because the principles of authority and freedom had both been operative in them, and in it, from the beginning. The Old Testament, so read, is equally a warrant for authoritarianism and liberalism.

Those who once glimpse the social and spiritual values that accrue from approaching these writings under the guidance of

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a full historical methodology are unlikely to be driven easily from the higher critical point of view. The thing, for them, which sets the literature of the Old Testament in a unique category (as compared with other writings of the ancient Near East) is not the validity of the actual history set forth but that understanding of the meaning of the past, in terms of ultimate reality, with which this literature is permeated. The outward and visible sign of this understanding lies in the use made of the successive documents in shaping the later evolution of Israel. From the higher critical point of view these writings are never merely local and temporal in origin. They are, indeed, products of history; but they are something more. They are the vehicle for an understanding of life elicited from all essential aspects of human experience. Those who grasp this philosophy are suddenly aware that the religious values of Israel's final document are timeless because it was shaped in accord with the real nature of life. The authenticity of these values cannot be communicated if one seeks primarily a revelation of an authoritarian pattern at an early stage of Israel's history. One must enter sympathetically into the life from which these values emerged before they can become a force in one's own life.

These values cannot be altered by anything that archeology has revealed or can reveal about the individual failure of Wellhausen, or of any other critic, to relate these writings adequately to the social process from which they emerged. Wellhausen's failure was relative and not absolute and was due to his position in time more than to any other single factor. He was shut away from the evidence which archeology has provided since his day. As that evidence has gradually appeared his followers have endeavored to correct his mistakes in details. But nothing yet turned up by the field archeologist threatens to drive the higher critical school from its basic position: that the Hebrew story reached its present form by a process of accretion which makes it not merely a record of events but an interpretation of their spiritual import.

Since Wellhausen's day the mass of new evidence which

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archeology has accumulated about life in the ancient Near East has gradually forced us to realize that the historical Hebrew people were much more intimately involved in the general trends of Near Eastern life than their own records suggest. Life, all over that larger area, was lived within patterns of desire, thought and conduct which this new evidence shows were basically similar in the various particular areas from which such data come. Palestine was deeply involved in this general cultural mold even before there was such an entity as a Hebrew people. Want of this evidence led Wellhausen, though he realized there had been an evolution, to conceive it as having been a much simpler progress from one social stage to another than it actually was. He thought, for example, that Israel's first profoundly influential contacts with this world pattern did not occur till the days of the Babylonian captivity. This captivity, he felt, brought about for the exiles a "total severance of all connection with inherited conditions." He therefore saw the "legalistic" Judaism established in the Jerusalem community in the middle of the 5th century B.C. as an essentially foreign way of life which had no deep rootage in the Hebrew past itself but had been almost entirely projected back into it by a revision of the history of an earlier age.

Now such a retrojection was made; but the material retrojected was much more native than he assumed. The new evidence shows that Wellhausen misunderstood his "legalistic" period. The misconception goes back to his failure to get to the bottom of the question of origins. Evidence recently discovered at Ras Shamra, ancient Ugarit in northern Syria, may be interpreted as showing that the cultus reflected in the "legalistic" document known as P is very largely a survival (purified and transformed through centuries of cultural struggle) of an ancient system very similar to that which operated at Ugarit 1000 years or more before this "priestly" document was written. As investigation proceeds it will probably become increasingly clear that the Canaanite ancestor of this "priestly" system was a more dominant force throughout the whole evolution of

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Israel's official document (and the successive incorporation of various strands into this history until it reached its final, "priestly" form) than any invasive, specifically Hebrew way of life. Israel's origins are multiple. Likewise its development did not take a single line. The process is complex.

Lacking today's evidence Wellhausen could never more than partially free himself from the official Hebrew view of history. His interpretation of the conquest of Canaan by the Hebrew clansmen is much closer to the actual facts than the record suggests when uncritically read. But even so, I believe, he thought too much in terms of a sharp military conflict between two political groups, each enjoying full group consciousness, in which one finally defeated and in an undefined fashion "displaced" the other. He consequently minimized the social and cultural influence of the "defeated" and "superseded" to an extent which sharply conflicts with archeological evidence and with the literary record itself when read in the light thereof. Similarly Wellhausen's failure to grasp the complexity of cultural origins influenced his interpretation of the "prophetic" period. He therefore did not face up, in a way that was historically realistic, to the real status of the religious system whose crudities the prophets attacked. His Hebrews began with a very primitive and simple religion. Because he did not recognize the complexity of Israel's early religious and social life, or the deep and native rootage (later corroborated increasingly by archeology), in the social psychology of that age, of the system the prophets criticized he had to posit as "accretions" all those factors of cultic life which called down the later ire of the prophets. He thought of those reformers as champions of a pure and typically Hebrew pattern which had been corrupted and he consequently exaggerated their contemporary social influence. He tended, correspondingly, to ignore the values in that religious system which masses and classes alike accepted as a proper and legitimate worship of Jehovah—a system that was, I believe, the religious counterpart of the royal theocracy (the prevailing social pattern of the Hebrew states). The abuses

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into which the system fell are exposed in the writings of the prophets. But beneath these abuses lay a reservoir of real and potential spiritual values which found expression in the pre-exilic psalms and proverbs and in the original, or J, history of the Hebrew people. The religion of Israel was never the system which the prophets championed; basically it was the religion which they criticized and by their criticism transformed in a measure but did not overthrow.

The origins of Hebrew monotheism constitute another problem revived by the findings of archeology. These discoveries tend to show that Wellhausen's theory on this point also was too simple. He conceived the religious development of Israel as a more or less steady evolution from polytheism through henotheism to a monotheism not fully attained until the post-exilic age. In reaction against this point of view some scholars are disposed to hold a monotheistic conception of the supernatural characteristic of Hebrew thought at a date as early as the age of Moses. This reaction was inspired by archeological finds showing that at the time the Hebrews first appeared there the culture of Canaan had already reached a level much more advanced than had previously been thought.

I believe there is a measure of truth in both these positions, yet both are simplifications of the actual process through which the authentically characteristic Hebrew monotheism was attained. One must first remember that modes of theological thought never establish themselves as disembodied ideologies. They develop along with and inside of corresponding institutional structures. One cannot, therefore, by referring to what happened at about the same time in neighboring cultures determine with finality whether the theological thought of the Hebrews reached the monotheistic level as early as the 12th or preceding centuries B.C. No one who knows anything of these surrounding cultures is likely to deny that Moses could have been a monotheist. But that does not prove that he was—much less that, in that age, the Hebrews were.

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The recently discovered mythological texts from Ras Shamra tend greatly to complicate the whole problem of the origins of Hebrew monotheism. Comparative study of this mythology may very possibly indicate that it may properly be described as monotheistic, whether or not the worshipers who used it were conscious of this fact. At this point I must recall and endorse as valid a point recently made in this journal by Professor Albright[2] who insists it is unjustifiable to define "monotheism" only in what he calls "unitarian" terms. It may easily become increasingly evident, as the comparative study of mythology proceeds, that the perception of unity in diversity was common to the makers of myths long before a philosopher was ever heard of. In that case the worship of many deities is not always properly defined as polytheism. The propriety of such a characterization depends upon the extent to which syncretism has progressed in a particular system, and also upon whether the godhead is conceived as the ultimate and universal reality.

Now this mythology from Ras Shamra shows a much closer relationship to the Old Testament than any similar material from Greece or Egypt or Mesopotamia. It is hardly too daring to say (so close is the relationship) that a very close variant of this mythology underlies the theology of the historical Hebrew religion. Its discovery has forced the admission that Wellhausen erred in dating most of the non-prophetic poetry of the Old Testament in the post-exilic age. Some such material, particularly in the Psalter, is highly impregnated with allusions to a mythology strikingly similar to that found in these north Syrian documents. It seems to me obvious that at least some of this Old Testament material must be very old. This judgment, however, is stiffly resisted by some, who seek to explain these Biblical allusions to myth entirely as poetical imagery deriving from the influence of Canaanite (Phoenician) literature as it was brought to bear on Hebrew literature, only relatively late, in the age of the great prophets. These same men

[2] Albright, W. F., "Archeology Confronts Biblical Criticism," THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR, Spring 1938, pp. 176-188.

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assert, however, that the very rich early Canaanite literature exerted such a profound influence on the Hebrew literary genius that the parallelism which marks Hebrew poetry is of Canaanite origin. Is it not strange that a people so susceptible, at an early date, to literary influence should be utterly immune to mythological influence until a much later time? Some believe the Hebrews of the Mosaic age were so closely *en rapport* with the world about them as to become monotheists at about the same time that monotheism appeared in Egypt and Mesopotamia. This change to monotheism was, they hold, caused by the same factors that produced it elsewhere and not by a preponderant influence exerted upon Hebrew thought by some specific neighboring culture. But if Hebrew thought was so susceptible to these general factors it is difficult to believe that all of that body of Hebrew literature which was closest to the Mosaic age remained completely impervious to the specific mythology current, not only in those distant centers (Egypt and Mesopotamia) but also in the new Canaanite environment. Such a phenomenon of special isolation from mythology could of course occur. But I must confess to a great deal of skepticism about its probability. It is at least possible, I believe, that if the Hebrews had developed a monotheistic theology in the Mosaic age it derived originally and specifically from the same root as the Ras Shamra mythology rather than from more generalized factors. If so, its affinities are somewhat closer with Mesopotamia than with Egypt.

The problem is even more complex than this, however, because another theological phenomenon known as henotheism also enters into the picture. Henotheism is the selection, by an individual or a group, of one god out of many for exclusive worship. Such theological particularism frequently accompanies strong political particularism. Nationalism, indeed, seems to have had a good deal to do with the establishment of Jehovah worship in Palestine. There is also good reason to believe that nationalism was a factor in imparting to the monotheism reflected in the Old Testament that dash of social-

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cultural particularism from which even St. Paul, centuries later, had not freed himself.

In Hebrew society, however, the particularistic attitude was not confined to circles having a henotheistic theological outlook (circles represented, for instance, by the prophets). The official Jehovah worship—which, for example, the great prophets of the 8th century faced—was very probably a syncretistic form of monotheism, as the prophets' allusions to the baals seem to suggest. Yet though this official worship may, under this definition, be described as monotheistic, the prophets found fault with it because it had a nationalistic bias which seriously limited Jehovah's sovereignty. Moreover, however strongly the professional devotees of syncretism may have been impressed intellectually by the unity of Jehovah, a prophet like Hosea certainly regarded the worship of the baals (who were presumably aspects of Jehovah), by the masses, as a disintegrating influence rather than a force making for monotheism. If there was any monotheism in Israel in the Mosaic age (and the official Jehovah worship of the prophetic period would have reflected the religious pattern of the Mosaic age) it was quite possibly of the syncretistic type reflected in the Ras Shamra texts. It is more than ever likely, therefore, to have been part of the heritage from Canaan.

If so, this monotheism was the theology of that social and religious system which the prophets criticized. The ethical aspects of that system were incompatible with the historical Hebrew monotheism of a later age, developed after criticism had stimulated Israel to try to live the examined life. In other words if Israel, in the Mosaic age, had actually attained such a highly ethical monotheism as the record in its final form associates with the name of Moses, it is almost inconceivable that this monotheism should have meant so little—as the record suggests it did—to masses and classes alike in the immediately subsequent period. It seems much more likely that the highly ethical end-product represented by the Old Testament documents in their final form resulted from a long process of social-

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cultural struggle; and that in the course of this process an ethically primitive syncretistic monotheism, which had been a heritage from the Canaanite culture, was gradually transformed as critical individuals stimulated at least some of the nation's leaders to examine its corporate life and modify its patterns.

In no dogmatic spirit I submit these suggestions on some of the great problems raised by archeology. Their worth must be tested and there is no expectation that they will not, in some respects, be found wanting. This discussion may suggest, however, that in the light of archeological discoveries higher criticism has not been essentially a futility. Archeology merely indicates that higher criticism has not yet carried its task through to a socially and scientifically satisfactory result.

I also hope the foregoing discussion may help a little to rouse the flagging morale of the religious liberal. This is a time which needs, probably more than any other age, what such men should stand for. The liberal has made some great mistakes. Among these has been a failure to appreciate Christianity as basically a historical religion, developed orthogenetically from roots embedded deep in that long past which lay behind its Founder and his disciples. Many liberals have not merely neglected that past; they have condescended to it; they have even cast it aside as in no way vitally related to their own culture.

Is it any wonder, then, that the forces of liberal religion so often dissipate themselves to little purpose; that they find it so hard to act in concert; that they feel behind them little drive of that higher authority on which it is part of the genius of liberalism to rely? The cure for whatever the ills of liberalism may be does not lie in infidelity to its own genius. The cure lies instead in that dogged fidelity to its genius which will insure for this age, as it has insured for past ages, protection from any degenerate form of authoritarianism. For strange as it may seem to some in this age, freedom is not the foe but the friend of authority.

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RIOUPEROUX RE-VISITED

Humbert Wolfe

It was before Elkin Matthews published "The Bridge of Fire"
that we talked in your rooms beside the river, Flecker,
in Oxford, when you were writing "Riouperoux."
There was white Curaçao on the table, ink and bent wire,
an etching (first state) of Heidelberg and the Neckar
crumpled but worth (you asserted) a pound or two.

And reams of paper for unwritten masterpieces,
and eager pencils, most of them with the points broken,
and books from Blackwell's, notably Ramal (Walter)
"When slim Miranda" as the dark increases,
I hear you speak it again, as it was spoken
with the slow husky drawl that the years cannot alter.

You thought that Masefield had some slight distasteful power,
that Phillips was a charlatan, but felt that Yeats
might if he studied Baudelaire, still count.
"It is my faith," you cried, "that one black flower
dropped from the Frenchman's hand will outperfume the Fates,
and with dark glory rekindle the pale Pierian fount.

I will walk," you murmured, "in Graiasvaudan's vale.
I will see the mountains that brood above the river,
whose snow-filled flood is like the soul of France—
cold as the ice it draws from, but with its current flail
smashing the tangled undergrowth of lies that shiver
at the swift terror in the waters of Romance.

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Riouperoux Re-Visited

Flow out of the mountains into the stolid plain,
out of the hills of song into the lowlands of prose!
That is your mission, and mine," you chanted, "Land
of the trouvère, of youth, of wine, of the stain
of blood spilt at the barricades—the rose,
whose bitter scent the gods of freedom planned.

Yes, I will go to France again and tramp the valley through."
Meanwhile the great laburnum with its golden bees
swarming in the green hive glimmered in the quiet Cher,
and the evening gathered and deepened before we knew
that the dark was upon us, and the silences,
where each dim blossom matched and marked a star.

"Before we knew that the dark was upon us." Yesterday,
after the thousand years of which you wrote, I stood
under the rain beside the river, and the mill.
I have forgotten what it is ghosts say,
or by what signal a stricken spirit could
win back to speech from the dark where all is still.

I heard your dangerous dim voice, so sweet
that had I answered, and made my voice to carry
beyond the slow forgetful flood in the hush,
it would have sewn the crocus at your feet
among the asphodel, and where no song-birds tarry
have starred the dome of Hell with the notes of the thrush.

I did not speak, Flecker. I could only linger
with helpless hands outstretched in a midsummer
cold as the darkest of December eves.
But as I stood, I heard a later singer
speak for us both, and thought, "Salute, newcomer,"
and heard an echo through a world of leaves.

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Radio: Medicine Show

JOHN T. FLYNN

A POSITIVE, defined, recognizable policy on radio broadcasting is one of those things the national government has not yet troubled itself to form. But attention to the problem cannot be very much longer deferred. The incredibly childish approach of the broadcasters to the problem of public discussion, the vague whisperings of plans for government entry into the business of broadcasting, the scandalous rumors about the Commission set up to represent the public interest, the vulgarity, banality, sheer ignorance and immaturity of the advertisers who sponsor our daily ration of culture, have so irritated the public conscience that Congress is certain to get around presently to this very serious matter.

It is impossible to consider radio without discussing the problem of freedom of speech. It is impossible to conceive of radio broadcasting without government control. The air is a series of highways over which messages may be broadcast. The number of these highways is limited—less than 100. There is therefore a sheer traffic problem to be faced. Unless these radio bands or highways are allocated everybody would attempt to use the same bands and transmission would be impossible. These highways are not like public streets which countless vehicles can use at the same time. In the air every traveler must be kept off the aerial highway while the licensed user occupies it. There is, therefore, no escape from a system of government licenses.

The privilege of granting licenses and of renewing them comprises the right to refuse them, to cancel them, to deny renewal. Therefore an arbitrary or excessively political government can employ this power as a means of controlling the contents of the broadcast. And thus arises the old ghost of invasions of freedom of speech by the political authority. Everybody will

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agree that under no circumstances should the government be permitted to influence or dictate the social, economic, religious, political or other intellectual content of broadcast programs, save insofar as the rights of other citizens may be involved. The slander laws and, within properly defined limits, the police power to exclude obscenity cover the government's general sphere of control, so far as content is concerned.

But freedom of speech and of the press may have other enemies than the government. And this makes it necessary for us to be quite clear what we mean by freedom of speech and of the press. The man who owns a newspaper and who is free from every form of government restraint certainly enjoys freedom of speech so far as his newspaper is concerned. But we must distinguish between the individual newspaper and the press as an institution. There is a difference between freedom of the individual owners and freedom of the press as an institution. A group of men who severally own all the newspapers in a society may come together in an agreement to exclude all news and discussion of certain subjects of social concern. They do this in the exercise of their own freedom. But having done it, that society no longer enjoys a free press insofar as the censored subject is concerned. It is entirely possible, therefore, that the individual owners of the press may be free of all government restraint and yet the country be without a free press. It is this view of the matter which remains obscure in most discussions of the subject.

Every newspaper owner is subject to restraints which arise out of his own human weaknesses—fear of offending his community, fear of the hostility of its powerful leaders, fear of religious and social and political groups. These kinds of restraints can never be eliminated. They are in the order of human nature and must be accepted as inevitable. Freedom of the press and of course of the radio means freedom from such restraints as may be controlled. Against these human weaknesses there is but one safeguard—a multitude of journals and a multitude of editors who will not be subject to the same restraints.

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All will not be trying to please the same people. The very freedom—nay urge—of one man to print becomes a powerful corrective of the restraints upon another to omit the news. Political oppression of the press is so baleful just because it can exercise its influence over every editor, can terrorize and silence any editor who defies its interests.

The restraints upon the press which arise out of these private and social and commercial interests become a grave public problem when the powers which exercise these influences are so great and so united that their pressure may be applied to all editors and to the press as a whole.

Let us suppose that editor Number One publishes his journal at a loss but makes up his loss through a subsidy granted by Mr. X. Editor Number Two also publishes a journal at a loss but meets his deficit by means of sums obtained for some service to Mr. Y. Editor One will feel at liberty to print what he chooses so long as he does not offend Mr. X. Editor Two will feel bound to print what pleases Mr. Y under penalty of losing Y's support. But Editor One will be hampered only by his dependence upon X and will be quite free to print what he chooses about Y. And Editor Two although restrained by Mr. Y will have no compunction about printing anything he wishes about X. But what will happen when Editor One and Editor Two are both dependent on Mr. X? If all the papers in a community are owned by Editors One and Two they constitute the press. In theory both editors are free to defy the powerful Mr. X. But in the nature of things they will not do so because the price of defiance is extinction. And therefore while these editors are legally free and voluntarily relinquish that freedom for a more highly coveted prize, namely solvency, the press is not free.

Something like this has happened to the press in this country. Few if any newspapers can publish their journals at a profit. They must employ those journals in another field than journalism—and that field is advertising, which is in no sense a part of journalism but rather a parasite upon it. It is the advertiser who makes up the editor's deficits.

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It is not true, of course, that there is but one advertiser who holds in his hands the power of life and death over the editors. No one can deny, however, that the advertising interests in a community, although they have their special differences on points of religion and social principles and even of commercial policies, are generally a unit upon certain important essential principles. But even where they are not a unit there is a menace to the freedom of the press which arises out of the necessity laid upon the editor to court their favor. The publisher solicitous for the favor of Mr. X and of Mr. Y, even though these gentlemen differ upon a point, will exercise the greatest prudence in seeking to offend neither. The very number of the powerful persons who make up the patron element of the press merely multiplies the number of restraints upon the editor. Altogether it forces on him that conservative timidity which compels him to remain away from certain great areas of news and from the discussion of certain serious subjects which the commercial interests in a community as a whole and separately wish to remain untouched.

Thus it seems clear that before we can have a free press society must find a means not only of protecting the individual editor from the invasions and restraints of government but of protecting the press as an institution from the editors themselves.

Thus far I have discussed this problem in terms of the press alone since that is an instrument with which we are more familiar. But the radio, like the press, is subject to the same observations. It is one of those instruments of public news and discussion which apparently cannot support itself as such and must turn to some other interest to pay its bills. Like the press it has turned to the advertiser. The advertiser is willing to pay the cost of assembling a great orchestra or of forming a troop of entertainers or supplying a dance band because he knows that millions will listen. All he asks is the privilege of interrupting the program at intervals to catch the ears of those millions of listeners. It is an old technique. The itinerant medicine man of former days carried about with him his banjo player and

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minstrel and clog dancer and magician to attract the crowd to his tent and to put them in a benevolent mood as a prologue to his own "high pitch" upon the wonders of his pills and lotions.

Now the radio is hopelessly committed to this form of operation. The advertiser is and doubtless for some time will remain the sponsor of the radio program. And because he pays the piper he is in a position to call the tunes. Thus the freedom of the radio as an institution of public discussion and news, not the freedom of the individual station, is threatened. The individual station is a commercial enterprise in the hands of an enterpriser who wishes to operate it as an instrument of profit derived from the commercial interests in the community. He has no wish to offend or battle or defy them. His only study is to please them to the uttermost, prove his usefulness to them and advance their interests. He has no liberty which he is deeply concerned in defending against them. But the grand result is that the institution of which he is but a part and which, as an institution, is a public and not a private function sees its freedom extinguished. Is it not clear that the freedom of the radio is destroyed if the government will not grant licenses unless it censors the programs? Is it not equally clear that that freedom is equally impaired if the advertising interests will not pay the bills unless they can impose a practical censorship?

But what then is to be done about it? There is obviously only one power with sufficient authority to do anything and that is the government, which is the trustee of the people for the administration of the air.

But no one will countenance a government-dominated news agency and forum. Men have not forgotten that the first struggle for freedom of speech and of the press was waged against political authority. That battle, certainly in this country, has been won. But a people vigilant for the preservation of its democratic freedoms will never cease to look with a certain suspicion upon political authorities, particularly in a world troubled as ours is today by so many ruling groups who assail the very

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existence of these rights. The radio is of necessity in the hands of the government. We cannot escape its presidency over the administration of the medium through which the radio operates. But every resistance should be offered the establishment of government-owned and operated radio stations since these are liable to become the instruments not of the government but of the politician who operates the government. But equally we cannot tolerate unregulated private ownership of the air. And there is no regulating authority but the government. How far, therefore, may we trust the government with this function? I offer the following suggestions.

The advertising sponsor presents a twofold problem. First there is the abuse of the advertiser's privileges in the use of the air and secondly the abuse of his power to restrain free discussion over the air. On the first point the abuse arises when the advertiser is permitted to disseminate news and discussions of public questions. The advertiser wishes to advertise his product. He therefore desires to command a large audience. This is a purely practical matter of drumming up a crowd. To do this he uses the most attractive entertainment he can obtain. Having gotten his crowd he should be permitted within decent limits to advertise his product. But he should not be permitted to turn that crowd into a political, religious or economic meeting. He should not be permitted to employ the radio and the crowd to spread religious, social, economic or political propaganda. However bad the newspaper may have become it has not descended to this. It does not, as a rule, rent out its news or its editorial columns to advertisers. It does indeed succumb to the influence of commercial interests but it does not permit the editorial function to pass out of its hands. Its editorials and reports do not have to run the gauntlet of advertising agents, vice-presidents and presidents and managers of commercial corporations, as is the case in broadcasts. The handling of news and views in the newspaper is in the hands of a department separated from the advertiser. And although the advertiser's spirit broods over the editorial room the editorial room resents

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it, resists it as much as it can. Furthermore, thinking of its function in terms of editorial excellence and obligation, the editorial room does build up an ethical standard which stands as a barricade against the over-insistent business office.

I know too well the bad influence of the commercial spirit upon the press. I know as well as anyone how much better the press could be if it were emancipated from this influence. But I know also how infinitely worse it would be if the advertising agent and the advertiser had moved bodily into the editorial rooms. This is what has happened in the radio broadcasting station. This is what I wish to end.

I would not restrain the radio broadcaster from the dissemination of news or of discussions. But I would compel him to separate this function completely from the programs of the advertisers. To permit the advertiser to become a social and economic propagandist on the air is to give the advertising interest a disproportionate place in the great forum of public discussion. A great manufacturer can pay the immense sum required to support a great symphony orchestra on the air because he gets an advertising return for the expenditure. But having drawn together a vast audience to listen to the symphony orchestra and having subdued the mind by means of the melting music, he may then interrupt the concert for a precious five minutes while he pours into the ears of his guests his economic and political philosophies. There is no public group with sufficient financial resources to meet this kind of propaganda. The advertiser should be permitted to have his crowd and his concert and a brief period to sell his wares but no more. As a citizen with economic and social views to exploit he should have only the same right, so far as the air is concerned, as any other citizen. Although this would not free the air from the influence of the advertiser it would certainly tend to bring the distribution of the news and views of the broadcasting station under the administration of an editorial group capable of developing a far more civilized ethic with respect to the news.

I would divide the air into its three functions. In one it

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would be a great medicine show where advertisers, for pay, could put on entertainment and cry their wares, but the ballyhoo would be limited strictly to entertainment. In a second the air would be a great distributor of news and views which would be administered by a separate editorial board at the expense of the broadcaster. In a third I would consider the air as a great public hall which would be open to hire by persons, and by cultural and educational and other public organizations to hold meetings. And a part of this time I would compel the broadcasting station to give freely for educational and public purposes.

I would not permit any newspaper to own or operate a radio station. The newspaper is itself a dispenser of news and views. It tends to become more and more a monopoly in its community. One-paper communities, or communities dominated by a single owner, are growing in number. A multitude of journals and stations, and the inevitable competition between them, is the chief prophylactic against excessive surrender to the sponsoring advertisers in both press and radio. To permit the radio to fall under the dominion of the press as the press itself falls under the dominion of monopoly is to throw away this safeguard.

Regulations covering these points might well be made by the government without infringing the rights of anyone or without setting the government up as a menace to the liberties of the people themselves. No other agency of society can protect it from that usurpation of the instruments of communication by the great, predatory interests of the nation—which is coming to be one of the most sinister problems of the modern democratic state.

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More—"Puritan *à Rebours*"

FOLKE LEANDER

STUART P. SHERMAN once asked why Paul Elmer More did not postpone his series of books on Plato and Plotinus and other classical worthies and give us his autobiography instead. The *Pages from an Oxford Diary* (Princeton 1937), posthumously published, sometimes resemble the thing Sherman asked for, yet also here the personality of the author remains to a certain extent hidden behind his ideas and his work—though certainly not behind the thin pretense of fiction in which these soliloquies have been veiled. The notes which make up this book were written out in the years 1924-1925 in Oxford, whence the title and the fictitious setting chosen. These years closed a long period of gestation in More's thought when he had been working out the religious views brought forward in his later books, and the notes formed an early summary of his new point of view, written down by him, apparently, in the process of clarifying his own mind. Shortly before More's death his daughter, Mrs. Harry Fine, came across the little manuscript, and following the advice of some of his closest friends he finally decided to publish it.

From this latest publication, as well as from the somewhat earlier *Marginalia*, it is possible to form a clearer picture of More's development than was formerly the case. They offer a natural basis for a retrospective survey of his life and work. No doubt More's work had its center of gravity in the field of literary criticism, but the human mind is not subject to rigid compartmental divisions and just as More's criticism is inseparable from his critical philosophy, so the latter is indissolubly bound up with his general philosophy, which throughout his life (apart from a brief period of militant materialism) was essentially a philosophy of religion. To focus attention on the development of More's philosophy of religion—as I am going

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to do on the following pages—is therefore not necessarily to throw the whole subject out of perspective; but only scant justice will in this way be rendered to the many-sided human appeal of his life and work.

"In a way I have come about a great circle," More writes, "and my end is close to where I began; for I was born, so to speak, a theologian, and my first literary work was a sermon, printed, without my knowledge, at the tender age of eight." This youthful theologian had also, we gather from another source, a strange power to hold his comrades transfixed, sometimes for hours, by the vivid and thrilling tales he invented for them. Two traits of an exceptional child thus foreshadow the two predominant interests of an exceptional man, literature and religion. In his early youth he drifted away from the faith of his childhood; his doubts finally reached a climax and forced him to make a final and, so far as Calvinism was concerned, irrevocable decision. "With something like a paroxysm of certainty, with bitter actual tears of regret, I cast off, once and for all, the faith that had nurtured the better life of my childhood and youth." At a Sunday morning service he finally reached clarity yet he left the church that forenoon "as one goes out of a spiritual home to wander in the bleak ways of an alien world."

There followed a period of romantic emotionalism.

> The thoughts of God were supplanted by a morbid introspection and the practice of worship gave way to indulgence in self-commiserating egotism. Naturally I was unhappy; but the more wretched I grew, the more assured I became that my isolation was the sign of a grand mission; somehow my very despair was to be the saviour of myself and of mankind. Under that malign spell I composed lyrics and tragedies and, at the last, a huge epic, in which I myself figured as the Wandering Jew, whose curse began with Cain's murder of Abel and was renewed at his contemptuous rejection of Christ on the way to the cross. I forget now in what manner the solution of the curse came about and how my hero was converted into the protagonist of the human race.

A perfect case of romantic *mysticisme d'alliance*—of belief in one's own Messianic mission!

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Next came a reaction into materialism. "A thick notebook was filled with the project of a New Philosophy which should prove once for all that the world and men are the product of a fatalistic Law of Chance and Probability. I was to be the new Democritus, and to soar where he stumbled." Yet once a Puritan always a Puritan. The religious instinct, awakened and nourished by the faith of his childhood, was still potent within him. The distant voices of the Hindu saints and sages soon reached his ears, and all the clangor of the scientific materialism then triumphant in America as well as in Europe could not deafen him to their appeal. There was something in him that responded to their message and vouched for its essential truth. In the Brahmanic theosophy of the Upanishads he found what was in fact and efficacy a faith, yet demanded belief in none of the things he had discarded; "its appeal was to what might be called pure spirituality, to something deeper than what we ordinarily think of as 'soul,' to that in us which has no attachment or relation to the phenomenal world or to concrete experience."

This interest in Oriental religion was evidently an effect of his Puritan background, and in spite of the prominent position of this strain in More's early writings it may nevertheless be doubted whether it ever struck very deep roots in him. When reading More's autobiographical statements one is more than once reminded of T. S. Eliot's dictum: "Religion is, of course, *for us* Christianity." Whatever Hinduism may have been to the Hindus, it was to More a kind of stunted religion, a thin post-Protestant independent spirituality. What lived on within him was Puritan otherworldliness liberated from Puritan dogma and masquerading in Oriental disguise. More's religious instincts found a temporary outlet in Hinduism but it was not Hinduism that had fostered and nourished them. This impression is intensified when one considers his own list of the stages through which he passed before his final conversion to Christianity: "childish faith, romanticism, rationalistic scepticism, critical curiosity, classical taste, Platonism." The absorp-

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tion in Hindu mysticism which followed upon his period of rationalistic scepticism is not even mentioned. Nor is the omission a casual slip, as we may learn from another passage in the *Pages from an Oxford Diary*.

> What saved me from moral and emotional paralysis in this pseudo-philosophy [scientific materialism] was, I think, a deep-seated interest in humanity. . . . What is the nature of this thing we call life, this irrational power . . . ? And so, disappointed in metaphysics, I gave myself for years to the curious pursuit of literature as the spontaneous expression of the *élan vital*—and that long before this phrase was popularized by Bergson.

He read countless biographies, led on by the hope that he would somewhere "surprise the secret of existence and learn how it can be made a thing beautiful and complete and precious in itself, with no reference to supramundane values, with no philosophy beyond that of the moving present."

It was a revival of his romantic interests, accordingly, that liberated More from the chains of scientific materialism. The relation between this romanticism and his Hindu mysticism seems to have been one of mere juxtaposition, somewhat after the manner of Emerson. At least we know from his own testimony that such was the case at the time when he was first acquainted with Irving Babbitt. "I am afraid that I held for him then the place afterwards occupied by Rousseau." Gradually, through Babbitt's influence, romanticism was expelled from his system; and thus he finally arrived at the view of life which has been embodied in the ten first volumes of the *Shelburne Essays* and in his book on *Platonism*. The Oriental element remained in his religious background, but the further one reads in the *Shelburne Essays* the more apparent does it become that his heart is now rather in a Platonism seen against the background of Oriental religion than in Oriental religion for its own sake. Yet this is still only a change of emphasis and his point of view remains fundamentally the same throughout this period.

The famous philosophy of the "inner check," as summarized

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in the *Definitions of Dualism*, was now the very center of his view of life. To most readers it has seemed a curious sample of incomprehensible mystification yet its import becomes clear enough upon attentive reading. And since one must have grasped this doctrine in order to understand much of More's critical work as well as the later modifications of his religious views, I shall attempt a brief summary of it here.

Everybody knows the general traits of the metaphysical tradition that goes back to Plato and Aristotle. There is the realm of being, one, immutable, unperturbed; there is not-being, the principle of evil in the universe; and between them, resulting somehow from the interaction of these two opposites, there is the world of contingent being and relative good. How this general scheme was worked out in detail within various philosophies does not concern us here. We should only notice that human nature, as a part of the universe, is itself constituted along the same lines; there is also in human nature a principle of unity, of good, consubstantial with, or communing with, the general principle of unity in the world at large; and there is also a dark substratum of chaos working through the unorganized passions and desires. If we ask for the name of the higher element of human nature Western philosophy answers unanimously: *intellectus*, *νους*. "Reason" is the element in man through which he communes with the higher reality beyond the world of sense. "Reason" is the organ of his communion with the Divine.

To all of which the logical positivist, and the modern naturalist in general, would answer: your "reason" is really no reason at all but rather a kind of esthetic-religious contemplation which you mix up with all kinds of logical paraphernalia in order to "prove" the truth of your vision. So far as this criticism goes Paul Elmer More is wholly with the logical positivist. No one has ever insisted more on the ultimately alogical character of religious dualism. His earliest word can be placed beside his last, on this point at least, without the charge of

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inconsistency. Consider for instance his comment on the Hindu conception of Brahma, in *The Great Refusal* (1894):

> Brahma signified originally the swelling of the heart in the fervour of prayer, the feeling of exaltation which ever comes to a man in seasons of earnest worship, when the walls of his personality are broken down and the infinite powers of the universe sweep over him. At such times the soul knew of the God that encompasses the barriers of the senses, and the word describing the condition of the worshipper was naturally extended to this nameless power with which he communed. So this God was called Brahma, the infinite, eternal, unchangeable, all-embracing, all-pervading. And he who in times of ecstacy felt his spirit rapt into communion with this God was said to know Brahma. And as knowledge with the Hindus, and forsooth with all men of insight, is a manner of identification, and what we know, with that we are made one; so he who knew Brahma was said to be united with Brahma, to be Brahma.

Surely we do not "know" the religious realities, More has always held, by the organs of knowledge known to the logical positivist; it is rather a kind of immediate *sensing*, a spiritual intuition. Turn from this early work to any one of his latest studies, *e.g.* the essay on von Hügel, and—no matter how far he may have moved away from Hindu mysticism—we still find the same insistence upon the vitally *sensed* religious realities as against the laborious constructions of rationalizing theology.

The element of unity in human nature is not then, for More, "reason" but rather a sense of the eternal, an intuition of higher values. If anybody should term this religious sense reason More would not, of course, start a lexicographical quarrel, if it were explicitly recognized that this kind of reason is something very different from the reason of Aristotle's logic. In this sense, for instance, Plato's νους was primarily a kind of immediate awareness or "vision" of the ethical Ideas and of the ultimate reality in which they are anchored. For More as for Plato the sense of eternal values is the element of unity in human nature which stands opposed to the multiplicity of impulses. But if human nature is thus a meeting-ground of the One and

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the Many, how does the meeting take place? The presence and activity of the Many we know as the passions hurrying us this way and that and always tending to excess. The presence and activity of the One make themselves felt in a powerful increase in man's strength to self-mastery and in a vital realization of the ethical dignity inherent in the life of self-mastery. The value of strenuousness is anchored, somehow, in the very foundations of the universe and we feel that something is eternally gained for the universe if we realize it in our own lives. We feel that the struggle between universal good and universal evil goes on also within ourselves. We cannot with certainty foresee the ultimate outcome of our specific actions but we can rouse ourselves and do our best. The obligation to do so, we feel, is a mysterious and infinite obligation from on high which brings its own reward or punishment in a peculiar kind of happiness or misery. To live up to this standard is to realize absolute value; our actions, moreover, upon the outer world, though always subject to contingency (for every man builds better or worse than he knows), will tend towards the good. The presence of the One we know as a mood of strenuousness conscious of its own intrinsic value.

The ultimate mystery of the moral life, accordingly, is an unaccountable coming and going of a mood of strenuousness. On this point More would summon to his support the testimony of higher religious experience in all ages and among all peoples. And certainly we must grant him that the mysterious presence and activity of a "higher will" in man are no inventions of his own or Babbitt's. In Christianity the mood of strenuousness has been interpreted as a gift from on high, as grace. "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling," said Paul, "for it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure." The apparent paradox contained in this doctrine gave rise to the problem of grace and free will. Still in Newman there is a trace of paradoxicality left, for instance in a passage like the following: "If we will, it is doubtless from God's grace, who gave us the power to will, and

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to him be the praise; but it is from ourselves too, because we have used that power which God gave. God enables us to will and to do; by nature we cannot will, but by grace we can; and now if we do not will, we are the cause of the defect." And Maximus of Tyre said:

> Do you think that divination, poetry, and such like things, are by divine inspiration insinuated into men's souls, and that virtue [so much better, and so much rarer a thing] is the work of moral art? You have forsooth a worthy conceit of God, who take him to be liberal in bestowing mean things, and sparing of better things.

Or let us quote the words of Isaac Barrow, commenting on a well-known passage in Paul:

> for *to will is present with me, but to perform that which is good, I find not*; I perceive not any means or way of effecting it: knowledge, therefore, and willingness to do good, doth not suffice; we need a prevalent force to stir and raise this unwieldy bulk, to overpoise our natural propensions, to subdue the reluctances, and check the opportunities of sense, to correct bad nature, and reclaim from bad custom. . . .

Another illustration, picked at random, may be furnished by von Hügel. The service of God really means for us the "fighting of self"; this work is done by "our volitional nature" and the grace of God working "in and through" our volitional nature. Grace is "the all-penetrating help of an infinite spiritual power, which itself gives what it makes us ourselves effect within ourselves." With St. Bernard he feels that

> the grace and the free-will interpenetrate each other throughout, and that the grace is in the free-will and the free-will in the grace. . . . Grace so little intereferes with, or simply adds itself on to, or runs parallel with the autonomy of the spiritual personality, that it actually constitutes that personality.

Certainly the presence in man of a "higher will," operative in and through the work of self-mastery, is no new discovery. In substance More's philosophy at the time when he wrote the *Shelburne Essays* consisted in taking this experience at its face value while disengaging it from the dogmatic "extra-beliefs" with which it had been surrounded in Christianity.

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It is unfortunate that More should have chosen the name "inner check" for this spiritual phenomenon and that he should have insisted so much that it operates as a negation. The metaphysical reasons for this curious twist in his doctrine are clear enough. Man is the meeting-ground of the cosmic One and the cosmic Many and how could two radically opposed principles interact except as negations of one another? Just as in classical philosophy Being, or Good, is the negation of Not-Being, or Evil, and between them, as the result of their interaction, there arises a world of contingent being and relative good, so in the human mind as a result of the negative interaction of absolute value and *das radikale Böse*—of spiritual strenuousness and unregenerate human nature—there arises the relative good of socially beneficial impulses and habits. In terms of human experience it is certainly not easy to grasp More's idea. The operation of the higher principle, More maintains, is always negative, for its presence produces a momentary check upon impulse: these are the moments when, like a ray from a transcendent world, the question breaks in upon us: is what I am now going to do right? Is the doing of this action compatible with the moral ideal of which I am conscious? The sense of ethical value thus produces a momentary pause and the original impulse is submitted to control as various considerations for or against it arise. The mood of strenuousness has in itself no specific content; it neither enjoins nor prohibits any particular act; but its presence causes us to inspect our motives and impulses—that is, it acts as a temporary check upon all impulses which, we feel, have not yet been submitted to sufficient inspection.

Whatever we may think of this interpretation it is certainly unfortunate that More should have insisted upon it so much. It is really quite unessential and his main idea could have been stated in much simpler language. There is a fundamental difference between the strenuous mood and the easy-going, don't-care mood. When man feels morally inspired, as it were, when the sense of ethical dignity is a vital presence within him,

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he has the strength needed for the overcoming of his baser impulses. The coming and going, waxing and waning of this strenuous mood is an unaccountable mystery.

Anyone who, like More, deifies character and the moral will must be profoundly at issue with the romantic deification of emotion. Speaking of the years of his "romantic aberration" More writes:

> In those yeasty years between childhood and maturity if I knelt at all it was before the image of my own vague desires, as it were a subtle quintessence of the fermentation of the flesh; if I knew any peace it was in moments of nerveless relaxation when self and the world swam together in a kind of vertiginous dream; if I had any philosophy, it was the reaction of a despairing disillusion, a sense of emptiness, out of which the phantasmagoria of life swirls up like a seething mist only to sink back into eternal vacuity.

Very different from the *Belphégor* of romanticism is the God of Christianity—"not by expansion of instinctive desires, nor by sentimental revery, nor by mere letting-go, is His presence felt, but by a certain constriction and bracing-up at the centre of one's being."

These passages are taken from the *Pages from an Oxford Diary*. In the *Shelburne Essays* the Divine Reality which is mysteriously present in man when the strenuous mood is upon him was still the impersonal, infinite, eternal, unchanging One of Hindu mysticism. Yet changes were bound to come; in fact, they had been working underground all the time. The truth is that More had never felt spiritually at home in the mysticism which he intellectually embraced. He writes:

> Deep and genuine as was my intellectual surrender to the Upanishads and the Bhagavad Gîtâ there was something in me that they left unsatisfied, a thirst they could not quench, though I did not know what or why. All this while I was reading such authors as Newman and Shorthouse with zest and sympathy, but with this curious twist of interest: what I got from them and what held me, was exactly what I had sought to escape in fleeing to Oriental mysticism, yet critically, in the end, I could scold them for that very reason.

What he missed in Oriental religion was, of course, a real God

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and a real otherworld; his uprooted Puritanism felt uneasy in the vast emptiness of the Hindu One. He was not ready for Christianity yet, but at this point of his development Platonism offered a conception of the divine realities that better answered his needs. In Platonism he found a real otherworld of Ideas, reminiscent of the Christian Heaven and, if not the reality, at least the symbolism of a personal God.

It is important to remember that the change came about by degrees. At first there was a shift of interest from the Orient to Plato and Greek culture in general. His imagination dwelt more and more within the latter sphere even though he did not formally abandon the religious background that he had brought with him from his Oriental studies. According to a Swedish critic, Dr. Knut Hagberg, the "mystical" inspiration is somewhat weakened in the later *Shelburne Essays* and the "humanistic" element is more prominent. Yet More's classical humanism was different from Babbitt's, for it was part of his quest for a more solid, substantial and, as it were, tangible otherworld than Brahminism could offer. This was what held him in Plato and the Greek tragedians. Brahminism, with its ultimate, supernatural, transcendent Unity, had been too metaphysical for Babbitt, whereas More, characteristically, had always been drawn in that direction rather than towards Buddhism.[1] And now, to More's mind, even Brahminism, though metaphysical enough, was nevertheless insufficiently concrete in its notion of the supernatural.

For Babbitt "the final reply to all the doubts that torment the human heart is the man of character." "Compared with this ultimate human reality, every other reality is only a shadow in the mist." For him the ultimately good thing in the universe is the strenuous man; not the Moral Law in independent majesty but the Moral Law as realized in human life. Apart from such realization it remained an unreal potentiality. He pinned

[1] More's interpretation of Buddhism, it is true, differed from Babbitt's. But even so the same difference reappears, since More held that Brahminism was more concrete in its notion of the supernatural than Buddhism. See his essay on Buddhism in *The Catholic Faith* (1931).

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his faith to the Aristotelian One *in* the Many as the solid rock upon which the human heart could rest. Separate the One from its actual incarnations and conceive of it as an independent, transcendent reality in its own right and you fall into useless and ultimately morally harmful metaphysics. Platonism as well as Brahminism had both gone too far in that direction. "Much of the loftiest spirituality of the Occident," Babbitt wrote, "has been associated with this Platonic idealism. On the other hand the early Buddhists saw in a somewhat similar doctrine in India an obstacle rather than an aid to the achievement of the fruits of religion." The kind of mysticism that is found in the *Shelburne Essays*, of the absolute One at the heart of the world, was foreign to Babbitt; not a word in that direction is found in his writings; there is nothing of it, for instance, in his Introduction to the *Dhammapada* where he gives us his interpretation of Buddhism. On the other hand More's philosophy of the One *and* the Many was intimately connected with his early interest in Brahminism, which served as a basis for his interpretation of Hindu religion in general; and when he gradually felt the need of a more positive and concrete conception of the divine his sympathies naturally went to Platonism.

At first no doubt the impelling motive presented itself as a predilection for the rich imagery with which Plato conceived of the supernatural. Nevertheless in the book on *Platonism* (1917) More's old philosophy remained unchanged. He still interpreted Plato's ethical Ideas as "imaginative projections of the facts of moral consciousness"—as various modes of the intuition of the One (the Idea of the Good), distinguished according to the various groups of impulses which are subject to the control of this supreme intuition. For his own part More did not yet literally accept the Platonic World of Ideas. His philosophy told him that these Ideas in their concrete multiplicity were only a symbolic play of the imagination whereas the divine reality was One. To his heart the Platonic Heaven was a resplendent reality but to his head still imagination.

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In his next book, *The Religion of Plato* (1921), the world of Ideas had become a reality for him philosophically also; and, above all, in the Ideal sphere also there was now a personal God. More's thought had reached its final phase. Consider once more the philosophy of the *Shelburne Essays*: there is the transcendent One, timeless and non-spatial, yet—paradoxically—operative wherever and whenever higher values are in process of realization. Such was the philosophy of which More now became increasingly sceptical. He began to ask himself whether the experience of higher values really contained within itself such a metaphysic. Was it, after all, necessary to conceive of the Eternal as a timeless absolute-infinite-one? Was anything of the kind really implicit in the immediate sense of a divine reality? These were questions that he turned over in his mind, and his final conclusion was that this absolute-infinite-one was a mere rationalistic abstraction, superimposed upon immediate experience. It stood for an intellectualistic interpretation of experience, a harmful superstructure that could but stifle the religious instinct and that must be cleared away in order to make room for genuine spiritual growth. Why indeed should man be strenuous, why should he propose to himself a line of life which requires a constant exercise of choice and restraint, in themselves painful to the natural man, if this life and the "happiness" to be attained in it are all?[2] "If we perish like beasts, shall we not live like beasts?" No, the metaphysic implicit in our moral sense is not that of an Absolute-One decked out in the rags of meaningless appearance. A philosophy more deeply consonant with our moral sense is that which rests upon the perception of plan and purpose in the world.

And if I discern plan and purpose, how shall I exclude these souls of ours, whatever you make them to be, from the great design? And if I embrace them in the divine economy, how shall I believe that they are dispersed at death? And if they perdure for a time or for eternity, what

[2] This, it seems to me, is the δός μοι ποῦ στῶ, philosophically, of More's revision of his earlier thought.

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vehicle shall I give them in that long journey, and what name shall I bestow upon the objects of their high adventure? At bottom it is just this: the thought of a conscious personality, yours or mine, caught in a web of outrageous follies and injustices, lured on to extinction through lying dreams and expectations, is too hideous to contemplate. Without God, and the otherworld, and the hope of salvation at the last, without these the universe becomes no sorry jest, as you would courteously deem it, but a purulent cancer on the corpse of nonentity. I prefer my conjectures.

A mere wish-belief, you will say. But then, More would ask, how can you be so sure that a wish-belief cannot be true? Need a belief be false merely because it is consonant with our moral sense?

Paul Elmer More's problem in *The Greek Tradition* and in his subsequent writings was to permit our deeper moral needs to speak for themselves and to restore religious experience in its lived integrity from the rationalistic constructions with which he had earlier surrounded it. The absolute, the abstract and the infinite—these words are "the sterile eggs of reason never fecundated by sense."

The orthodox theologians may have been betrayed into extravagant language, but the God of their worship, and in reality of their thought, was no logical abstraction; He was a Person, the author of Providence, the hearer of prayer, the Father of the living Christ. The mystery of God may be unfathomable, His power and majesty beyond reckoning, His ways not as our ways; but if He is a God, He is not absolute or infinite.

More's severe treatment of mysticism in *The Greek Tradition* and his condemnation of Aristotle's influence upon theology are two closely interrelated aspects of his new hostility towards the Absolute.

More's return to Christianity thus presented itself philosophically as a return to the dim but vital instincts of immediate religious experience. In his rejection of the Absolute he may seem to have come round to the position which had been held all the time by Babbitt. Yet there was a difference. To More immediate religious experience, when unhampered by mis-

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placed rationalism, still bore witness of an otherworld though not that of the Hindu One. And when confronted by the facts of Christian dogma and tradition man's deeper religious instincts, he believed, would ultimately lead him to make the venture of faith.

More has been criticized for neglecting this "experiential" basis of Christian dogma but hardly with justice. The criticism applies to Babbitt but certainly not to More. In his theological and apologetic writings, it is true, More did not discourse vaguely about spiritual potentialities which are supposed to lead one among all religions to Christianity. But instead he tried to show *why* these instincts point towards Christianity and cannot stop short of its full acceptance. Mere affirmation that this is the case is the hardest among dogmas, however soft in appearance. More weighed possibilities and argued his decisions. He did not prove anything *more geometrico*, to be sure —that cannot be done in theological matters, he insisted, because the organ of experience is not primarily reason but a kind of alogical *sensing*. Nor can a painter prove the adequacy of his successive brush-strokes *more geometrico*, however sensitive he may be to their artistic effects. You can persuade in such matters but you cannot prove anything.

Misplaced logic was, in fact, More's great enemy. He had himself suffered from its devastating effects in the Calvinism of his early youth. More's reassertion of the supremacy of "intuition" and "imagination" in religious matters should, no doubt, be seen against this background. The rigid logic of Calvinism—"one dogma growing out of another as the theorems of Euclid are linked together"—was exercised at the cost of man's deeper religious sense. The traditional theological conception of God had been a mixture of the Christian God and the absolute, unconditioned Cause of all things. "To the hard brain of the French Protestant," More writes, "such a compromise was intolerable; he would have consistency or death. Forthwith he proceeded to draw out of this axiom of an unconditioned first Cause all the logical consequences which the

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orthodox theologians had glanced at and had dallied with in their scholastic manuals, but practically had never really admitted." More was a Puritan *à rebours*.

In his early youth More abandoned the Puritan dogmas but he retained the Puritan sensibility; "that obsession of a mystery beyond the senses, out of which my dualistic philosophy was to spring, those intimations of a whole ghostly world corresponding to something latent in the soul itself—all this was really not touched by the inroads of intellectual doubts." There was something latent in the soul—that mysterious waxing and waning of a mood of strenuousness; and this mystery was connected, somehow, with the great mystery beyond the senses. At first—retaining, perhaps, *malgré lui* some of the Puritan rationalism—he defined this superrational reality as the infinite, timeless One of mysticism; and the strenuous mood was defined as in essence a harsh negation, the only way in which a timeless Absolute could interact with the stream of appearance. He retained this view for many years but his growth was all the time towards a richer and more humane conception of the supernatural.

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Should They Live?

Certain Economic Aspects of Medicine

WILLIAM G. LENNOX

"WHY Keep Them Alive" and "Why Let Them Live" are titles of recent books by that effective dramatizer of life-saving medical research, Dr. Paul de Kruif. As Dr. de Kruif uses them these questions are only rhetorical and ironical. I believe they deserve consideration as real questions. I am no economist yet one economic fact is as easy to read as a neon sign on Broadway: the number of unproductive members which society can support is limited. The endurable limit for the United States, like the limit of the national debt, has not been defined. It is temporarily high because as never before we are drawing on various storehouses of wealth—accumulated surpluses, credit and (largest of all) the deposits of nature's wealth. I believe, however, our people must begin to do some straight thinking, plain speaking and non-political planning or face a period of social and economic eclipse.

Productiveness of the individual is the essential element in national solvency. Therefore those who are farsighted, intelligent and socially alert will study the growing problem of the unproductive and the socially useless. The portion of this problem which lies in the domain of medicine is the concern of lay persons as well as doctors, for none of the measures which I shall discuss could or should be translated into action without the approval of public opinion. I emphasize at the outset that social usefulness is not just a matter of dollar productiveness. A Tiny Tim, generator of courage and good will, may be a greater social asset than a wholly selfish manufacturer of electric generators.

Increasing the proportion of productive citizens is as simple as raising chickens; first select, preserve and improve the good;

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second eliminate the bad. But how to do this? The American Foundation has recently performed a great service to the country by publishing *American Medicine*,[1] a compilation of the views of 2,000 physicians on questions touching medicine and the public. These volumes contain a wealth of opinion on improving the health of the people; but the knotty second portion of the problem, the elimination of the unfit, is almost wholly ignored.

This avoidance is due to several causes. First, although the majority of doctors, I believe, agree with the views which I shall express they fear to say things distasteful to the unbridled sentimentality and intolerance of our times. Was not the best of doctors, William Osler, subjected to a whirlwind of abuse because he was falsely reported as advocating the chloroforming of those who reach 60? Second, doctors, in common with our political Utopians, are engrossed in the present and do not plan for the future in terms of a balanced budget. The question of the future support of the growing army of the unproductive, like many other realities, goes unfaced. Third, doctors fail to assume leadership in social questions. As an inexperienced "hand" on a huge southwestern cattle range it used to be my job at round-up time to work on "the drag," keeping the worn-out cows and little dogies from falling behind the herd, while the experienced cowboys rode at the head, skillfully "pointing" the wild-footed steers toward their destination. Physicians, as a class, work only on the drag—trying to keep the physically and mentally unfit in the procession, leaving the shaping of medical social policies to politicians. I myself am such a physician for my professional years have been spent in working with and for some of the sick who are most forgotten. My ideas come from no ivory tower. If they deserve denouncement let him who has given more of himself for the physically unfit fire the first word.

Medicine, however, is open to a heavier charge than indifference. Although most of the physically or mentally unfit live

[1] *American Medicine*, The American Foundation, New York, 1937.

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in spite of the efforts of medical science some live because of it. The "shell-shocked" veterans are a case in point. Because political considerations dominate medical treatment the incapacitating neuroses of these men are perpetuated under a doctrine of "no symptoms, no compensation."[2]

The saving of a life puts a halo on the head of the physician but may add a load to the back of society. Medical science tends to repeal the law which has been the mainstay of evolution—the survival of the fit. On account of public health measures and publicly dispensed medical care a high infant death-rate no longer offsets a high birth rate in those families in which congenital mental and physical defects are common. Among all classes many infants who would have died at birth "in the old days" are today alive—but hopelessly crippled and a burden so long as they live. The use of the respirator or "artificial lung" may postpone death for an indefinite period but at a huge cost. And as for the other end of the life scale, medical investigators are turning their attention toward the prolongation of the lives of the aged. Who will support these old people? The state? Because of old-age pensions the state of Colorado is nearly bankrupt and some of its institutions face closure.

Granted that natural resources are limited and that vast sums will be needed for the making of better citizens, society and medicine face the blunt question: Should the amount of money and medical attention given to a sick person be governed by the possibility of bringing him to a condition of self-support and social usefulness? Doctors attempt to persuade parents not to sacrifice their normal children in order to lavish money and attention on a child who is hopelessly deficient. On the other hand the medical profession, backed by public opinion, goes contrary to its own advice in calling for more, and for more expensive, public institutions for the care of incurables while incipient cases depend on the chances of private charity. An item from my own experience illustrates the point that medi-

[2] Aring, Charles D. and Bateman, J. Fremont, "Nurturing a National Neurosis." *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 109:1092-1096, October 2, 1937.

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cine should mesh with the gears of the economic needs of the nation. Fresh from medical school I went as a missionary-physician to China where I proudly assisted in campaigns for the prevention of epidemics. A few years ago I went again to China, but this time to survey the country's medical needs in the light of its economic and social condition. Plainly China did not need more people; already there were more mouths than could be filled. Persons saved from a quick death by smallpox or cholera were condemned thereby to a slow death by starvation. Therefore I suggested that until wealth could be increased or birthrates reduced, medicine in the Orient should abandon attempts at wholesale prevention of infection and should concentrate instead on the eradication of those diseases, such as trachoma, tuberculosis, hookworm, malaria and syphilis which destroy productivity long before they destroy life. There is not the same disproportion between population and material resources in America as in the Orient but if we are far-sighted we shall begin to do something about that portion of our population which is a heavy and permanent liability. Our permanent medical liabilities may be separated into two groups.

The first group, though relatively small, numbers many thousands. The members are confined in institutions where they are never seen by the public. They are the congenital idiots or monsters, the result of some slip of the hand of Him who made them; lumps of matter in human form but without human mind. What should be done with these? Of many defectives it can be said that human judgment is subject to error and that cures sometimes occur when least expected, but for this lowest group there can be no such plea. A clockcase without works can never tell time. Physicians are bound by inherited ethical standards and the motto "They shall not die." Raymond Pearl, the biologist, has this to say:

> These unfit organisms are kept alive by the rest of society for no realistically demonstrable reason other than that they were once born, and by being born, somehow placed upon the rest of mankind what has gradually come to be regarded as a permanently binding obliga-

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tion to see that they do not die. It is difficult to convince a biologist that a social philosophy will endure for any great length of time that deliberately and complacently loads upon the already weary backs of the able and fit an evergrowing burden. . . . No species or variety of plant or animal has long survived that was intrinsically incapable of making its own living. There is *somewhere* a biological limit to altruism, even for man.[3]

"Very well for another person's child," says the objector, "but what if it's your own?" Memory flicks past rows of writhing, incontinent, vacant-eyed, speechless bodies, distressing to the point of nausea, and I answer "I should rather see a child of mine in its coffin." Many a parent whose situation is actual and not hypothetical has made the same statement. Mercy is my plea, partly for the miserably living defectives, partly for the curable who suffer for the lack of money now wasted on the incurable. "Society would never countenance planned murder," warns another, "even though death is a release." What of war? Society deliberately, systematically and with great cruelty kills its strongest members in war while it unmercifully prolongs the lives of its weakest. Expensive bullets for the best of humanity; expensive preventive inoculations, trained doctors and nurses for the worst. The end of this road is ruin for all.

The second group of permanently disabled numbers millions: the incurably sick with heart, joint, or lung disease; the wrecks made by war, by machines, or by drink and drugs; and the aged. Patients with nervous or mental disease occupy half the hospital beds in the United States. I can speak with special knowledge of the half a million or so epileptics of whom there are approximately 40,000 in public institutions. Most of these patients (and a yet greater number cared for at home) are physically or mentally incapable of self-support and will be a burden so long as they live. Obviously the time to lavish money is in keeping incipient cases from becoming chronic and in searching for the cause and cure of epilepsy. The various states annually pay about $18,000,000 for feeding and housing per-

[3] Pearl, Raymond, "Biology and Human Progress." *Harpers Magazine*, 172:225, January, 1936.

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sons with epilepsy—and not that many thousands for investigation. The National Health Conference held in Washington last July proposed that $850,000,000 be spent annually in setting up bureaus, erecting new hospitals etc. but was silent on what seems to me the greatest need of all—medical research to discover new ways of stopping those diseases which limit human productivity. Should the lives of incurables in institutions be prolonged by prophylactic injections against typhoid fever, scarlet fever and diphtheria? The death-rate in institutions from communicable diseases is decreasing and consequently the need for more institutions is increasing. To these facts medical superintendents point with pride and taxpayers with anxiety.

Moreover what of those who do not wish to live? The law encourages a man to die for his country; it now permits him to drink himself to death; but it forbids the use of methods more speedy and perhaps less obnoxious. The determined will find a way, but too often it is a messy one—especially when exhaust or illuminating gas is inhaled, for the would-be suicide may then live long years in a mental hospital. There is a method (inhalation of nitrogen) which is speedy, symptomless and which the person can stop, without unpleasant after-effects, at any point short of unconsciousness. If the would-be suicide cannot be dissuaded or if he has an incurable disease and must find release from pain or misery would it not be better to provide a place, related to a hospital, where he can rid himself of life with efficiency and some measure of dignity? If a patient is helpless and is dying the merciful physician instead of trying to prolong the bitterness of going by a few days takes from it what sting he can. May such a physician attend me.

Society's anxiety should be directed not only toward the disabled who are here but even more toward the hordes of defectives who are on their way. "No one in this rich country shall starve" is a fine vote-getting phrase, but I fear many will starve unless a non-vote-getting corollary is added. If the feeding of all who are born is an obligation upon society, then a

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solvent society must say how many and what sort are to be born. In direct denial of this principle, courts until recently have refused doctors the right to provide contraceptives to those patients who, because of disease or poverty, should not bear children. Physicians have been relatively inarticulate, allowing lay persons, mostly women, to do their fighting for them. Other doctors have allowed their professional judgment to be influenced by ecclesiastical decrees which, in the name of a merciful God, forbid contraception or abortion even when the life of the mother is endangered. Enlightened Massachusetts raids the clinics and arrests the public-spirited women and physicians who are helping to control death and distress through control of birth. Recently a woman entered a charity hospital, unconscious and having convulsions which it was foreseen would end in death. She was pregnant and certain members of the hospital staff urged that a Caesarean operation be performed at death in order to save the unborn child. If this were not done, they argued, the physicians must bear responsibility for the death of the viable foetus; they would, in effect, be guilty of murder. The physician in charge said "No." The patient had been epileptic since girlhood and had for years been an inmate of a state institution. She was syphilitic and was separated although not divorced from her husband. The foetus was illegitimate and the father of it unknown. The husband was Roman Catholic and the patient herself Christian Scientist. A sister of the patient and the patient's husband, the only known relatives, were both opposed to a Caesarean operation and refused any responsibility for the care of the child should it be born. The patient died and autopsy disclosed a foetus which was syphilitic. A Supreme Court opinion rendered by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes[4] should be the answer supreme in such cases:

It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute de-

[4] Holmes, Oliver W., "Case of Buck vs. Bell in which the Constitutionality of Virginia Sterilization Law was Upheld by U. S. Supreme Court," *Journal of Heredity*, 18:495, November, 1937.

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generate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the fallopian tubes.

This matter of birth-planning is not only a problem for individuals but must increasingly engage the attention of nations. In past generations the principal safety valves for overpopulation have been three; war, prestilence and famine. Modern agriculture can remove the threat of famines. Modern medicine has greatly reduced the loss from infectious disease. Only the cruelest and the most wasteful of the safety valves, war, remains. Because medicine is responsible for reducing disease it is responsible for finding a means of reducing the pressure of population. There are reports that female animals can be immunized against pregnancy by hypodermic injections of the sperm cells of the male. Money spent on new battleships might better go into endocrine research. Given a means of birth limitation, future international agreements might deal not only with boundaries, finance and trade but also with populations. Some countries in relation to their wealth are grossly overpopulated. Japan, thanks in part to modern medicine, is rapidly increasing in numbers—with results disastrous for her neighbors. In the great oriental countries the poverty and ignorance of the people act as deterrents to measures of birth control. Modern civilization has fashioned the medical methods of mass preservation and at the same time the military weapons of mass destruction and the economic weapons of mass production. The net result threatens the destruction of the West by the East. If medical research could devise a method of birth control available to the masses a balance might be kept.

This principle of limiting certain races through limitation of offspring might be applied *intra*nationally as well as *inter*nationally. Germany in time might have solved her Jewish problems in this way. We zealously exclude certain aliens from our shores but both on the mainland and in overseas territories their entrance by birth is free and unlimited. And of course

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all who arrive must be fed. It is poetic justice that our fastest-growing racial group is the American Indian.

In contrast with the Orient the population of America will soon cease to increase. This seems both inevitable and desirable. For except for purposes of cannon fodder our need is not for more people but for fewer and better. The fewer the people the more of our natural wealth will there be for each. Despite excited planning and frantic spending the working men and women of our country outnumber the jobs by eleven millions. Some 20 millions in this country are dependent upon public funds for food and shelter. Machines will continue to supplant muscles.

And although much can be done toward improving persons after birth, improvement of the stock should be our far-off goal. Simple segregation or sterilization of congenital defectives would immediately loosen a portion of our burden (an estimated 17 per cent in the case of feeblemindedness[5]). Because healthy persons who are "carriers" of an abnormal trait far outnumber those who are actually abnormal, the near elimination of a certain abnormality would require hundreds of generations. Furthermore a germ-cell may carry highly desirable as well as undesirable genes. Better a short-lived epileptic Byron than a healthy long-lived Al Capone. Many geneticists view these difficulties with despair. The longer and more tortuous the road, however, the sooner should a start be made. Evidence accumulates that genes are large chemical molecules and this raises a dim glimmering hope that these molecules may some day be artificially altered.

The accumulation of information forms the necessary prelude to any start in human betterment by means of eugenics. A great deal is known about heredity in fruit flies, but no really serious attempt is being made to study the transmission of the physical, mental and personality disorders of man. Here would be a long-term Public Works Project of real productiveness. Studies of identical twins emphasize the importance of genetic

[5] Fisher, A. R., "Elimination of Mental Defect." *Eugenics Review*, 16:114, 1924.

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factors in many supposedly "acquired" diseases. For example the hereditary factor in tuberculosis and in diabetes is nearly as great as in epilepsy. Greater absolute results in the reduction of epilepsy would be obtained by the celibacy of persons with migraine (sick headaches) than of persons with epilepsy. Though exact knowledge is all too scanty, common sense and experience indicate that certain individuals and families who may be either rich or poor are relatively sorry specimens from which to propagate. If so, waterings with federal or other funds will not yield a harvest of productive citizens, for the seed is poor.

But decreased breeding from the bottom is not enough. The healthy in body and mind, the naturally self-sufficient must have larger families. At the present time the college-educated are not reproducing themselves. Heavy taxes help to discourage child-bearing among the self-supporting. This same tax money when spent in poor relief helps to keep down the death rate among those who are economically least productive. I do not advocate a higher death-rate among the economically unproductive. A lower birth-rate is the logical way out. Too many of the "unemployable" are employed in procreation.

What could and should be done about the physically and mentally unfit? Medical economic losses must be compared with losses from other sources rather than viewed by themselves. Though the bill for mental and physical disability is huge there are other bills which might more easily go unpaid. Certainly as much money is wasted on lipstick and liquor as on caring for the permanently insane. The rich or poor who won't work are a weight; and a double weight are those enemies of society, caught and uncaught, who actively destroy. Better execute at once those criminals now condemned to a degrading but expensive incarceration for the unproductive years of their lives. The medical scientist has an easy task compared with that of the religious or social scientist who attacks the cancer of selfishness. Even in the social field, however, medical research may prove helpful. One of the many secretions of the pituitary gland, when injected into a rat, changes it from a carnivorous

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to an herbivorous animal. Perhaps a hormone can be found which will stimulate human charity and cooperation! But until society comes to grips with problems of social and economic waste I believe it should eliminate, of the unfit, only the idiots and monsters, the criminal permanently insane and the suffering incurables who themselves wish for death. Other incurables must be supported throughout their natural lives, but as cheaply as possible in order that more effort and money may be spent on the as-yet curable cases. For reducing the number of the unemployable and socially unproductive, measures of birth control should be encouraged. Most important of all is research in human heredity. Du Pont spent $43,000,000 and 18 years making dyes before a net profit was shown. Medical research depends on scattered yearly grants of a few thousand dollars. But an adequately-financed, long-term program, free from political interference, is essential to the study of hereditary factors of disease.

Two important objections will be raised to any real effort at vital budget-balancing. First, who is to decide whether certain persons are socially useless? Decisions involving life and death are, however, reached daily by legal processes. The selection of the congenitally and hopelessly mindless for elimination would offer no more difficulties than their selection for lifelong incarceration. A court-appointed medical committee would be sufficient. Laws would of course need to be revised, and prior to this public opinion would need to be awakened. The essential prerequisite to human progress in any field is willingness to face realities and to work out fundamental rather than temporary solutions of problems. The second objection is more important. Could measures such as we have been discussing be enforced except under an absolute dictatorship? To my mind this objection is representative of a fundamental controversy which promises to divide the civilized world.

In the presence of complicated and conflicting interest, how can we reach and enforce wise judgments and preserve both the nation and the freedom of the individual? Walter Lipp-

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mann has devoted a book to his solution of this question and to his "The Good Society."[6] I commend it to the reader. Lippmann believes that a new world economy, based on a division of labor, is both inevitable and desirable but too intricate for any existing organization of society. Nations which are now attempting to master their economy by arbitrary and absolute dictation from above are doomed to final failure because there are no supermen to act as dictators. The organization of a liberal democracy is the alternative to totalitarian slavery and final chaos. Such a democracy will rest on individuals who are just, reasonable, honest and unselfish. Each of the many divisions of labor will think and act not for the interests of that specialized group but for the good of the whole. Government will be not an active director but an umpire and coordinator. If Lippmann's argument is true (and it bears for me the stamp of sense and reality) then all who wish for a better world for themselves and for their children should at once set about the task of synchronizing their lives and efforts (and the efforts of their particular divisions of labor) with the necessities of the new economy. Each must identify himself more and more with all humanity; we must synthesize knowledge and diffuse it on a wide scale. There must be more than just talk about making a better mankind.

Integration is a prime requisite of our times. There must be an integration of the needs and claims of the many divisions of labor; a fusion of warm sympathy and cold economic facts; a compromise between the claims of those who live today and of our children's children who will someday rise to bless or to curse us. In this betterment of the race, medicine must play a part, education a part, religion a great part. As Conklin points out, religion is more courageous than science in opposing dictatorship.[7] As a transformer of individual aims and characters real religion is indispensable. By integration I do not mean unison. Within his own skull each of us has a perfect example

[6] Lippmann, Walter, *The Good Society*, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1937.
[7] Conklin, E. G., "Science and Ethics." *Science*, 86:595, December 31, 1937.

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of the synthesis and coordination of multiplied interests and activities. The brain contains some 10,000,000,000 microscopic storage batteries which discharge their currents over multiplied billions of nerves. An inherent wisdom of the brain integrates the activity of these billions of batteries and makes them act for the good of the whole body. My colleagues and I are studying the abnormalities that take place in the rhythmic electrical currents of the brain when consciousness is lost or when epileptic seizures occur.[8] At such times the normal multiple small waves become single huge waves. A discordant rhythm, beginning in a hidden corner of the brain, spreads over the whole brain, dominating its rhythm and throwing the body of the epileptic into the dust. It is as though a symphony orchestra, which normally plays in harmony, had begun to play in unison; or as though representative democratic government had suddenly become totalitarian. May there not be, as philosophers have long suggested, an inherent wisdom or influence in society, a will for human betterment, which will integrate our multiplied individual efforts and help to make a just and at the same time an economically sound democracy?

To use a time-worn analogy, society's path lies along a mountain side. On one hand lies the valley of totalitarianism, ending in the pit of scientifically dictated thinking and living so vividly pictured by Aldous Huxley in his *Brave New World*.[9] On the other hand rise the anarchic heights of complete individual freedom. Doctors, teachers, business men, workmen, housewives linked together must somehow build between pit and peak a path which will lead to a good society. From each division of society let men possessed of wisdom and wide sympathy make signposts which shall mark a path for all to follow. One of the guiding posts set up by medicine should read: "The privilege of death for the congenitally mindless and for the incurably sick who wish to die. The boon of not being born for the potentially unfit."

[8] Gibbs, F. A., Gibbs, E. L., and Lennox, W. G., "Cerebral Dysrhythmiac of Epilepsy." *Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*, 39:298, February, 1938.

[9] Huxley, Aldous, *Brave New World*. New York, Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1932.

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Ignorance Builds a Language

JOHN S. KENYON

A CHEMIST whose training had been limited to the dusty retorts and the alcohol lamp in a village high-school laboratory of the 1890's would get short shrift if he applied for a position in a great industrial plant; nor would a quack bonesetter get a look-in at a position in a modern clinic. Yet in our American system of training in the use of the mother tongue, which Sir Henry Newbolt in his distinguished Report on British Education has declared to be the one essential foundation of national education, we are employing by the hundreds, in this country today, teachers of English whose scientific training in the language is fairly comparable to that of the aforesaid chemist or quack doctor. A distinguished English Inspector of Schools, Mr. George Sampson, has stated that "A teacher of speech untrained in phonetics is as useless as a doctor untrained in anatomy," and every teacher of English is a teacher of speech. It would be safe to estimate that less than one per cent of the American teachers of English have had any training in phonetics worth mentioning—that is to say, in the indispensable elements of their subject.

And not only in the present teaching and use of the English language, but in the development of our language, ignorance has been at least as important a factor as knowledge. I am not thinking of the inert ignorance of the uneducated about their language—that indeed has had a profound and on the whole a progressive effect on language, manifesting itself in an almost miraculously intricate and regular operation of known laws of linguistic behavior. I am thinking rather of the linguistic ignorance of the cultivated, ignorance of a growing body of knowledge; of that aggressive ignorance which adopts the tech-

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nique of knowledge and is powerfully influencing the language we use.

It is not surprising, in the present state of English teaching in American schools and colleges, that among the educated there should be a profound and widespread ignorance of the nature and normal operation of the linguistic processes, past and present, that govern the English we speak and write. Fortunately this does not prevent the literate from enjoying the use of good English; it is when this ignorance dons the armor of the critic that the fact becomes important. Swift's proposal "for Correcting, Improving, and Ascertaining the English language" and for "fixing our language for ever" furnishes a good instance. It would be hard to exaggerate the lack of comprehension here exhibited of the nature and processes of the growth of English from the earliest times. For though some of Swift's predecessors and followers recognized the fact that no living language can be fixed and secured from change, none of them had any adequate idea of the regularity and method of its constant growth or of the function of this unobserved growth in the formation of cultivated idiom.

Swift was followed by a group of grammarians and lexicographers earnestly engaged in rescuing the English language from imminent ruin—Lowth, Dr. Johnson, Campbell, Blair, Priestly, Lindley Murray, Walker, and others. Some of the basic assumptions that governed the thinking of these men were:

(1) Grammar was a system of logic, most perfectly exhibited in Latin. Until recently *grammar* had meant exclusively Latin grammar, a sense preserved in *grammar school* and in our grammatical terminology.

(2) English had little grammar of its own and had to be subjected, therefore, to a perfect external grammatical system. This is reflected in Johnson's remark, "English has been subjected so little and so lately to grammar." Out of this assumption grew the usual definition of grammar: "The art of speaking and writing the English language with propriety" (Murray). There is a great gulf fixed between this concept of

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grammar and the scientific concept casually stated by the late American scholar Edward S. Sheldon: "Grammar is a description of the facts of language."

(3) From the conception of grammar as an external logical system applicable to a language followed the notion that all forms of a language are "correct" or "incorrect"—that there is, in the universe somewhere, an inherently correct way of saying or writing everything. This simplified the difficult task of adjusting usage to theories of correctness: if great writers violated "grammar" they were simply wrong. Therefore there was no hesitation in correcting the "mistakes" of Shakespeare, Milton, Addison, Swift, and the rest.

(4) Since in the 18th century there was no science of linguistics, no body of knowledge of the principles of the growth and structure of English, ideas about the laws of pronunciation (especially in its relations to the written language) were of the vaguest. In his dictionary of 1791 John Walker dealt, more fully than any one up to his time, with pronunciation. He based his treatment on the letters of the alphabet, a practice followed in dictionaries to this day. He shared the views of his predecessors that the letters were the "elements" of English; that they had "powers" of sound, as if they were seed from which words sprouted. Of the word *quay* he says, "Sometimes seen written *key*; for if we cannot bring the pronunciation to the spelling, it is looked upon as some improvement to bring the spelling to the pronunciation: a most pernicious practice in language." There was little conception of English as a living language, to which spelling was a mere incident in its long history.

Most of these conceptions are still more or less current and in the main control the views of the educated on "correct" grammar and pronunciation. It is true that the scientific attitude toward English has made remarkable strides in America in the last ten years. There are encouraging signs that the scientific point of view is penetrating to the great body of teachers of English in schools and colleges. But the general body of the literate is not likely to keep pace with the scientific advance in

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their language. As a result of this perennial ignorance our English is constantly, and will continue to be, shaped to a considerable extent by the ignorant efforts of the cultivated to improve it.

Since it is solely usage that not only accepts or rejects but first creates grammatical forms, syntactical constructions, meanings of words, and pronunciations (though this is ignored in practice by thousands who have theoretically accepted it since Horace stated it), the scientific observer of language meets no fact more frequently than that many usages and pronunciations now unquestioned had their origin in ignorant blunders—i.e. in violations of usages valid at the time. For instance before the 14th century *you* was only a plural objective pronoun. By a misunderstanding of certain ambiguous constructions (as *if you like* "if it please you") *you* came to be accepted as a nominative (as *you are strangers*). By another shift *you* also came to be used for one person. Usage, and usage alone, has now made *you* just as "grammatically" singular and nominative as it was plural and objective. This was not accomplished without protest. Professor Fries quotes a beautiful sample from George Fox (1660) objecting to singular *you*: "O Vulgar Professors and Teachers, that speaks Plural when they should Singular . . . Come you Priests and Professors, have you not learnt your Accidence?" Here Fox condemns one construction while using another equally open to objection. He not only uses *speaks* as plural but shows no hesitation in using *you* as nominative, though he could have argued just as soundly that it was only objective as he did that it was only plural. His criticism is typical of much of today's. He attacked what suited his purpose and ignored the other accepted usages equally open to attack.

A whole series of blunders in verb form has given us the forms *baked*, *carved*, *crept*, *stepped*, *bound*, *bit*, *spoke*, *have sat*, *have shone*, *have stood*, and some 100 others, mistakes once parallel to *knowed*, *drinked*, *have rode*, *have rang*, *have ate*, *have fell* etc. Some of them were recognized as blunders; but inexorable usage took advantage of the general linguistic ig-

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norance of the cultivated, so that we now declare *have sat* "grammatical" and should oppose any attempt to restore the regular form *have seaten* as vigorously as we now deny place to Shakespeare's *have spoke*, Gray's "Elegy Wrote in a Country Churchyard" or the historically correct *have went*.

In contrast to adopting mistakes, we also refuse admittance to usages that accord with the laws of English, in our ignorance overlooking parallel usages that we accept without question. This is well illustrated in the field of semantics. Acting on the baseless assumption that a word can have but one "proper" meaning, the critic stands like Canute to keep back the tide of shifts and new adaptations of meaning which mark a living language in the midst of busy life that uses words for its own purposes and not to please the purist. Moreover the "proper" meaning to which the critic would restrict us is itself usually a shift from former "proper" meanings. A recent letter to a literary journal asserts "Know all men by these presents that this word, *alibi*, should never be used for the word, *excuse*. This word, *alibi*, has a very specific, limited, and legalistic denotation that does not permit its being used as a synonym for *excuse* in any connection whatsoever." Whether the extended figurative meaning of *alibi* is yet general is here incidental. The statement is of interest as showing that the writer's mind, like that of hundreds of the educated, has no place in its scheme for such shifts of meaning. Have no other legal terms become figurative and generalized? Who now hesitates to use *entail* in a generalized sense?

The irony of this attitude is shown in Swift's phrase itself—"ascertaining and fixing." To the younger generation some attention to context is required to insure the "right" meaning of *fix*, and it is doubtful whether the majority of the educated would at first glance know Swift's meaning of *ascertain*; they might wonder, in the proposal for "correcting, improving, and ascertaining," why the *ascertaining* should come last.

A precious list of examples of this Canutish attempt to prevent words from adapting their meanings to new conditions

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may be seen in R. G. White's *Words and their Uses*, a once admired and—alas!—still influential book. See particularly his objections to *animal* (in the sense "lower animal"), *catch* (a train), *dirt* ("earth"—as in Shakespeare, Milton, Bunyan), *execute*, *ice-water*, *real estate*, *rooster*. Two examples are typical: "*Consider*," he says, "is perverted from its true meaning by most of those who use it." Among the "most" were standard writers of the past 400 years; but actual cultivated usage stands no chance in the presence of a "true meaning." Again, he made the usual objection to the conversational *have got* for *have* on grounds of "true meaning" (for no well-informed person denies its currency among the cultivated), refusing acceptance to an established idiom while ignorantly accepting parallel meanings open to the same objection—for every speaker who uses *shall*, *may*, *can*, *dare*, *must*, *ought*, is employing the same shift of meaning in the preterit-present verb that has taken place in *have got* for *have*; and *ought* has done the thing twice over under the noses of the purists. "But that was long ago" they say; "we mustn't let it happen again."

This kind of criticism of meaning is still popular with the educated. "Oh, you are Professor Syntax, are you? Well, now, tell me: what about this misuse of the word *healthy*? A climate is *healthful*, isn't it?" Desiccated instances of such theoretical distinctions of meaning not supported by general use are scattered throughout the body of American teachers as part of their stock in trade, and their influence on usage is considerable. It would be a healthy exercise for all such critics to ponder the prefatory article on Signification in the great *Oxford Dictionary*—and better still to study the scores of different meanings therein exhibited from the living language of common words like *get*, *go*, *see*.

In pronunciation—the basis of all living language—our English teaching leaves us ignorant of such elementary facts as the nature and formation of the sounds we use, the simplest laws and most constantly operative facts of sound-change, the

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relation of spelling-forms to the living language, and the historical development and prevalence of standard types of speech with their interrelations. Errors arising from this ignorance have been adopted, and usage—to which error is as good grist as truth—has fixed them in accepted English. We are horrified at *drownd* for *drown*, *gownd* for *gown*, *acrost* for *across* and *onced* for *once*; but we have accepted the *d* in *astound*, *sound*, and *thunder*, and the *t* in *against* and *midst*, which originated in the same "mistakes."

If Tennyson had known anything about historical sound-change he might not have insisted on pronouncing *knowledge* like *know*, adopting a theory of earlier generations. Walker (1791) partly knew the principle involved and remarked,

> Some speakers, who had the regularity of their language at heart, . . . with heroic fortitude have opposed the multitude by pronouncing the first syllable of this word as it is heard in the verb to *know*. The pulpit and the bar have for some years given a sanction to this pronunciation; but the senate and the stage hold out inflexibly against it; and the nation at large seems insensible of the improvement.

Preoccupation with writing and print has made it hard for the average educated person to think habitually of the English language as pursuing its intricate development and adaptation to the needs of life independently, in the main, of letters and spelling. He does not distinguish without an effort between the traditional utterance of his language and its variable, inconsistent, and irrational spelling-forms. So, while usage has in the main accepted the traditional oral development, spelling-pronunciation has played a larger and larger part in the formation of standard speech; and usage accepts this spelling-pronunciation as freely as the traditional.

Tacit assumption of the authoritative nature of spelling leads the pots of spelling to black the kettles of tradition. When a large group of words like *honor*, *humble*, *horrible*, *hospital* etc. came from Old French into English they had had no *h*-sound for centuries. But since they were often spelt with *h* (in imitation of Latin), the literate, taking the usual view that the

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spelling-form prevailing in their time was the word itself, began to sound the *h*. Hence one by one most of these words have acquired the *h* sound, and the historical pronunciations *'umble*, *'orrible*, *'ospital* etc. are material for caricature. Only *hour*, *honest*, *honor*, *heir* have escaped this pious reform. Of course those in which the *h* ceased to be spelt, as *able*, *arbor*, have acquired no *h* sound. Our habit of putting the cart before the horse is seen in the *clerk-clark* controversy. We blame the English for giving the traditional *ar* sound to *Derby*, *clerk*, *Berkshire* etc. while we ignorantly accept the same *ar* sound normally developed from the same source (the *e* sound as in *very*) in numerous words like *carve*, *far*, *smart*, *star* etc. So spelling-bound are we that we are content to sound *ar* if it is spelt with *a*; but so sacred is the now irrational spelling *Derby*, *clerk* etc. that instead of also adopting the correct spelling *ar* in the few remaining words we enshrine the bad spelling and condemn the historically correct pronunciation. As Dr. Fuhrken says, we are willing to mispronounce words just to show that we know their miserable spelling. The spellbinders have their shibboleths, such as *often*. The letter *t* in its spelling, silent long since by regular sound-change, has been canonized and the schoolteacher reverences it accordingly; but she continues to omit the *t* sound in *soften*, *listen*, *fasten*, *bristle*, *castle*, and many others; and likewise (horrible!) in *last night*, *next door*, *mustn't*, and others, though she is unaware of it and might deny it.

Spelling-pronunciation as a corrective is fragmentary and inconsistent. Its practitioners pounce on the scattered victims that fall within their linguistic range, leaving the unobserved words of the same class unregenerate. Thus usage has accepted the *o* sound in *combat* but keeps the original *u* sound in *come*, *love*, *honey*, *some*, *front* etc. It has adopted the *th* sound in *theater*, *throne*, *Arthur*, *Elizabeth*, *Katherine*, *Martha*, *Nathan*, *Theodore*, in which *th* formerly spelt the *t* sound; but it keeps the original *t* sound in *Thomas*, *Thompson*, *Esther*, *Thames*, and all the nicknames *Art*, *Betty*, *Kate*, *Marty*, *Nate*, *Ted*. *Anthony* seems fated to a *th* sound in spite of dictionaries and

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of *Mark Antony* and *Tony*. *Anthonio* in *The Merchant of Venice* has preserved the *t* sound by a changed spelling.

Few spelling-pronouncers have any idea how upsetting a consistent application of their principle to the living language would be. They might hesitate to apply it to *heard-beard*, *treat-great-threat*, *done-tone-gone*, *early-nearly*, *eight-height*, *goes-does-shoes*,—the list is endless. But after usage has unquestionably sanctioned a spelling-pronunciation contrary to former good use, it must then be accepted as correct. Ignorant as many such changes were in their inception, usage has in fact adopted many of them. This impressive company, bastard offspring of literacy and linguistic ignorance, mingle on equal terms with the legitimate children of phonetic law and say "Don't despise us; you will beget others like us who will be received into good society as we have been." This is a safe prediction under an educational system in which uninformed legislators compel prospective teachers of English to spend their time of preparation bandying "quartiles" and "percentiles" in place of getting aware of the facts of the language they are to teach; when neither the teachers nor most other educated persons know even the names of the scholars who have slowly established these facts; when a leading news magazine does not mention the sudden death and irreparable loss of the greatest historical grammarian of the English language.

The most influential linguistic ignorance is ignorance of usage itself. To many of the educated who accept the authority of usage in theory the statement "It is not in good use" means, practically, "I disapprove it." It is not easy to ascertain the actual usage of large bodies of the educated on specific points. There is a temptation to substitute the ignorant claims of quack treatises on "Correct English," "Write it Right" etc. for the actual practice of the cultivated. A Mopsa-like faith in print inhibits the one needful question, "What linguistic acquirements give this writer a claim to speak?" Still, there is by now so large an accumulated body of expert observation on past and

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current English usage that on most points good usage is ascertainable. The work of Sweet, Storm, Jespersen, Wright, Wyld, Poutsma, Luick, McKnight, Baugh, and many more, and especially that vast storehouse of first-hand information on usage, the *Oxford Dictionary*, are now available in first-class libraries. Above all, if his eyes are open for them, the educated reader can observe disputed points for himself in the best writing. He cannot read far in British novels without discovering that in cultivated speech there is no hesitation in saying "Who did you meet there?" or "Everybody got what they wanted."

A clear instance of the disparity between theoretical and actual good usage is the use of a final preposition. The objection to it never was warranted by standard practice. As Curme has shown, Dryden gave currency to the heresy on the above-mentioned false assumption that Latin practice is valid for English. Only a few tried to follow Dryden. The great monuments of English since before the time of Chaucer have freely used this ancient and effective construction, which accords with other progressive features of English idiom. Objection to it is stock in trade of second-rate teachers and of manuals of usage; it keeps bobbing up among the semi-literate. An occasional good writer ruins his sentences by avoiding it on theory instead of following his sense of style. Thus I find in *The Forsyte Saga* "Of what she was thinking," "Turning to see at what she was looking" —instead of the normal "What she was thinking of" and "What she was looking at." Especially in the carefully doctored English of radio announcers one hears "A good place in which to live," "An object for which to work," in contrast to the simple dignity of the biblical "bought the potter's field, to bury strangers in," Hamlet's "fly to others that we know not of," Burke's "the sphere she just began to move in," Washington's "the command I am honored with," or Lowell's "soil good to be born on, good to live on, good to die for and to be buried in." Every real master of English style knows that the final preposition is not only anciently established but is compact, simple, natural, and effective. Ignorance has not succeeded in

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eradicating it and is not likely to do so. In Milton's phrase, "What a fine conformity would it starch us all into!"

But in another instance a baseless theory, founded on the same fallacy of a Latin model, has gained complete acceptance in English—avoidance of a double negative. Not a single good reason except the tyranny of usage can be given for not using two or more negatives to strengthen negation. It is wholly in accord with linguistic principle, being in the best of use in many other languages, as formerly in English, and is extremely effective, as in Chaucer's famous four-negative sentence. It is still in full vigor in folk speech, where its great value keeps it alive; and it frequently occurs in disguise in cultivated use. The case is typical of my thesis: the objection regularly offered by the critic is the false one—that two negatives necessarily make an affirmative; not the real one—that usage has rejected it, decisively, though ignorantly.

Thus unawareness of what actual cultivated usage is goes along with failure to recognize its decisive function in every case. The occupation of the teacher and the scholar of English becomes more and more the dissemination of the facts of the language in past and present living usage. The need of information on the part of both teacher and public dwarfs all the panaceas perennially offered for improving our English. A fine group of young American, English, Scandinavian, and Dutch scholars are attacking the task with vigor and breadth of mind, and with marked success; but toward a general acquaintance with the facts indispensable for intelligent decisions hardly a beginning has been made.

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Ecce Criticus

PAUL HENRY LANG

85,418,314 persons attended the events of the Federal Music Project throughout this country since October, 1935.[1]

2,000,000 boys and girls are now playing in school bands and orchestras.[2]

As a nation we have recently become aware that music belongs somewhere in our lives. Immense energy, both professional and voluntary, and private and public money are lavished on musical undertakings.[3]

THE above statements are so important that anyone following with sympathetic anxiety the development of music in this country will wonder what steps have been taken to insure an adequate administration and guidance of so important a phase in the cultural life of the nation. It will take very little investigation to discover that the anointed leaders in shaping the musical destiny of the country are the journalists called music critics, the radio announcers and commentators and the music teachers. It is no exaggeration to say that the music critics and radio speakers exercise an influence amounting to dictatorship on the musical conceptions and tastes of the public and on the officials in charge of musical education. Their daily columns and introductory talks set the tone; they discover new talent, crown and dethrone monarchs of music, give expert opinion on new and old music and impart essential information on matters musical to countless millions of people.

Musical criticism is an old profession. If we forget for the sake of simplicity the critics of the mythical "pre-Bach" era we may still go back to such venerable 18th-century writers as Mattheson, Scheibe, Baron Grimm and J. A. Hiller. With J. F. Reichardt we begin to find musical writers and critics of uni-

[1] Report of the Project's national director, 1937.
[2] National Association of Music Merchants.
[3] Clarke, Eric, *Music in Everyday Life*, N. Y., W. W. Norton & Co., 1935.

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versal information, great gifts of keen observation and a penetrating style of presentation. One more generation and with E. T. A. Hoffman, one of the master novelists of the Romantic movement in Germany and musician of no mean talent, we reach the beginning of an era which produced the most enlightened and truly "professional" musical criticism as practised by Carl Maria von Weber and Robert Schumann, to whom we may add Hector Berlioz and Richard Wagner although the strong political and propagandistic predilections of these two often clouded their otherwise excellent writings. These writers were, however, not newspaper men in the modern sense; they were music critics, members of the profession, who studied and judged the music of their colleagues and of other composers of the past. Everyone knows the prophetic utterances of Schumann concerning Chopin and Brahms but few of us know that Hiller was the first to appreciate and perform Handel's *Messiah* in Berlin, that Reichardt wrote a book on the German comic opera (1774) at a time when it had barely started and Weber discoursed about the *leitmotive* in 1816. (This may be disconcerting to those who habitually accord its copyright to Berlioz and Wagner.) All this was musical criticism in the real sense of the word. The writers were first and foremost concerned with the music itself, examined and analyzed it with the humility and understanding of a colleague who knows that praise and condemnation must not be the result of mere intuition or good or bad humor. The most interesting trait in these old-time critics was their willingness to give the benefit of the doubt to new tendencies; they knew that art is condemned if it remains stationary. At the end of their reviews they mentioned also the performance and, in a few words, its merits.

The "journalistic" touch made its appearance almost simultaneously with the older critics just mentioned. The vituperations which accompanied Handel's activities in London, the quarrels of the buffoons and the Gluck-Piccini rivalry in Paris removed musical subjects from the hands of the professional critic and projected it into the daily press as *chronique scan-*

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daleuse. Henceforth it was the amorous adventures of singers and virtuosi which occupied the foreground. In our day this type of musical criticism appears in so-called biographies (cf. Ernest Newman's *Liszt*, Catherine Drinker Bowen's *Tschaikowsky* and Robert H. Schauffler's *opera omnia*) and the manner of performance occupies 80 per cent of the reviewers' space. Nineteenth-century Vienna produced that type of music critic who with his pompous and garbled articles and *feuilletons* presumed to dictate musical taste. Great as was their power until a generation ago, the Hanslicks, Kalbecks and Korngolds failed and are now almost forgotten because they arrogated to themselves the sole right to pass judgment on composers and musicians. This type of critic is still with us, but whereas his importance dwindled considerably on the continent because of the many good publications available and because the newspapers have opened their columns to musical scholars as they do hereabouts to scientists and economists, it still holds sway in England and is supreme in this country.

In trying to fulfill his duties the critic should be an ideal listener, sensitive not only to the obviously good and the glaringly bad but to every aspect of the art unfolding before him. But he must also be an educator of the public—to prevent it from being captivated, through its lack of critical ability, by the superficial and sensational, and to enlighten it when it fails to recognize great art. Our American music critics wield a power not granted their present colleagues in Europe.

Yet, with a few exceptions, our critics have failed woefully in their twofold duty. What have they done to help the growing millions of music lovers on their way to the appreciation of great music? They have not only failed to guide them but worse than that have frequently misguided them. Wherever we turn our eyes, to daily reports, articles in the music section of the Sunday papers or program notes, we are confronted with a thick tangle of prejudices, inherited formulas and catchwords, a prodigious lack of information and an unbelievable ignorance of musical literature. We have mentioned Hanslick

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among the rather undesirable type of music critic but in spite of superficiality this Beckmesser managed to give in his *History of Concerts in Vienna* (1869-1870) and in his *Modern Opera* (1879) a great deal of valuable original information that reveals a man of learning and intellectual curiosity. Our own critics of today live on a few dictionaries, the works of their predecessors, and the writings of some of their English colleagues. In a word journalists use other journalists for reference. With the exception of one New York daily which includes in the Sunday edition an extended music section dealing with a variety of subjects and featuring regular columns of foreign events from the important musical centers of the world, the newspapers restrict themselves to the official press releases of the orchestra, opera and radio managements and to daily and weekly articles on Brahms, Strauss, Tschaikowsky, Wagner and a number of other composers of the romantic and post-romantic period, with Debussy, Ravel and Sibelius appearing occasionally for the sake of "modern" music. Not a single original idea, not a single attempt to widen the horizon, but the eternal repetition of Flagstad, Toscanini, *Daphnis and Chloe*, *Tristan*, *Till Eulenspiegel*, Stokowski, the Nordic landscape of Finland, Bach-Busoni and Ernest Newman. There are only one or two among the critics who escape the spell of these "actualities" and have a musical taste catholic enough to deal with works that lie outside the romantic era.

When Hans von Bülow, the chivalric defender of everything that seemed worth while to him, be it a new composer or the political philosophy of Bismarck, coined the famous group, Bach, Beethoven and Brahms, he did not know that his "three B's"—considered a sort of *bon mot*—would become an esthetic credo in America. At one of our major universities there is even a course called simply "the three B's." Needless to say that such a grouping—one of the last great masters of the outgoing baroque, the forward-looking arch-symphonist, and the lonely retrospective musician who was trying to save the glory of classical art in a world engulfed in the dramatic

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frenzy of the Neo-German School—has as much justification as a trio of poets such as Shakespeare, Shelley and Swinburne. Curiously enough our critics and writers completed this group by adding to it a number of romantic and post-romantic composers and thus formed a magic circle that absorbs all their attention. What then, it may be asked, does the old Leipzig *cantor* do in this company? He was, we might say, elevated to his exalted status by Mr. Stokowski and the critics, because our American public knows Bach mainly through the transcriptions of the eminent Philadelphia conductor. The gigantic orchestral paraphrases of spiritual songs, of suave and intimate chorale preludes and other organ pieces, and of works for chamber orchestra and solo violin have thus received diplomatic status and joined the other *big* orchestral pieces and music dramas; for we must resign ourselves to the fact that all the above-mentioned composers are considered only as writers of large-scale orchestral compositions, and those outside the magic circle are not admitted unless they are equipped, by one or the other of our benevolent conductors, with some heavy artillery. Critics and conductors have apparently reached the conclusion that by adding two or three symphonies of Haydn and Mozart to the existing repertory they have accounted for the whole of musical literature. If they want to offer anything new they give us another transcription or "symphonic synthesis." Of late Sibelius joined the elect and promptly became "the greatest living composer."

This tendency to label everything "the greatest" is unfortunately the cardinal esthetic maxim of the critics and textbook writers. They measure everything and like the astronomers are anxious to establish the exact rank and magnitude of every composition, computing the distance that separates one star symphony from another. Writing about the first Brahms symphony, a work of great merit and beauty, especially great, on account of its noble tone, in its hysterical environment, but a work which is distinctly retrospective and as such classicistic and not classic, one of our leading critics says:

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Listening to the overwhelming outburst in the closing pages of the greatest of all symphonies (save one), we could not but feel that here the re-creator had pierced to the secret of the creator's mystery in this apocalyptic utterance. . . .

The reader is supposed to find this statement so obviously explicit that the writer dispenses with all further explanation. But there are, fortunately, many musicians and music lovers who are left completely baffled by such a statement. They are not interested in the exact hierarchy of symphonic values but they wonder what constitutes the measuring rod; can the inexorably close-knit thematic work of the sonata movements, the deep pathos of the adagios and the wholesome humor of the finales of Haydn's symphonies be surpassed; can the "singing allegros," the swift contrapuntal developments and the haunting Italian sensuousness of Mozart be rated higher or lower than the breath-taking sweep of a Beethovenian scherzo; can the crafty elegance of the Mendelssohnian symphony be likened to the convulsive climaxes of Tschaikowsky; or can the profound melancholy and longing for a better world of the Brahmsian slow movements be pitted against the chromatic meanderings of Franck? The same puzzle game confronts the reader in discussions of opera.

There are three great comedies in music and one of them is *Der Rosenkavalier* of Richard Strauss (the reader need not be told the identity of the other two).

The reader is just as much in the dark as in the case of the mysterious "greatest symphony." Knowing the disposition of our critics we would unhesitatingly pick a Wagnerian comedy. *Die Meistersinger* therefore accounts for the second place *ex officio* but we are completely lost in the third choice. Shall we think of that truly Shakespearian comedy of Verdi, or the inimitable Italian buffoonery of Rossini, the angelic wit of Mozart's comedies, the rustic humor of Smetana's *Bartered Bride*, the somewhat perfumed grace of de Falla and Ravel or the jazzy merriment of Krenek? The following excerpt will aptly illustrate the ridiculous results of comparison, which

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seems to be the only approach to musical esthetics practised by the majority of our critics.

Side by side with the familiar naïvetés that are the obvious things in much of Haydn's music, there are harmonic and melodic subtleties that make the average Mozart symphony seem trite by comparison.

All that can be seen in the prodigious composer of a hundred-odd symphonies are some "subtleties" which he possesses to the detriment of another great symphonist whose "average" symphonies are absolutely unknown to the critic.

However bad the situation may be with our daily chroniclers they must yield the palm to their brethren of the ether. The verbal sauce that accompanies broadcasts of importance defies description. I am not concerned here with the role of the radio in general—only with its avowed intent to disseminate musical knowledge and foster interest and taste in music. I want to examine the verbal assistance given to Toscanini by the announcers and commentators.

The announcer, having recovered from the thrills of the evening, assumes his pontifical tone and tells us the symphony was not always the sumptuous affair, "the supreme form in which a composer can express his deepest thoughts." Three hundred years ago, "when the word was first used," it meant only a few bars of music that "introduced a vocal piece." After this we are left in the dark as to what happened until Haydn, whom he generously credits with being the father of the symphony, wrote his "first." And then follows a most astounding short history of the symphony, a résumé that would be the envy of Drs. Spaeth and van Loon, old hands at the game. We are given to understand that this first symphony of Haydn lasted for only eight minutes! Think of it, the mere fraction of one movement of a juicy symphony by Mahler. The announcer further informs us that Haydn never went much beyond the "half-hour symphony," that it took Mozart "24 symphonies" before he attained this time-limit, apparently the lowest acceptable for a full-grown symphony. Beethoven's first was also a mere 30 minute affair but the Eroica shattered all existing

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records by its almost 45 minutes' duration. This must have been an isolated phenomenon since we are assured that with the exception of the ninth the rest of Beethoven's symphonies "average one-half hour." The public is thus offered music of the highest artistic merit and at the same time is misled and misinformed by incompetent and musically illiterate individuals who do not have sufficient intelligence to read an article in a dictionary before assuming the unique role of lecturer to the universe.

This worship of the big, the long, the ponderous and the loud is the worst plague besetting our musical life. It has made our public oblivious of the fundamental approach to an understanding of music—the road of intimate choral music, chamber music, piano music and songs. There were times when the ability to take part in the execution of such music was considered indispensable.

> Supper being ended, and Musicke books (according to the custome) being brought to the table, the mistresse of the house presented me with a part, earnestly requesting me to sing; but when, after many excuses, I protested unfainedly that I could not, every one began to wonder. Yea some whispered to others, demanding how I was brought up; so that, upon shame of mine ignorance, I goe now to seeke out mine old friend, master Geronimus, to make myselfe his scholler. (Thomas Morley, *A Plaine and Easie Introduction to Practicall Musicke*, 1597.)

The sonatas, trios, quartets of the past centuries were written for home use, for the musicals in drawing rooms; and the many songs were intended to be heard by a small group of people gathered around the piano and not to be bellowed in a huge auditorium by an operatic prima donna intent on bringing down the house. In those days music was a most personal experience to people; they literally lived with it. Today we face it as exhibition.

The trend toward grandiloquence was a product of the romantic era and the musical taste of our public has its roots in the musical style of that period. The musicians of the last century, from Berlioz to Strauss (who is a typical protagonist

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of the nineties although living and creating among us), expressed their thoughts by large gestures and used a complicated, at times even enormous, technical apparatus. It was therefore concluded that deep poetical feeling cannot be expressed without an intricate form of execution, and composers tried to give the illusion of deep and ponderous thoughts by using a musical architecture of grandiose proportions ornamented with all available gadgets and devices of modern instrumentation. Today we wonder why musicians of judgment were captivated by orchestral scores which when dispossessed of their tremendous orchestral ornaments show an astonishingly meager invention and vague construction. Instead of curing the man of the 20th century of this pseudo-grandeur our conductors and critics, working hand in glove, have carried him to a superlative sphere of the colossal and established the era of the hyphenated composer. Even the condensed and concentrated Wagner was not sufficient, although what could be more rewarding than hearing the galloping Walkyries, the dying Isolde, the rumbling seas of the Dutchman, the terrific clatter in Siegfried's funeral march, the majestic trombones of the *Tannhäuser* overture, the collection topped by the jubilant exit of the *Meistersinger* overture and the somber Good Friday music of *Parsifal*—and all in one sitting, this being a typical program of a "symphonic" evening, an exciting two hours for one's money. The literature of the grandiose was "exhausted" so our orchestras (not all of them, thanks to a few thoughtful artists) turned toward the oldsters of music, sleeping quietly on the shelves of libraries so far as the public was concerned. They put Bach, Buxtehude, Pergolesi and a few other "modest" composers on the map. These venerable masters, thoroughly neglected by the organists and pianists (who in their turn live on other transcriptions), were then dressed up with all the available velvet, silk and gold of the modern mammoth orchestra and launched on a new existence. It need not bother any one that such transcriptions completely distort the physiognomy of the original work. Most of the transcribing musicians

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label their products "free-transcription," which means that the hyphenated addition of their name to that of the old author is not merely an act of courtesy; from their own experiences in the world of music the transcribers add generously to the fabric of the composition.

The greatest single factor in this pollution of musical taste is the conductor of the famous Philadelphia orchestra, under whose hands the Bach *Chaconne*, originally written for an unaccompanied violin, emerges like an atom bombarded by an enormous atom-smashing machine. This transcription is available on phonograph discs and will be cherished in years to come as an important document of a perverted musical civilization. But this musician, whose extraordinary gifts are surpassed only by his total lack of artistic scruples, did not stop at the masters of the Baroque era; he attacked music that is the incarnation of ethereal choral composition, pure and free from all showmanship, and performed Palestrina's "Adoramus Te" with full orchestra. Likewise the *Missa Papae Marcelli* of the great Roman composer, a work for centuries considered the very miracle of *a cappella* art, was given an adequate symphonic background by the leader of music in Rochester.

What do the chroniclers and arbiters say? They not only endorse it (with one or two exceptions) but ask for more.

> The profound sympathy and devoted workmanship that go into these transcriptions have long been eagerly recognized. One wishes Mr. Stokowski would see fit to make more transcriptions from Palestrina in particular. Conditions of vocal performance are likely to destroy the beauty of Palestrina's music when it is rendered as written. But the motet "Adoramus Te," when played in the Stokowski version, opens the heaven of Palestrina's ecstasy to all doubters.

This represents not only the complete bankruptcy of journalism, but a level of musical illiteracy that is unfathomable.

When we cast a glance at the operatic field we behold the same maze of misinformation and misrepresentation. The writers and annotators simply refuse to understand that opera is an Italian form and that Wagner is merely a German episode

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in its history. No one wants to belittle the powers of the Bayreuth master, but to the careful observer it was long evident that the Wagnerian music drama was essentially one man's work and style and cannot be continued since it is not timeless and universal. Wagner's heavy shadow was like Attila's horse; the grass did not grow where it passed. A legion of epigoni followed in his footsteps, and because they were merely the heirs of a complicated and rather naive system of dramaturgy they failed to carry music drama one inch from the place where Wagner left it. But our critics and writers did not notice that the world is weary of the psychological *leitmotive*; that people want theater again, good theater without metaphysics in every line of the text and hidden meanings in every harmony. The critics refuse to see the definite tendency to return to the true lyric stage. The tendency started with Wagner himself whose *Meistersinger* is by far his most enjoyable opera from the point of view of sound theater and of music relatively untrammeled by psychology and metaphysics. Among the immediate followers of Wagner, Strauss, having written some "music dramas," returned to the 18th-century play-opera and in his *Ariadne* tried to give a modern German version of the Italian *opera buffa*. The most popular of modern grand opera composers, Puccini, after a lifetime of *comédie larmoyante* returned with *Gianni Schicchi* to the traditions of true Italian operatic style. Works like *Jonny Spielt Auf*, *Porgy and Bess*, *Four Saints*, *Schwanda*, are all brave attempts to restore opera to its rightful place—that of good theater. They may not yet represent great art but they certainly represent great artistic integrity and deserve help and encouragement instead of stupid comparisons with the bearded gods of the Wagnerian world. The press was caught unawares by the sudden popularity of Smetana's *Bartered Bride*. They could not quite understand how such a simple thing could create so much mirth and unabashed joy, but finally credited it to the local color of the Slavic countryside. Then came the performance, in the Metropolitan Opera House in New York, of Verdi's *Otello*, an operatic mas-

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terpiece which with the same composer's *Falstaff* reaffirmed, recreated and restored opera to the great traditions of the lyric stage. These works represent a unique and convincing solution of the eternal problem of the lyric drama and in them lives the great tradition of the musical stage which started with Monteverdi. The public greeted *Otello* with enthusiasm, for we have a new public, intelligent, receptive and ready to accept great art. But the critics?

It might be said, as Bernard Shaw suggested, that as Verdi's melodic inspiration began to flow less copiously, his technique became further developed and enriched, and . . . taken as a whole, *Otello* can be regarded as a work of still impressive mastery.

Other critics emerged with such grave dramaturgical ideas as

Prefigurations of Puccini, Leoncavallo, Montemezzi and others were common enough to any one who had an air for such details last night. But with them, and with clear hints of the later Falstaff were reminders of this and that opera of the earlier periods of Verdi's career, even to the lightning of *Rigoletto* discoverable again in the piccolo part of the opening storm music.

One would despair at such authoritative dilettantism if there was not at least one member of the fraternity who, with all his love for the magic circle, has the courage to go his own way though the rest refuse to listen to common sense.

One of the supreme masterpieces of the literature of music-drama . . . came last night into its own. . . . For this is music drama, not of the Wagnerian type at all . . . but music drama of the subtlest meanings and the utmost emotional intensity. It is also Italian to the very core, springing from the pure genius of a race as well as an individual. . . . The monologues of Otello are no philosophical reveries, but the most direct, human, passionate revelation. The opera is not a symphonic web of "endless melody" but a continuous melodic development which now spins itself in a flexible musical rhetoric and now accumulates in combinations of the voices that coincide exactly with the crises of the drama.

It is not every day that we are regaled with such musical criticism, for this it is in the real sense of the word.

The critics' activity does not end with their daily ministra-

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tions in the newspapers. Owing to their dominant position as leaders of musical scholarship and education they take charge of the writing of program notes for our great symphonic societies and act as speakers during the intermissions of radio broadcasts. It is in these program notes that the most lasting damage is done because questionable esthetic concepts regarding the works performed are instilled into the listener. And it is in these program notes that the lack of information or of understanding on the part of these pseudo-scholars is evidenced in its most glaring form. So long as they are called upon to discourse on the works that form what I called the magic circle they are relatively safe because of the abundance of literature available in the English language. The stories are so engaging, the plots of operas so varied, the personal idiosyncrasies of composers so appealing that nothing is needed to complete the picture but a few remarks, a number of "lush adjectives and a purple typewriter ribbon." The very fact, however, that the critics would deal with a symphonist of the calibre of Brahms on the same terms they accord to Tschaikowsky or Franck shows they are completely in the dark as to what constitutes symphonic writing. If they venture only a little to the left or to the right, into the realm of Mozart or Stravinsky, the confusion is capital, and if—*mirabile dictu*—such an "old" composer as Palestrina happens to catch the fancy of a conductor (not in the original form of course but transcribed for super orchestra) the notes become grotesque in their absolute falsity.

When preparing the audience for a performance of Mozart's overture to his opera *The Marriage of Figaro* the learned commentator thinks it necessary to warn the public that Beaumarchais' play is "a moral blister, and it is a good thing for Mozart's opera that so few opera-goers understand Italian nowadays." This marvel of literary criticism was tendered to us as an unsurpassable characterization on the part of the late Mr. Krehbiel, but the annotator adds "happily, the music of Mozart escapes this contagion of immorality." With this sentence the writer reaches the end of his resources and then goes

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on to quote from Krehbiel's *Book of the Operas*. "It seems to be the most careless of little pieces . . . making light of some of the formulas which demanded respect at the time, there is no free fantasia" etc. The last remark immediately betrays the uninitiated, gloriously unfamiliar with the history and function of the overture. Thus is one of the milestones of orchestral literature disposed of. But the 18th century was too naive a period anyway, "symphonies were turned out as casually as buns from a bakery (though *some* of them proved to be things of *surprising* and immortal beauty)." The italics I inserted in the last aside dispense with further comment, although I should point out that more than 90 per cent of the musical literature of the 18th century is unknown to the critical corps which so magnanimously accept some of its products as surprisingly good. Otherwise they would not persist in repeating the long-exploded fantastic story about Haydn's Croatian origin and music. Symphonies of Dittersdorf, Mysliweczek, Rosetti, Pichel, Gyrowetz, Pleyel, Wranitzky, Hoffmeister, to mention a handful among the many eminent symphonists of Haydn's century, all made use of popular music. Their very names illustrate the countenance of the old Austrian empire with its Germans, Bohemians, Hungarians, Slovaks, Croats and Poles all milling around in the capital, borrowing and giving each other tunes. It was precisely this conglomeration of nationalities and folklore which created that specific Austrian tone we associate with the Viennese School whose purest representative was Haydn.

Another program speaks of the *Pavane* of Gabriel Fauré and gives us a detailed description of the *sarabande*. Here we get a glimpse into the inner mechanism of journalistic musical erudition. When a reporter is called upon to talk about warships he usually consults the established authority, Jane's *Fighting Ships*, he is usually careful about the details and avoids mixing up turrets with galleys. If our musical reporter looks up the wrong dance we may give him the benefit of a doubt and credit him with a pardonable slip. But when he makes

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Palestrina (the uncompromising and outstanding exponent of the musical Counter-Reformation), a pupil of Claude Goudimel (the co-author of the Calvinist Psalter), one suspects the reporter used the edition dealing with wooden frigates.

This much for music preceding the era of the late 19th century. When we look at later compositions we discover an exact parallel. As soon as the critic hears a few dissonant chords he is convinced he is listening to "modern music." If Mr. Stokowski would oblige the guild by transcribing a 13th-century motet he would send them reeling around with polytonality, polyrhythmic and dissonances of the sharpest nature. But there is the new and the seemingly new. The cause of modern music is retarded mainly because a number of composers who have nothing in common with modern music are bodily incorporated into the clan by our critics and writers. Strauss, Mahler, Rimsky, Debussy, Vaughan-Williams, Ravel, Cyril Scott, Malipiero and others are lumped with Schoenberg, Stravinsky, Bartók, Berg, Hindemith, Krenek and many others. All the composers belonging to the former group are called modern or contemporary masters, and if we want to be frank we should admit that most people who consider themselves "modernists" and are fond of what they call modern music have in mind these belated romanticists who live on the last vestiges of the music of the 19th century. The truth is that Occidental music exhausted its natural resources by the turn of the last century. In order to create new melodies and new moods Western romantic music was compelled to fall back on exotic sources. The Spanish dances with their characteristic rhythm and melody opened the way to the long line of models taken from the peripheries of European, African, Indian and other out-of-the-way sources. We have seen the advent of Spanish rhapsodies, boleros, transatlantic sonatas, Indian, Negro, Hungarian, Finnish, Brazilian, Chinese and Arabian suites based, usually, on pseudo-national tunes, jazz studies and many other exotic subjects; and we have witnessed the short-lived popularity of a new type of program symphony, or rather symphonic poem,

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dealing with locomotives and football games. On the other hand old and sometimes forgotten forms reappeared in a "modern" garment; gavottes, minuets, forlanas, fugues, passacaglias, inventions—even the venerable *concerto grosso*—found an echo in the 20th century.

The critic is completely at sea when confronted with this music. He lavishes praise on the scintillating fireworks of Ravel's *Daphnis and Chloe* and on the truly barbaric power and vehemence of Stravinsky's *Sacre*, not realizing that the second work is the antithesis of the first and owes its existence to the strong reaction of the modern composer from the volatile harmonic patches drifting lightly and meaninglessly on the surface of post-romantic and impressionistic compositions. The mistake amounts to taking one of the waiters for a member of the company because he wears a dinner jacket.

This situation has a corollary in the music taught in our schools and universities. The catalogs of the greatest universities and of the smallest junior colleges abound in courses on romantic composers, with an occasional course on their "forerunners." Instructors in the history of music dispose of the older centuries in a few lectures by lumping them together under the curious title, "pre-Bach" music. The lecturers never stop to wonder what their colleagues in the fields of fine arts and literature would have to face in the way of criticism if they drew a similar line and started their respective "surveys," let us say, with Hogarth and Watteau, or Swift and Voltaire, to mention some contemporaries of Bach. We are as yet lamentably unaware that music is not an isolated phenomenon in the history of civilization. Before we have a true musical culture we shall have to realize that music was a vital part of the culture of all ages and was affected by the same intellectual tendencies that animated the other arts and letters of the time.

"In the fast-growing musical activity of our schools and colleges may be seen the one enduring hopeful sign of the future of music" says Eric Clarke in a thoughtful book that makes an accurate diagnosis of the situation. A great deal has

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been accomplished toward endowing music with the catholicity of taste, scholarship and seriousness of purpose characterizing other departments of our academic institutions. Able and untiring men, realizing they must make students familiar with good music before they lead them into the more abstract field of scholarship, have abolished the banjo and mandolin clubs that flourished alongside the classics and poetry clubs. They have reorganized glee clubs to sing musical literature instead of humorous ditties. We have also seen the appearance in our academic institutions of the musical scholar, who treats his field in the same manner in which his colleagues deal with philology, archeology, literature and history. But all these are still rather isolated phenomena, as can be seen from the excellent investigations by Randall Thompson[4] and W. Oliver Strunk[5] and need much encouragement, especially from college administrations. Our academic music teachers are still mostly musicians who have more or less practical experience but lack an academic training and approach. Our music departments are still mostly hybrid conservatories teaching the "appreciation of music" along with instruction in the playing of instruments, singing, and exercises which they call composition. We still have those thorns in the side of every right-minded academic person—the "voice major," the "applied music major" and other more or less ludicrous academic subjects. But we have also many good conservatories and therein lies the solution.

Musicians, composers, instrumentalists and conductors are not made in universities. We should abandon the current method of training musicians by giving them a "C plus" at the end of the academic year and then letting them advance to higher grades of piano-playing or counterpoint. It is preposterous to grade creative ability by academic marks. It is not done in any other field of the modern university. On the other hand gifted musicians are waylaid by dry and unimaginative harmony and counterpoint teachers out of touch usually with

[4] *College Music*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1935.
[5] *State and Resources of Musicology in the U. S.*, American Council of Learned Societies, Washington, 1932.

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living art. A composer, a poet, a painter does not need a degree. He should study with competent masters in free schools of music, and *beaux arts* where his work is not evaluated by credits but by personal guidance unlimited by meticulous curricula setting the number of hours a student may devote to music. While the music school is as important as an academic department—indeed we might say more important—its methods and aims are quite different. A college is a place where scientific methods should be pursued and where they are supposed to prevail. The academic institution has a two-fold task with regard to music: to guide the undergraduate in his acquaintance with music, just as he is guided by teachers in the realm of the fine arts, and to enable the graduate student to carry on research work that will enrich our knowledge of music.

If scholarship takes the place of dilettantism we shall not be compelled to listen to the complacent verbosity of journalists, we shall not have to confiscate from the innocent student such musical dime novels as the writings of Drs. Spaeth and van Loon and the chit-chat of the critics turned writers. We shall be able to aid and further the many undertakings which indicate that the time has come for the American public to revise its stand concerning music. Once more people go to hear chamber music, choral organizations give impressive performances all over the country, and their programs are not restricted to Handel's *Messiah.* The great music schools are turning out a host of excellent players and our whole musical life is less and less dependent on importation. The American composer is still a neglected and even despised entity, considered "second-rate" by the same critics who bow their heads low before the innumerable third-rate Italian, English, German, Rumanian, Polish and Russian composers whose music is liberally aerated by the visiting conductors of their respective nationality. But the day will come when art criticism will be founded on something more than the *Stories of All Operas* and the *Abridged Dictionary of Music and Musicians.*

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In the Workshop

Doctor Alexander Marx

Custodian of Hebrew Treasures in America

A. S. W. ROSENBACH

DOCTOR ALEXANDER MARX is a rare combination of bibliophile and scholar. In his 35 years as librarian at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America in New York City he has created a library of Jewish books and manuscripts that is not only the finest in America but is in certain respects superior to the great Jewish collections in the Bodleian and the British Museum.

When he came to the Seminary in 1903 he was made custodian of some 5,000 books and three manuscripts. He was, at 25, the youngest member of the staff. Today he is 60, and the library of the Seminary numbers 107,000 volumes and 7,000 manuscripts. It contains also a Museum of Jewish Ceremonial Objects of great excellence.

Dr. Marx, like every successful bibliographer, is a detective of ability and strategy. During his first year at the Library it came into possession of a rare Commentary on the Pentateuch, published in Mantua in 1476, and lacking 22 leaves at the beginning and one at the end. Twenty years later, when the collection of Dr. Elkan N. Adler was bought by the Seminary, Dr. Marx discovered the first 22 leaves of the incomplete volume among its treasures; and the next year a casual visit to a downtown New York bookstore brought to light a fragment which he knew to be the final missing page—price $3. Again, Dr. Marx recalls the unheralded visit of a Yemenite book peddler, who dumped his wares out of a grocery bag upon the Librarian's desk. Among the yellowing and thumb-marked fragments was one leaf which the Doctor identified by its handwriting as the final page of a mutilated manuscript which had come into his hands some years before. He managed to conceal his excitement, sorted out a number of other fragments of interest to the Seminary, asked the price in normal business tones, bargained a bit as is the custom when dealing with Eastern collectors and finally acquired the batch at the market price—thereby completing an invaluable manuscript.

Dr. Marx's forbears made and

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dealt in wine in Germany. His father was president of a bank in Königsberg and author of scholarly scientific articles; his mother was a woman of beauty and culture whose poems were published after her death. There were 12 children in the family and today Dr. Marx's brother, Moses, is on the library staff of the Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati. Despite this relationship I should like to wager that the competition for rarities between the two brothers is keen and no quarter asked or given.

Dr. Alexander Marx started to build his own library when he was confirmed in the Synagogue at the age of 13. He knew then that he preferred a life devoted to books to the rabbinate, for which his father intended him. In these 47 years his private library has grown to some 10,000 volumes, one of the largest of its kind. The volumes crowd his home and the Marxes dare not move to larger quarters for fear of disarranging them. The books come first, the family afterwards—as it should be!

As a young man Marx attended the Gymnasium at Königsberg and then the Rabbiner Seminar and the University of Berlin. In five years he knew every book and periodical in the Jewish field at Königsberg, where he received his Ph.D. degree in 1895. At Berlin he became the disciple of Professor Moritz Steinschneider, cataloguer of the Bodleian Collection at Oxford and originator of new methods for describing Hebrew incunabula. Steinschneider was already in his 80's but his influence was a profound one. Dr. Marx today is an authority on Steinschneideriana and possesses one of the few complete collections of the great bibliographer's printed works and collateral material.

Dr. Solomon Schechter was teaching at the University of Cambridge in England when Marx went there to complete his studies. These two had much in common in their love of learning and their enthusiasm for Hebrew literature. Because young Marx had difficulty in finding kosher meals Dr. Schechter invited him frequently to his home in Cambridge, and when the older man was called to New York in 1903 to become President of the Jewish Theological Seminary he asked Marx to join the staff of the Seminary.

In the years since, Dr. Marx's study has become the consulting room for almost every leading writer and student in the Jewish field. Some 300 books founded on the material in the Seminary Library have been written in the last decade. Dr. Marx has stimulated the study of original sources, particularly in the field of the *Responsa* (the questions and answers on law which have accumulated from the pens of the legal authorities throughout the centuries of

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Jewish history). To him have come inquiries about ancient Hebrew manuscripts — parchment, vellum, goat skin and paper— about bookbinding, incunabula, paleography and the myriad specialties in which this accomplished librarian is an authority. He knows Arabic, Aramaic, Hebrew, Latin, Greek, German, Dutch, French, English, Italian, Spanish and Yiddish. He can recall the exact circumstances of the purchase of each item in the library—the author, contents, title page, binding and price. He is using this, his 60th year, which has been set aside as a sabbatical, as a busman's holiday to catalogue the 7,000 manuscripts in the Library.

As might be expected his acquaintance embraces the whole field of Jewish scholarship, past and present. He has known and corresponded with the poet Bialik; the Harvard scholars George Foote Moore and George Sarton; Professors Elbogen, Freimann, and Mittwoch of Germany; Immanuel Löw of Hungary; Doctor da Silva Rosa and Rabbi A. Maarsen of Holland; Professor José Millas of Spain; Julien Weill and Maurice Liber of France; Le Grand Rabbin Eisenbeth of Algeria; Doctor Max Mayerhoff of Cairo; Simha Asaf, Gerard Scholem, President Judah L. Magnes and Rector Hugo Bergmann of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; and innumerable others.

Dr. Marx's literary enthusiasms and his charm have won for him the lasting friendship of many writers and bibliographers, including that pioneer collector, Judge Mayer Sulzberger of Philadelphia, whose private collection formed the nucleus of the Seminary Library. Then came the libraries of Dr. David Cassel of Berlin and S. J. Halberstam of Austria. During Dr. Marx's custodianship the libraries of Professor Moritz Steinschneider, Adolf Oster, Professor Kautzch, Dr. Schechter, Israel Solomons and Hyman G. Enelow have been added. I recall Dr. Marx's delight when I purchased on behalf of the Seminary authorities the splendid collection formed in London over a period of 40 years by that very able scholar and gatherer of Hebrew treasures, Dr. Elkan Adler.

Dr. Marx had in Jacob H. Schiff a true and devoted friend who never disregarded an appeal for the purchase of books for the Library. His son, the late Mortimer M. Schiff, a collector of sure and unerring taste, was also interested in the welfare of the Library and some of the notable additions were secured through his generosity and unfailing support. Nothing can be said about the formation of this Library without mention of Dr. Cyrus Adler than whom no one was better equipped to assist Dr. Marx in his enterprise. There must have been little conspiracies

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and secret conferences between these two great booklovers to bring about the great collections now so happily at the disposition of students and scholars. I am sure of this, for I have myself taken part in these surreptitious meetings and assisted in their harmless intrigues.

Dr. Louis Ginzberg, Professor of Talmud, and Dr. Israel Davidson, that fine medieval scholar, both of the Seminary faculty, have been others among Marx's warm and devoted supporters.

The Library of the Seminary now has manuscripts, incunabula, broadsheets, books, prints, rare fragments like the two pages of the Hebrew original of the Book of Ecclesiasticus, music, talmudic treaties, Inquisition documents and *auto da fé*, Codes, *Responsa*, and personal correspondence and autographs of great historical figures.

Some years ago a newspaper writer came to interview Dr. Marx and was in turn asked: "Why write about me? What value lies in that? Better that you write about the Library. There you have precious treasures. About them one can keep on writing endlessly and never exhaust the subject."

I could write on endlessly about Dr. Marx and not exhaust my material. Respecting his wish I have given but few facts concerning him. I think I must say, however, that in my opinion the most precious treasure in the Seminary Library is Dr. Marx himself!

"E. V." Is Dead

EDITH CHRISTINA JOHNSON

E. V. Lucas is dead. His friends echo the lament of Charles Lamb for Coleridge. For the suddenness of the event, on June 26, makes its finality the more difficult to realize. His last public appearance was, characteristically, at the weekly lunch of the *Punch* editorial staff, just the day before he knew he was to face the ordeal of an operation. In less than two weeks "the largest heart in literary London was still." Three years ago, in his last autobiographical sketch,[1] E. V. wrote: "We ought to go on being well and strong and fit until three score years and ten, and then vanish." It was two weeks after his 70th birthday that he himself "vanished."

On the same day his last piece of writing, "The Wanderer's Notebook," appeared in the *London Sunday Times*. Lucas' love of writing was a life-long passion. It conquered the arduous duties of publisher when, as the head of the London firm of Methuen for 14 years, he remained true to his creative work. As he said, he loved writing and could give precedence to nothing else. In fact his will leaves, subject to various life interests, the residue of his property "one-fourth to the Royal Literary

[1] *The Old Contemporaries.*

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Fund, and three-fourths to the Authors' Pension Fund."

E. V. Lucas' own literary output was colossal—33 pages of the British Museum catalogue are required to list his more than 100 books. If, as some authority remarked recently, genius is excess of energy, E. V. was richly endowed. Much of what he wrote was of the transient nature of daily journalism, but for his contribution in two fields he may lay claim to immortality, if one may be so bold as to risk prophecy: he was a born essayist and a natural scholar.

Of his essays and sketches, a small but substantial quantity—rare and individual in its essence—will remain. He had the keenly observing eye of the essayist, who is essentially the poet of prose. Out of the familiar stuff of everyday experience he picked the matter of his essays, indicating its significance in comment rich in literary content and alive with the pleasure of recognition. He wrote always with a certain felicity, but in his best work there is the final mark of genius in the cunningly turned phrase, the adroit use of familiar words. There is not only the sudden illumination of meaning that captures the reader's attention but the richness of implication that stirs endless associative currents in imagination and memory. His prose, singularly pure in quality, unmarked by mannerisms or tricks of style, carries less risk of being "dated" than the work of many of his more popular contemporaries. Its effects are produced mainly by directness, concentration and understatement.

E. V. could be as unsparingly analytical of an idea or a personality as the most forceful of our modern realists, for he had a certain quality which Mr. Frank Swinnerton calls, in his brief but brilliant tribute,[2] "harsh justice." E. V.'s record of his first impression of the poet Swinburne illustrates this dynamic realism:

> This, my first sight of Swinburne, I am not likely to forget, since various other preconceptions instantly crumbled away. For one thing, though he was as short as I had supposed, his body was by no means the inconsiderable affair that, from many testimonies, one had thought it. On the contrary, it was marked by solidity, and below the waistline was not less ethereal than that of many a trencherman who had never written at all or anything but prose. His face, too, which was highly colored, bore further signs that materialistic interests were not outside his scheme of life. The eyes were fixed and mirthless. Above the eyes, however, all was different and magnificent—a dome, lofty and aloof as one could ask, curiously like Shakespeare's. His hair, a ruddy grey, was thin; his beard, the same color, was fuller than I had expected. But his whole person was informed by prandial intentness. It had neither vivacity nor spiritual suggestion.

Again, E. V. could be finely meditative and philosophical, as well as direct and intense—as in his comment upon the funeral of W. J. Craig, the English Shake-

[2] In the (London) *Observer*, July 3, 1938.

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spearian scholar, whom Lucas memorialized and immortalized in his essay, "The Funeral."

> I found myself meditating . . . how melancholy it was that all that storied brain, with its thousands of exquisite phrases, . . . should have ceased to be. For such a cessation, at any rate, say what one will of immortality, is part of the sting of death, part of the victory of the grave, which St. Paul denied with such magnificent irony.

The words might have been spoken of himself. The firmness and strength of his own prose derived from the scholar in the essayist.

His was a "natural" scholarship, the product of years of concentrated reading: at the British Museum ("my real Alma Mater") while he was still a reporter for the London *Globe* and, for a few short terms, at London University where he came under the influence of its professor of English, W. P. Ker. E. V. sometimes deplored his own lack of a classical education but many a university professor might well have envied him his richly stored mind. His knowledge was encyclopedic in its range and amazingly exact and detailed. Yet he was never pedantic. His was humanized erudition.

When commissioned by Methuen & Co. (in 1900) to edit an edition and write a new biography of Charles Lamb, E. V. in his investigations instinctively employed the scientific methods of a modern research scholar. He visited in person every place in England known to be associated with Lamb's life and history, interviewed those who owned letters or manuscripts of Elia, read all that had been written by and about Lamb and, so far as possible, what Lamb had read. Consequently he had a knowledge and understanding of his subject such as no previous editor of Lamb had possessed. Yet such was his characteristic modesty that even today the full significance of E. V. Lucas as a scholar is far from being recognized.

This work in nine volumes, published over a period of years from 1902 and running into more than one edition, established Lucas' reputation as the preeminent authority on Charles Lamb. It was the first climax of a long literary devotion, originating in his early youth and persisting as the dominant motif in his life. But a second and more dramatic climax came in 1935 when, through the joint efforts of the houses of Dent and Methuen the letters of Charles Lamb, collected and edited by Lucas, were published in three volumes. This triumphant edition, the result of years of effort to overcome the obstacles of copyright ownership and costs of publication, was the consummation of E. V. Lucas' scholarly achievement. In recognition of this work Oxford University conferred upon him the degree of Doctor of Letters in June 1936. Other notable honors had come to him: election

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to the select group—never more than 50—known as Companions of Honor; the degree of Doctor of Laws from St. Andrews University; appointment to the Royal Commission on Historical Monuments. But the Oxford distinction was E. V.'s greatest academic triumph.

The three-volume opus contains 1,022 of Lamb's letters, some 50 or more never before published. As a result of E. V.'s further investigation of manuscripts in England and the United States—which he canvassed from north to south and east to west in a special visit for that purpose early in 1934—the editors' notes from previous editions were carefully revised and corrected. The chronological arrangement of the letters, and the expansion of the notes by the addition of more detailed references to many of the personalities who formed the Elian circle, are in accordance with the editor's aim to make these volumes constitute a new biography of Lamb, definitive and intimate because recorded by Elia himself.

His life-long association with the writings of that earlier essayist earned for Lucas the affectionate titles, "the modern Lamb" and "the reincarnation of Elia." He himself was embarrassed by the comparison, for no one more thoroughly appreciated Lamb's genius. Most similarities between the two writers are merely superficial, but it is interesting to note that each expressed himself by choice through two closely related forms, the essay and the letter. E. V.'s own publishers will soon give the reading public an opportunity to catch that more intimate and complete portrait which his letters afford. Unique in form as well as content, they are concrete evidence of the debt we owe him for having preserved for our generation incomparable examples of "the gentlest art."

Mansfieldiana

MATERIAL on Katherine Mansfield is being sought by Nell Nathan of New York City. Miss Nathan is now in England, care Messrs. Joseph Nathan Co., Ltd., 16 St. Helen's Place, London, E. C. 3, searching for material on the author's life and works in that country, and she would appreciate being notified as to sources and original items both there and in this country. She is interested in unpublished letters, association articles, anecdotes, and English or foreign books and periodicals containing literary appreciations. Miss Nathan is particularly eager to collect articles and comments written about Katherine Mansfield by John Galsworthy, Thomas Hardy, Robert Littell, Walter de La Mare, Barry Pain, H. M. Tomlinson, and H. G. Wells.

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Discussion

MR. HUDNUT DISCOVERS THE PRESENT

To the Editor:

In an article entitled, "Architecture Discovers the Present," in the Winter 1938 AMERICAN SCHOLAR, Joseph Hudnut makes a most acceptable contribution to pure literature. Here are high ideals, a lucid philosophy, an accurate analysis of certain facts of historic development put forward in a prose style and a fluid vocabulary that has fine form and literary distinction. It is a pleasure to read such prose as this and to follow so cogent a line of thought, and on the strength of these printed words one is convinced. With high hopes, then, one turns to see their realization in the visible form of those architectural structures that follow from these premises, for "by their fruits ye shall know them."

Mr. Hudnut is the literary and scholastic exponent of a powerful and almost world-wide movement, but not the only one, for his fellows in actual practice are frequently almost as able with the pen or the typewriter as they are with the T-square and slide-rule. This is a phenomenon of significance: that so many architects today are equally men of letters. Art of all sorts at this present seems to be based on very intensive thought and is, it would appear, more the result of ratiocination than of instinct and of impulse, in which respect it appears to differ from most of the art of the past six thousand years. Whether it is archeological or modernistic, it certainly has a custom-made quality; it is "literary" (to use the phrase once applied to Victorian pictures) and the literature is of a surprisingly high degree of excellence. Whether this is a vital source of esthetic creation is a point possibly debatable.

There is no question but that Mr. Hudnut, Walter Gropius, Frank Lloyd Wright and their comrades are "monstrous clever fellows." They clearly comprehend the nature of the flood tide of modern life that is bearing them along. As Herbert Read says of surrealism, that particular form of art is the just and perfect expression of Communism, Bolshevism, and Anarchy; so it may be said of the work of the Hudnut-Gropius-Wright school that it is an equally exact expression of our scientifico-mechanistic civilization. Of the best of it, that is; not of its chaos, indirection and general futility.

And, I repeat, the philosophy—or rather metaphysic—that is offered in justification of this expression is not only plausible but sound and convincing. Mr. Hudnut's essay is full of fine and high ideas, admirably expressed. Here are one or two culled almost at random:

"Thus there was established at the outset the dual nature of architecture, its roots an organic necessity and a spiritual impulse."

"Form is a process by which men overcome the chaos of the experienced world with a pattern consonant with their inward aspirations. Form is an expression of faith."

"Here will be mirrored for the first time the collective soul of a new and splendid age. Beauty, a spirit inaccessible to thought and skill, will enter unbidden into the heart of structures thus conceived and fashioned."

This is good doctrine and to all of it I say a hearty Amen! But there seems to be a slip somewhere, because a large part of the works produced presumably in accordance with these principles, at least by the most admired members of the school, seem faddish, inept and ugly. They appear to me, and I believe to many others, time-serving, narrow-minded and without artistic impulse or spiritual content. Let me try to say why, to my way of thinking, they fall so far short of their avowed object and are indeed no true expression of the high principles Mr. Hudnut so admirably puts into words.

In the first place "modernistic" or "functional" architecture has become obsessed by function to the exclusion of the suggestion of content. This consciousness of function is a good way to start, and it certainly is necessary at this time, but it does not go very far. If it stops there it is abortive. Significant form is good but it must lead on to significant meaning. Left by itself it is only another manifestation of current materialism.

In the second place there is a very perilous

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tendency to accept gadgets as vital elements. Ribbon fenestration, angle windows, cantilevers, unsupported projections, "Maya set-backs" and all the argot and jargon of current practice are no essential part of the esoteric doctrine of the protagonists of a new architecture, though they act as though they were. They are as faddish and fleeting as the peculiar details of *art nouveau* or the fashion styles of post-war femininity, or any other of the light-headed aberrations of a jumpy society. They are actual deterrents to the development of a rational style. Yet it is a case of "love me, love my dog." If we accept, as we are glad to do, Mr. Hudnut's evangel, we must accept the whole bag of tricks that goes with it, and this some of us refuse to do.

In the third place they have become completely bedeviled by structural steel, ferro-concrete, glass as a building material, chromium steel, and all the other ingenious devices of engineers, scientists and technicians. They are like children with a new present of "Mechano" and other mechanical toys. For the moment they can see no other adequate form of amusement. Now all these (or most of them) are valuable adjuncts to the art of building, but it seems to me pretty narrow-minded, ophthalmic and obtuse to hold that since these new elements came into play there should be no further use for stone, brick, marble and wood.

This "error of mortal mind" links itself with a cognate illusion, and that is that, since what we may call the "Mechano" style is admittedly appropriate and adequate to express the ethos and perform the functions of *modern* civilization, now, strictly speaking, little more than a century old, it must be used for social factors that have an ancestry running back for five or six thousand years—churches, colleges, dwellings, for example. Usually, to justify this contention, the plea is offered that, since always in the past there was one style of architecture for each period, therefore we ought to do likewise. This is "the appeal to history" which a high ecclesiastic once said was "heresy"; in any case it comes curiously from those who vociferously cut themselves off from history, deliberately severing the cord of tradition, precedent and cultural sequence. In any case I do not think the analogy holds because hitherto society has always had a certain unity in its basic factors. Religion, sociology, education and philosophy; labor, trade, politics and domestic life were pretty much all of a piece in spite of superficial bickerings; at least they were until some time in the fifteenth century. Now there is an almost complete severance of all rational ties of sympathy, though I will now concede a point against my own contentions, and that is that progressively politics, sociology, art, philosophy, religion and domestic life are rapidly taking their colour from mechano-materialistic civilization, and the severance of a few generations ago is becoming less obvious.

The point I am trying to make is that, in spite of this current trend, it is the particular business of architecture (and ought to be of the other arts as well) to counteract such an unwholesome tendency by proclaiming the integrity of the continuous idea—by refusing to make a human dwelling "a machine for living," a school like an automobile factory, and a church like a movie-house. If this centripetal and particularistic civilization ever again achieves a real, not a specious unity, the unified architectural style will come of its own accord—and something tells me it will not bear a very close resemblance to the "international" style now (I like to think) riding for a fall.

In the end it seems to come down to this: that Mr. Hudnut and his peers put a valuation on modernity that it does not deserve. He and they seem to think there is something noble, sacred and highly promising in it. I think otherwise, and hold that a survey of the general and specific condition of the world since the end of the late war justifies this conviction. The sort of architecture that is produced by the camp-followers of Mr. Hudnut's high leading, and that of Mr. Gropius and Mr. Wright, is quite all right as a technique for putting into visible form the acts and the ideology of this particular manifestation of man's propensity for going astray, even when it is ugly—and perhaps more perfectly when it is ugly—but for the real things that matter, and always have since the first Egyptian dynasty, it seems singularly inopportune and misleading.

While in general, as I have said, I am very fully in sympathy with Mr. Hudnut's thesis, there is one point on which I must dissent from his conclusions, and that is in the matter of the Lincoln Memorial. He condemns it flatly and with much reiteration, as in a style which represents something that has long since gone from the world, cannot and should not be revived. If not this, I wonder what he would have had? Lincoln "belongs to the ages" and so does Classical architecture. It is not the product of an ephemeral fashion any more than the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, the drama of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides, and the sculpture of Phidias and Praxiteles. It is one of the eternal verities and it looks the part.

Suppose that this memorial had been built at some time in the recent past when some slight

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and passing fashion was in vogue? What if it had been Victorian Gothic like the Connecticut State Capitol, Romanesque like the old Washington Post Office, or *art nouveau*, or in the Mission style, or as coldly cubic as the Lenin tomb in Moscow? What then? My considered opinion is that had any one of these horrid things happened, by this time it would have achieved the fate justly impending over the Romanesque Post Office. Eternal verities do not submit themselves to clever experimentation.

RALPH ADAMS CRAM,
Boston, Mass.

DR. RHINE FENDS——

To the Editor:

The question regarding ESP which Mr. Manuel Gelles raised in his letter published in the Summer AMERICAN SCHOLAR is one which has been in the minds of the investigators of ESP since the first publication under that title. Mr. Gelles was concerned over possible *a posteriori* selection of favorable results or series of results.

The best answer to this question, as Mr. Gelles would no doubt recognize, would consist in the publication of all results of all experiments conducted. This was possible after the first three years of ESP investigation at Duke University; and the monograph, *Extra-Sensory Perception*, which I published in 1934, represented the totals of all scores, favorable and unfavorable. Since that time the great expansion of the research has not permitted as yet the publication of all results obtained, but this procedure will be carried out in the fullness of time.

In the meantime the principle of reporting which is followed consists of inclusion of all results, favorable or unfavorable, obtained under the general conditions described. For example, in a report of experiments in which distance separated the cards from the subject, all results for that condition would be included. All others would be ignored. Or again, in a report in which the cards were called with a view to predicting the order obtaining after a given amount of shuffling, all the tests made under the specific conditions described would be included in a report on that set of conditions.

I think it would be clear to Mr. Gelles, if he made a study of the actual reports such as those appearing currently in the *Journal of Parapsychology*, that the important principle to which he refers is not being violated.

J. B. RHINE,
Professor of Psychology, Duke University

——A THRUST

To the Editor:

After reading the copy that you sent to me of Dr. J. B. Rhine's letter to you, I have come to the conclusion that I did not make myself very clear. However, I examined the publications mentioned in his letter and find in them an even stronger basis for the criticisms I made in my earlier letter. The detailed reports of the experiments of Dr. Rhine and some of his assistants, in addition to committing some serious statistical errors, leave a doubt that the actual conduct of the ESP tests is at all scientific and unbiased and therefore subject to any type of statistical analysis.

I should like to make more explicit the general criticism contained in my previous letter by referring to an "empirical control test" which is described in the summer issue of the *Journal of Parapsychology*. In this test Dr. J. A. Greenwood of the Mathematical Department at Duke University used 500,000 trials of ESP cards to discover exactly what mathematical law was followed if the question of matching cards were left to chance alone. The results were in very close agreement with mathematical theory and were taken by the author to confirm very closely the previously estimated *a priori* chances of success in the ESP tests. However, the analysis which was described in my previous letter and which is necessary for a mathematical estimate of the ESP "chances" was not made either here or in any "empirical control series" described in the recent articles in THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR or in the publications referred to in Dr. Rhine's letter. Dr. Greenwood's series of 500,000 cards should have been divided into, let us say, 1,000 consecutive sets of 500 cards each. Each group of 500 cards would then correspond to 20 ESP runs of 25 cards each. If the average of the "successes" per 25 cards runs is taken for each set (of 20 runs), some sets would show averages higher than 5, some very close to 5 and the remainder would show averages somewhat less than 5. To illustrate the object of such a division let us individualize these sets by calling them A, B, C etc. for the first 26 sets and then AA, AB, AC etc. for the next 26 sets and so on so that each set is designated by some unique letter or combination of letters. Consider then that each set corresponds to an individual who has been tested for ESP. We would discover then that some set, say AP, has an average well over 5. We would not conclude, therefore, that the mechanical set of cards AP were any different from the mechanical set of cards AR which showed an average of less than 5, since

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we realize that they both form part of one large experiment. Now in choosing individuals or groups of individuals with high scores for ESP, Dr. Rhine and his assistants are constantly committing this type of *a posteriori* reasoning. There were and are many ESP tests being conducted throughout the country. There is no indication that more than a fraction of these are reported. The tests which are successful either in showing a high average or, under what observers assume are unfavorable conditions, a low average, are reported. The many others which, together with reported experiments, make up the whole mass of data presumably following the chance series, are apparently not reported.

A concomitant statistical fallacy which greatly exaggerates the erroneous conclusions drawn from the type of treatment described above is that of not stating in advance how many trials will be made. It is possible, therefore, to continue the trials until the average desired is obtained. If an individual who has scored well at the beginning does not do as well later on it is assumed that there is a "falling off" or "decline in ability." The successful subjects dealt with in the volume *Extra-Sensory Perception* number only eight, and three-quarters of the tests described were conducted with these eight, of which almost one-half of the total calls made and described in the book were with three individuals only. The book itself thus deals with the results of a small group taken from a large number and observed only so long as they are successful. The number of trials varies widely with each experiment, averages are taken during the experiments and discussed with the subjects and the number of trials is, apparently, never stated in advance.

These criticisms apply to the work done by other ESP investigators as well as to Dr. Rhine's work. As a matter of fact, in the "Suggestions to Experimenters" (pages 166-168 of *Extra-Sensory Perception*) the following rather (statistically) startling suggestion appears. "10. Short runs are desirable, say 5 at a time, with a check-up after each 5. Then it is best to go casually and quietly on without too much discussion of results." On page 61 of the same book, in describing a very "successful" experiment conducted in an automobile in which only he and the subject were present, Dr. Rhine states that he called "right" or "wrong" after each card called by the subject. This improves the chances of success, since a subject knowing his score during the calling of a run of 25 cards has a clue to what cards may come up. In a paper appearing in the summer issue of the *Journal of Parapsychology* two experimenters, J. G. Pratt and M. M. Price, examined two groups of school children. There were four separate tests conducted, the number of calls in the tests being, respectively, 29,325, 53,975, 15,625, and 3,650. This is typical of the wide variation in the number of trials which appears for various tests in an ESP experiment. The ESP experimenter might answer to this that he terminates the set of runs if the subject becomes tired or inattentive or for some other reason apparent to the experimenter, but obviously if the experimenter knows the average at every point and also knows what he is trying to prove it is difficult to see how he can maintain an unbiased attitude. In the description of this experiment the experimenters state, in describing the test with some particular children, that in the case of one child they used seven runs (175 cards) and in the case of another ten runs (250 cards). Thus the number of runs varied even with individuals, scores being reported after each run.

Of course any such experimental method makes it impossible to apply statistical criteria to the results. Perhaps a simple analogy will show the fallacy of the method used. Suppose someone were to offer to make a series of wagers with you on successive tosses of a coin on the following terms. If the coin falls tails he owes you $1 and if it falls heads you owe him $1, settlement to be made whenever *he chooses to terminate* the series of throws. Obviously you would be very foolish to accept any such wager since your opponent could terminate the throws at a point when the balance was in his own favor. By terminating the experiment at will, even possibly for some reason which is justified in the mind of the experimenter, the average desired may be obtained. Stopping at the "right" time is a statistical fallacy made use of in obtaining ESP results.

Another fallacy, which appears throughout the ESP investigations, is a type of *a posteriori* reasoning apparently not recognized by Dr. Rhine as such but made use of in explaining a falling off or, if necessary, a sudden improvement in results. For instance, on page 77 of *Extra-Sensory Perception*: "Another factor that upsets Pearce's scoring, as a rule, is any change that he does not easily and spontaneously accept as likely to work. A few changes he has taken without a considerable drop, those apparently in which he has taken part in the planning and in which he felt sure of success." From page 158: "The decline of Linzmayer began in June, 1931, with my urging him to work against his obvious wish to leave. He ran below chance then, as I had expected and hoped he would do. This was, however, a great strain for him, and perhaps the ruthlessness of the method permanently injured his capacity for ESP

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by inducing strained or unwholesome memories and attitudes." From page 112: "Moreover, the early results, obtained when we were all less experienced, were among the very poorest. With improvement in technique and judgment, the results have risen in value." This last statement is surprising in view of one of the "Suggestions to Experimenters," page 167. "2. The preliminary tests should be entered into very informally, without much serious discussion as to techniques, or explanations or precautions. The more ado over techniques, the more inhibition is likely; and the more there is of explanation, the more likely is introspection to interfere." This group of suggestions, on pages 166-168, is itself a strong criticism of the scientific standards of ESP tests.

There is undoubtedly a very strong feeling in the minds of Dr. Rhine and his fellow investigators that there should exist the casual relations often mentioned in their works and of which the above quotations give examples. It is the duty of a sound statistical method, properly used, to translate this feeling by means of the strictest standards into evidence that may be accepted by others not possessed of this intuitional feeling. If Dr. Rhine wants to establish a correlation between the mental or physical state of an individual and his results on the ESP trials, he should carefully state *before the trials* and in the presence of unbiased observers what he believes the state of the individual to be and the number of trials to be made—which in every case should be a fairly large number, at least 1000 (40 runs of 25 cards each, which would give only 40 scores). The experiment should be conducted in the presence of skeptical observers. Before any conclusions are drawn such experiments would have to be repeated again and again under similar critical conditions, and all the experiments to be given stated in advance and a complete schedule of results obtained. No averages in any case should be taken, and certainly they should not be discussed with the subject until the particular experiment has been completed. This is the minimum scientific standard that should be set for ESP observations.

Dr. Rhine might object that the conditions, especially with respect to the presence of critical observers, are too onerous. On page 75 of *Extra-Sensory Perception* he states "We had noticed earlier that when someone dropped in to watch Pearce work the scores at once dropped down," in connection with "the inhibitory effect of visitors upon the clairvoyant function." In that case perhaps some arrangement could be made whereby observers would be hidden from the view of the subject. However, that is all the problem of the investigator if he wants to claim for his experiments the type of scientific accuracy and lack of bias which justify the standards of statistical criteria. If Dr. Rhine feels this is impossible for his experiments then the question of the presence of ESP, so far as he is concerned, should properly remain in the realm of intuition and not claim for itself statistical proof.

MANUEL GELLES, *New York, N. Y.*

More's Broadsword a Pen

To the Editor:

One reason for the bitterness of the controversy about humanism is the fact that Paul More, who was fundamentally as honest and sincere a man as I ever knew, used his pen as a broadsword. On the personal side he was one of the finest people in the world and to talk to him in little groups where we were all friendly, even though we disagreed, was a most profitable and gratifying way of spending an evening. In the give and take of such meetings it was possible to check with a humorous remark a tendency on the part of anyone to crusade or pontificate or run away with the ball, and it was possible to discuss many of the points in controversy between More and his opponents. Some of these meetings I remember with very deep satisfaction; and I feel if there could have been more of them and more people could have known More in his habit as he lived, much would have been gained. No one that I knew ever left such a meeting with the slightest doubt of the depth of More's convictions or of his fundamental sincerity and integrity.

More was to my mind a far abler critic than Brunetière but both harmed themselves by always writing what Brunetière called in one of his volumes "*discours de combat.*" This merely sharpens points of disagreement by arousing emotional sensibilities involved in pride of intellect and vitiates the atmosphere in which fruitful discussion might take place. I very much wish, in the interest of having More and his cause represented aright, that this aura of controversy could have been dispelled.

CHRISTIAN GAUSS,
Dean, Princeton University

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About Our Authors

Double quotation marks usually indicate passages taken directly from autobiographical letters requested from the authors themselves.

A. J. MUSTE is Director of the Presbyterian Labor Temple, New York. His dual interests have developed from a passion to build a better social order "on the dynamic of religion." On the one hand he is convinced that violence (whether in international war or in class struggle) is self-defeating; and on the other he has taken an active part in the labor movement. Twenty years ago he resigned from the pastorship of a Congregational church in Massachusetts because he refused to abandon, or keep silence about, his religious pacifist convictions. Today he is a member of the New York Committee of the Keep America out of War Congress. From 1921 to 1933 he was director of Brookwood Labor College, and at various times during and since that period he has shared in the leadership of important strikes and in campaigns to organize workers, particularly in basic industries. The development of Mr. Muste's position may be followed in his contributions to various periodicals—*The New Republic*, *Nation*, THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR ("Fight the Good Fight?" Summer, 1937)—and the chapters he has written for such volumes as *Labor Speaks for Itself on Religion*, *Pacifism Today* and *American Labor Dynamics*.

STEPHEN C. PEPPER, who has been at the University of California, Berkeley, since 1919, has worked his way up through the academic grades until this year he will have an opportunity, as chairman of the art department, to put into practice what he ably preaches and profoundly believes. Just after his recent appointment to his new rank (and after he had written "The Arts Without Artists") he felt even kindly towards archeologists and *Kunsthistorichers*. He does not plan now to drive them out of his department after all, but will make a separate stall for them. . . . Much of his childhood was spent abroad. "Many images and standards remain from those years. No mountains have ever seemed adequate since." . . . With one minor deviation ("a short sojourn in the army in 1918") he has stuck fairly closely to his special interests, esthetics and metaphysics. In 1923 he collaborated with Carl Cutler on a book, *Modern Color* ("substance his, exposition mine"), and has recently completed a volume, *Aesthetic Quality*.

WILLIAM CREIGHTON GRAHAM, professor of Old Testament language and literature at the University of Chicago for ten years, has accepted a call to become Principal of The United College, an affiliate of the University of Manitoba and Winnipeg. "It is hard in a way to leave Chicago which is such a stimulating place. But some of us Canadians ought after all to go back home and share some of the good things we have got from our generous American cousins." Mr. Graham has also things to share with Chicago, however. Some he shared with McGill University, in 1920-26, as lecturer in Aramaic and Syriac; some with the American School of Oriental Research in Jerusalem as Annual Professor, 1936-37. . . . "During my preparatory years I had experience in the following occupations: farm hand, clerk in the office of an express company, salesman in a fashionable jewelry store, elevator starter, spool factory hand. I also worked as timekeeper on a railroad construction job in the wilds of Northern Ontario. Finally I had two years' experience as a probationer for the ministry in rural parishes. . . . THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR rendered a genuine service in publishing Professor Albright's article and thus raising a question which ramifies into many aspects of the life of our times. My only hope is that I can say something that will stimulate other ways of looking at the whole problem. In discussing the issues involved I speak for no 'school'—only for myself."

HUMBERT WOLFE, principal assistant secretary to the British Minister of Labour, has written a number of books of prose (essays and literary criticism) as well as of verse. His volumes of poetry (*Uncelestial City*, *London Sonnets* and his many others) are an extraordinary combination of lyricism and satire and from time to time show the "careless omnipotence" he ascribed (*News of the Devil*) to the genus, young boy.

During the winter 1937-38 JOHN T. FLYNN made a careful study of the Radio Division of the Federal Communications Commission. He has an innately strong ability to smell a rat, a proclivity reinforced by his long training and experience as a newspaper man and journalist. From 1920 to 1923 he was managing editor of the *New York Globe*; in 1934-35 he served as adviser to the United States Senate Committee investigating munitions; and for the past seven years he has written a weekly column for *The New Republic* in addition to numerous articles published in other magazines. His four books—*Investment Trusts Gone Wrong*, *Graft in Business*, *God's Gold* (the story of Rockefeller and his times) and *Security Speculation—Its Economic Effects*—present mate-

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rial of direct importance to investing and consuming America.

FOLKE LEANDER reports: "My pet aversion is National Socialism. Of more general interest may be some impressions of American academic life growing out of my recent ten-month stay in America. The students of the Graduate College in Princeton, among whom I spent most of the time, were a remarkably agreeable and vital group, though they suffered from the inferiority complex which academic people in America have about their profession and though they talked constantly about themselves. Young American students are much more boyish than we are, not at all in the sense of intellectual immaturity but in the sense that their behavior and outer appearance is more reminiscent of happy childhood than is true of students elsewhere. The Swedish undergraduate, for instance, is a very dignified personage. I also noticed a keen instinct for essentials which happily made up for a sometimes rather extensive ignorance; and above all a healthy instinct for distinguishing between fake and the genuine thing—which I often wish we had more of. I also had occasion to admire the quality of the courses given, the high level of the discussions and the extraordinary teaching ability the professors had acquired through long practice. Striking too was the general spirit of gaiety which seemed to characterize the American campus. At times one had a feeling that this was something of a Shangri-la—a happy place, cut off from direct influence upon the literary and political life of the nation." . . . This astute Swede is only 28, by the way.

WILLIAM G. LENNOX, M.D., writes: "I notice that you carry obituary-like notices at the end of each issue. The essential items for mine are very simple. Formerly the writer was a missionary of the Methodist Church and a staff member of the Union Medical College at Peking, China (1916-20) and since then has been a medical research worker in epilepsy and migraine. He is now assistant professor of neurology at the Harvard Medical School and president of the International League Against Epilepsy. . . . What business has a narrow specialist and laboratory worker to talk about budgets and economy? Not much, but I am a director of a Texas cattle company and of a Colorado bank."

JOHN S. KENYON is in a strategic position to wage his campaign against the corruption of our mother tongue, for he is professor of English (at Hiram College) and member of several linguistic societies. Moreover as a member of their staffs, he has heard the faculty and student body of half a dozen colleges and universities edit the English language. He was also a member of the committee of the American Council of Learned Societies created to plan a linguistic atlas of the United States and Canada. . . . Quite in keeping with his dominant interest, his pet aversion is "pseudo-dialect writing, especially the cheap trick of representing standard spoken English in distorted but phonetically correct spelling; as *razed* for *raised*, or *would of gone* for *would have gone*, pronounced exactly alike in cultivated speech."

PAUL HENRY LANG, associate professor of musicology at Columbia, gave up a career as composer and operatic conductor to battle for the academic study of music. Years in the conservatory and the orchestra pit were followed by many others spent at Heidelberg, Paris and Cornell in the study of musicology, comparative philology, literature and history. "My greatest interest is in cultural history and my immediate aim is to contribute to a buttressing of those scholars who want to raise the teaching of music in the university to the status of an academic discipline. I find we can recruit a student body in musicology as capable if not more so than their colleagues in Europe. Our real difficulty is one of convincing administrations that music is not merely a matter of finger dexterity." Mr. Láng has spent the past summer writing *Music in Western Civilization*, a cultural history of music that attempts to place music where it belongs in the current of intellectual history. The book, he admits, is reaching appalling proportions.

ABRAHAM S. WOLF ROSENBACH, author, scholar and eminent bibliophile, is himself the owner of a large and rare collection of books and manuscripts. He is secretary of the Rosenbach Company (dealers in rare books and manuscripts), president of the American Jewish Historical Society and member of the Board of Graduate Education and Research, University of Pennsylvania.

For the past ten years EDITH C. JOHNSON, professor of English, Wellesley, had known and corresponded with E. V. L. as her friend and publisher. (Methuen and Co. brought out her *Lamb Always Elia* in 1935.) She is therefore in a fortunate position to appreciate and appraise him.

HENRY S. DRINKER, JR., author of "Music Gets the Run-Around," has asked the editors to state that his manuscript was submitted under the title "Music as a Cultural Study." He was not consulted in the matter of the substitute title and believes his own more accurately described the temper and subject-matter of his article.

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